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ABSTRACT
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (MNCS) IN FOREIGN MARKETS? A CASE STUDY OF CHINESE AND
AMERICAN MNCS
Shiwei Jiang
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. David C. Earnest

Scholars have identified multinational corporations (MNCs) as increasingly
important and influential actors in international politics. However, mainstream
international studies scholarship has failed to explain why MNCs succeed or fail in
entering foreign markets. Market entry is a particularly vexing question for U.S. and
Chinese firms seeking to compete for each other's consumers. As this study shows,
surprising differences in success among U.S. firms in China, as well as Chinese firms
in the U.S., suggest that statist and market factors interact with corporate strategies
in confounding ways. Through case studies in the internet, automobile and fast food
industries, this dissertation builds a theoretical framework that better explains why
some MNCs succeed in foreign markets while others fail. Empirical studies show
that two contrasting cultures (universalism vs. particularism, individualism vs.
collectivism, and rule-based vs. relation-based governance) make it more difficult
for Chinese MNCs and American MNCs to adapt to their counterpart's market.
Although the study finds some support for the cultural dissimilarity argument, it
finds that culture alone is an insufficient explanation. The results suggest that statist
and market factors like ownership, sector industry, interest groups, entry mode and
choice of location are also determinants of a MNC's success in a foreign market.
Based on those findings, the study provides suggestions for both Chinese MNCs and

American MNCs seeking to compete in each other's markets.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The Research Question: Why Do Some Succeed While Others Fail?

What factors determine MNCs' failure or success in a foreign market? The
Sino-U.S. relationship is described by leaders and academics as the most dynamic
and important bilateral relationship in the 21st century.1Actually, it is very
challenging to define the Sino-US relations as they are neither friends nor enemies.
The politicians of both countries came together to coin an interesting term,
"stakeholder."2 China and the U.S. are not political and military allies, but they are
close business partners. We know that business conflicts can cause political
conflicts; in return, political conflicts will damage mutual benefits. The trade deficit,
China's purchase of American companies, American companies' failure in China,
fights over oil, and RMB exchange rate are some major conflicts that further deepen
distrust between China and the U.S.
This dissertation is an examination of Chinese Multinational Corporations
(MNCs) and American MNCs and their interaction with domestic and international
politics, and how MNCs' failed or succeeded in foreign markets due to multiple
factors.

1 In summary, there are tw o opposing views toward China's rise in the U.S. One is "engage with China but
not contain it", which is embraced by Bill Clinton and some American scholars like Robert Keohane and
David Lampton. The other is "China threat theory" supported by John Mearsheimer and some hawks in
the U.S. Congress or military.
2 Zhao, Suisheng, China -U.S. Relations Transformed: Perspectives and Strategic Interactions (New York:
Routledge, 2007).

News media often attribute the failures of Chinese MNCs or American MNCs
in their counterpart’s markets to the distrustful and competing China-U.S.
relationships. However, bilateral relationships are not enough to explain MNCs'
performances in a foreign market. Some American MNCs have failed while some
succeeded in China, so did the Chinese MNCs in the U.S.
In general, the factors that affect MNCs' success can be categorized into two
kinds: internal and external. Internal factors are "within the company."3 These
internal factors are often discussed in classes of business administration, finance
and management. Internal factors will be briefly examined in the dissertation when
I discuss company cases in later chapters, but they are not the major part of my
analysis. For instance, when I discuss state-owned Chinese companies, I may probe
their leadership structures to show the interaction between government and
business. But I will not go deep into some questions regarding internal factors, like
what is Facebook’s hiring process and average salary?
The major difference between American multinational companies and their
Chinese counterparts is who they serve and what goals they pursue. The different
political economy structures between China and the U.S. determine this major
difference. Private American MNCs serve themselves and they pursue maximum
profit, because their survival relies on their business performance. By contrast,
state-owned Chinese enterprises may submit themselves to the Chinese government
and do not necessarily pursue maximum profits. Their survival is not merely
dependent on their revenues and market share, but also on the political support and
3 A company's management, average salary, accounting, strategic plan, risk investment, human resource,
hiring process, etc.
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policy preferences from local and state governments. With China's opening-up
reform in 1978, many American MNCs entered China in the 1980s like KFC. By
contrast, Chinese MNCs are quite new to the U.S. market. Most Chinese MNCs
entered the U.S. after 2000. Therefore, American MNCs are generally more
experienced in tackling the challenges of overseas markets than Chinese MNCs. This
dissertation does not seek to compare American MNCs with Chinese MNCs.
International business scholars usually pay much attention to internal factors
such as cost control, organizational structure design, management of subsidiaries,
and corporate strategies, whereas they neglect those factors that outside the
company, which are called external factors. For Chinese and American MNCs, their
failures or successes in the counterpart's market cannot only be simply explained by
internal factors. Based on a strong body of literature showing that multifaceted
external factors can affect MNCs' overseas performance, this study focuses specific
attention on three major external factors that influence an MNC's success or failure
in a foreign market. They are culture, statism, and market entry. They serve as
independent variables (IVs), while the dependent variable (DVs) is MNCs' failure or
success in a foreign market.
How do IVs relate to the DVs? First, I argue that MNCs are more likely to fail in
the host country with a contrasting culture compared to the home country. The
cultural approach is adopted to show that China and the U.S. are indeed two
contrasting cultures in three primary dimensions: universalism vs. particularism,
individualism vs. collectivism, and rule-based vs. relation-based cultures. Second,
states’ interventions or support can greatly affect MNCs’ overseas business practices
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and performance. Those interventions or support are frequently seen in three areas:
sectoral politics, ownership and interest group. Sectoral politics exist in both China
and the U.S. In China, local officials favor foreign investments in capital-intensive or
labor-intensive sectors based on their personal interests and concerns for social
stability. In contrast, foreign investments in the internet sector are heavily regulated
and discouraged. In the U.S., government agencies and U.S. media are cautious about
foreign purchases of American firms in sensitive sectors. The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has blocked some deals by Chinese
investors in recent years. I find that the murky ownership of Chinese MNCs is a
major concern for American investigators, while the complicated nature of
American interest group politics is a major concern for Chinese investors. Third,
different entry modes pose different risks. Usually, joint ventures and international
franchising imply less control but lower risk than wholly-owned subsidiaries. A firm
wholly owned by foreign MNCs through acquisitions may make the host country feel
uncomfortable, particularly in sensitive or key industrial sectors. In addition to
entry modes, location choice is an important component of market entry. When
foreign MNCs invested in China in their early years, they usually chose big cities and
were more likely to succeed. In this power-centralized country, big cities imply
more relational assets which are called "Guanxi" in China.
Admittedly, those cultural dissimilarities between the U.S. and China play an
important role for Chinese MNCs and American MNCs seeking to compete in each
other's markets. However, cultural differences between the U.S. and China are fairly
constant. Moreover, this dissertation is not a cross-cultural case study (e.g. eBay in

China versus eBay in Europe). Therefore, the cultural variable does not vary. This
dissertation will highlight statist interventions and market entry while controlling
cultural factors.
Before delving into literature review and hypotheses, it is necessary to explain
what do MNCs and their successes/failures mean.

Define MNCs and Their Successes or Failures

A. What Are MNCs?
What does "MNC" mean and how to define their success/failure in this study?
Some historical studies show that the Dutch East India Company (founded in 1602)
is the world's first MNC.4 Compared to the Dutch East India Company, today's MNCs
have changed a lot, but some of their characteristics have not. Behind giant MNCs,
we often see the shadow of states' power and hunger for profits.
Multinational Companies or corporations (MNCs), multinational enterprises
(MNEs), international corporations and transnational corporations (TNCs) are the
terms scholars often use interchangeably. Although their distinctions are very
ambiguous, some scholars treat MNCs and TNCs separately (Tablel.l).

4 Daniel Gerstell, "Administrative Adaptability: The Dutch East India Company and Its Rise to Power,"
accessed on M ay 12,2014,
http://history.emory.edu/home/assets/documents/endeavors/volume3/DanielGerstell.pdf
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Table 1.1
Comparisons between MNCs and TNCs
Multinational Corporation

Transnational Corporation

1. Has national identity

No principal domicile

2. Control is centralized in the national
headquarters
3. Monolithic organization

Control is dispersed

4. Head of foreign subsidiary reports
to the head of the international
division
5. Limited integration between foreign
subsidiaries

Global operating units report directly
to chief executive or executive
committee
More integration between global
operating units

6. Ownership is concentrated in home
country

Ownership is internationally
dispersed

7. Business plans are for national
markets

w orld as a single m arket

8. Differentiates between domestic
market and foreign market

The whole world is viewed as a single
market

Confederation

Global planning considering the whole

Source: Encyclopedia o f Economic Development edited by P.K. Jalan.

In this dissertation, 1prefer to use MNCs rather than TNCs, because an MNC
has national identity while TNC does not necessarily have a principal domicile.
There is no universally accepted definition of MNCs. According to the International
Dictionary o f Finance, an MNC is defined as "a company having production and other
facilities in a number of countries outside the nation of origin. Also, and more
correctly, called multinational enterprise (MNE), or transnational corporation.
According to the United Nations (UN) there are about 35,000 multinationals
controlling some 170,000 affiliates, though the largest 100 account for 40 percent of
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cross-border assets."5 Kogut further argues that the economic definition
emphasizes the ability of owners and their managerial agents in one country to
control the operations in foreign countries. It is recognized widely that capital flow
is not the distinguishing characteristic of a multinational corporation. Capital can
flow from one country to another in expectation of higher rates of return. However,
this flow may be invested in the form of bonds, or in equity amounts too
insignificant to grant control to foreign owners. In this case, this type of investment
is treated as a portfolio investment. The central aspect of direct investment is the
ownership claim by a party located in one country on the operations of a foreign
firm or subsidiary in another. The multinational corporation is, thus, the product of
foreign direct investment that is defined as the effective control of operations in a
country by foreign owners.6

B. Corporate Success/Failure
What is corporate success or failure? In 1964, Warren Bennis and Philip Slater
proposed at least three traits that would define corporate success in the future: 1.
High-level employee satisfaction, 2. Strong conflict management competence, and 3.
Wide acceptance by consumers. Similarly, in the Foundations o f Corporate Success,
John Kay defines corporate success as good relationships with its suppliers,
customers, or employees and successful localization of products and leaderships.7

5 Graham Bannock and William Manser, International Dictionary o f Finance (New York: Wiley, 2003).
6 B. Kogut in N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes, International Encyclopedia o f the Social and Behavioral Sciences
(Oxford: Pergamon, 2001).
7 John Kay, Foundations o f Corporate Success: How Business Strategies Add Value (Oxford University Press,
1993).
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In this study, there are three specific ways to define the abstract concept of
corporate success or failure.
First, does this MNC establish a foothold in that foreign market? If an MNC
continues to lose bids or acquisitions and lacks strong business presence in a
foreign market (let along market penetration), it is an obvious failure for that MNC
in that market. For example, compared to Samsung, China's Huawei lost several bids
and failed to establish a strong presence in the U.S. market. Likewise, both Facebook
and Twitter are absent in China. In this scenario, those MNCs had the worst level of
corporate failures in that foreign market.
Second, does the MNC's presence in that foreign market endure? In other
words, does this MNC penetrate the market and win acceptance by both consumers
and the host government? An MNC might easily establish its presence in a foreign
market. However, it might exit that market quickly for various reasons (e.g. fierce
market competition, cultural differences and political intervention). For example,
unlike Facebook and Twitter, eBay and Google survived the Chinese market for
several years (eBay: 2002-2006, Google: 2006 - 2010). Although they finally exited
the Chinese market, they did make some profits and learned some lessons from
their mistakes in China. These MNCs experienced a lower level of corporate failures
than those in the first scenario. However, their exits are still considered as a
corporate failure, because they did not fully penetrate that foreign market in which
similar products and current strong competitors already exist (e.g. eBay vs. Taobao,
or Google vs. Baidu).

9

In the third scenario, corporate success or failure is a context-specific and
relative term. Why is this? Two different MNCs may both establish a strong
presence in a foreign market. Both are welcomed by the host government and
consumers in that foreign market (e.g. KFC and McDonald's, or Ford and General
Motors in China). In this scenario, we may wonder which one enjoys more corporate
successes than the other and how to measure those successes? Scholars have used
various indicators or conducted surveys to compare different MNCs in that foreign
market. For example, a survey8 of young consumers in the U.S. and China showed
that the Chinese respondents were more apt to eat KFC foods and spend more time
doing so, than the Americans. The Chinese also had much more positive impressions
of KFC than their US counterparts. Also, some business data show that KFC and
General Motors are more successful than McDonald's and Ford in China,
respectively. For example, table 1.2 and table 1.3 show that KFC enjoys more
successes than McDonald’s in China in terms of brand power index and number of
outlets, respectively. This study will use multiple indicators to assess corporate
success or failure, including percentages of market share, numbers of employees,
numbers of chain stores or subsidiaries, FDI, brand power index, profits and
revenues.

8 Terrence Witkowski, Yulong Ma; "Cross-Cultural Influences on Brand Identity Impressions: KFC in China
and the United States," Asia Pacific Journal o f Marketing and Logistics, Vol. 15, 2003
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Table 1.2
Top 10 International Power Brands in China, 2013
Rank

Brand

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC)*
Pampers*
Colgate*
Olay
Crest
Apple*
McDonald's*
Omo
Coca-Cola*
Carrefour

Brand Power
Index
(average
=100)
564
482
424
371
355
336
324
286
281
260

Nationality

US
US
US
US
US
US
US
UK/Nl
US
France

Source: Brand in the Millward Brown BrandZ ToplOO ranking, 2013.

Table 1.3
Number of Fast Food Outlets in China, 2012
KFC

4,260

McDonald's

1,730

Real Kung Fu

596

Source: YumlBrands company records

This section has briefly discussed the definitions of corporate success/failure
and one important question: how to measure it? The third question is very
important. If an MNC has already established a lasting presence in that foreign
market, then we can use multiple measures to assess their corporate success or

failure. These measures include but are not limited to profits, power brand index,
employee satisfaction rates, number of employees and subsidiaries, market shares,
amount of direct investment and revenues. The next section will address existing
studies related to the research question. Why have some MNCs succeeded in a
foreign market while others have failed? The literature review section will be
organized into three major sections: culture, statist and economic aspects. For each
section, 1explore previous research first and then propose at least one hypothesis
and numbered it by section (e.g. H la is the first hypothesis in the first section).

Culture

A. Broad Definitions o f Culture
In the first place, what is the broad definition of culture? Culture has been
defined in a wide variety of ways. Inglehart defines culture as "a system of attitudes,
values and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and is transmitted from
generation to generation.”9 According to Lustig and Koester, culture is a learned set
of shared perceptions about beliefs, values, and norms, which affect the behaviors of
a relatively large group of people.10 Chen and Startosta define culture as "a shared,
learned, and symbolic system of values, beliefs, ideas, and attitudes that shapes and
influences our perceptions and behavior."11 Clearly, culture is often associated with

9 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton University Press, 1990).
10 Myron W . Lusting and Jolene Koester, Intercultural Competence: Interpersonal Communication across
Cultures (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1996).
11 Chen Guoming and William J. Starosta, Foundations o f Intercultural Communication (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1998).
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core values, specific beliefs, social organizations, social action, and a way of life.
According to Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, culture organizes meanings
and meaning-making, defining social and political identity, structuring collective
actions, and imposing a normative order on politics and social life.12 In summary,
the broad definition of culture can be understood through two dimensions: the
intangible subjective culture and the tangible objective culture. For example,
Google's corporate culture - "Don't be evil!" is an intangible subjective culture.
KFC’s logo and universal design of chain stores belong to tangible objective culture.
Guanxi (relations) in China is a hidden business culture, while the outcomes of
Guanxi are usually visible and tangible.

B. Academic Research on the Relationships between Culture and an MNCs Overseas
Performance
Both International Political Economy (IPE) scholars and International
Business (IB) scholars agree that cultural differences play an important role on
MNCs' performance in foreign markets. A school of literature compares contrasting
cultures and their impacts on the practices of international business. For example,
IB scholars13 argue that failures of expatriate managers in host countries often
result from the inability to adjust to a foreign culture.

12 Lichbach, Mark Irving, and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds. Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and
structure (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
13 Fukuda&Chu, 1994; Hill, 2003; Andreason, 2003.
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Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory is a framework for cross-cultural
communication and is frequently utilized by many scholars14 to analyze a variety of
issues regarding MNCs, including expatriate managers, international colleagues,
design of organizational structure and market entry modes. Hofstede's cultural
theory scrutinizes culture from various dimensions and analyzes how cross-national
cultures affect management of firms in foreign markets. In the 1960s Hofstede
originally proposed four rudimentary cultural dimensions: 1. Individualism versus
Collectivism; 2. Uncertainty avoidance; 3. Power distance (strength of social
hierarchy); and 4.Masculinity versus femininity (task orientation versus personorientation).15 Later in the 1990s, Michael Bond and Minkov's research led them to
adding two more dimensions: long-term orientation versus short-term orientation
(also called "pragmatism") and indulgence versus restraint.16 How is Hofsede's
cultural study related to MNCs' overseas performance? By measuring these
dimensions through individual surveys and scores, Hofstede shows that China and
the U.S. are two contrasting cultures, which can cause difficulties for the working
relationship between expatriate managers and local colleagues. Usually, countries
with high scores in individualism are often rule-based cultures (e.g. the U.S.), while
those with high scores in collectivism are relation-based cultures (e.g. China).
Therefore, those MNCs that emerged in a relation-base culture tend to fail in a rulebased market.

14 Drogendijk&Slangen, 2006; Tse&Au, 1997.
15 Geert Hofstede's academic website, accessed June 13, 2014, http://w w w .geerthofstede.nl/
16 Ibid.
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Another well-recognized scholar in the field of culture and MNCs is Fons
Trompenaars. His famous work, Riding The Waves o f Culture, is a wealth of
information helping to explain how cultures differ and offering practical ways in
which MNCs can do business in various countries. Similar to Hofstede's
Individualism vs. Collectivism, Trompenaars uses Universalist and Particularist to
depict cultural differences between the U.S. and China. One of his illuminating
arguments is: Universalists are more common in Protestant cultures. The USA,
credited with being the most litigious society on earth, has considerably more
lawyers per head of population than particularists - East Asia.17
Universalists try to use the courts to mediate conflicts while particularists
tend to use social networks and relations to resolve disputes. Trompennars used
many real examples and personal experience to support his argument. For example,
when an American manager brought a weighty contract to a subsidiary in East Asia
in the 1980s, his local colleagues were quite upset by the eighty-page contract
because they were not comfortable with such a formal contract. Trompennars
argues that "one serious pitfall for universalist cultures in doing business with more
particularist ones is that the importance of the relationship is often ignored. The
contract will be seen as definitive by the universalist, but only as a rough guideline
or approximation by the particularist."18 Indeed, businessmen in the particularist
culture like China prefer to make the contract as vague as possible and may object to
clauses that tie them down.

17 Trompenaars, Fons and Charles Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves o f Culture fNew York: McGraw-Hill,
1998).
18 Ibid.

Beyond Hofstede's and Trompennars's cultural dimension theory, some IB
scholars use the governance environment to explain failures of MNCs in foreign
markets. Li compared rule-based governance culture (the U.S.) with a relation-based
governance culture (China). His examination of Human Resources (HR) research
shows that past studies of expatriate managers' failures in foreign markets did not
consider "how elements of societal governance such as the legal system, political
factors, level of trust, and information quality may affect the ability of expatriate
managers to develop effective working relationships with local employees."19
Indeed, Guanxi has a major influence on the management of businesses based
in China, and also those owned by overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, known as the
bamboo network.20 Guanxi is rooted in traditional Chinese culture and it is also at
the center of debate about business practice today. Social network or social capital
is well researched in American scholarship. Famous scholars are Robert Putnam
and Nan Lin. Guanxi is a Chinese equivalent of social capital. Guanxi plays a more
important role even than regulations and contracts in various areas of Chinese life.
When American MNCs come to China, they find they need to follow the Chinese way,
that is, Guanxi. Previous studies21 have shown that Guanxi can serve as substitutes
for formal institutional support. Guanxi can also be a source of sustained
competitive advantage for doing business in China.

19 Maurer, Steven and Li, Shaomin, "Understanding Expatriate Manager Performance: Human Resource
Management Implications o f Governance Environments on Work Relationships in Relation-Based
Economies," Human Resource Managem ent Review, Vol. 16, pp. 29-46, 2006.
20 H. W-c Yeung, Handbook o f Research on Asian Business (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007).
21 Tsang, 1998; Xin&Pearce, 1996.
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C. Individualism vs. Collectivism
With regard to the dissertation's case studies-Chinese MNCs and American
MNCs--we all know that the Chinese culture and American culture are different. But,
to what extent of degree are they different? Are they slightly different or
contrastingly different? This study applies an integrated cultural approach to
examine whether China and the U.S. have two contrasting cultures which create
miscommunication and misunderstanding in business practices and thus thwart
MNCs' performance in the counterpart's market. The integrated cultural approach is
based on three major theories: Hofstede's cultural dimension theory,
Trompennars's universalist versus particularist distinction, and Li's rule-based
versus relation-based governance.
How do we know China and the U.S. are two contrasting cultures and in what
ways are they different from each other? First, Hofstede’s study (Figure 1.1) tells
that China is a highly collective society (score over 90) while the U.S. is a highly
individual society (score less than 90). Each country in this model is characterized
by a score on six different dimensions. Those scores in Figure 1.1 are chiefly based
on Geert Hofstede's recent book: Cultures and Organizations.22 This book is a
combined research, which chiefly uses IBM survey data between 1990 and 2002 and
the recent World Values Survey data.
What are the implications of culture dimension theory for MNCs? In a
collective culture like China, personal relationships prevail over task and company.
In addition, people act in the interests of the group and the subordinate-superior

22 Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software o f the M ind ^McGraw-Hill, 2010).
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relationship is obvious. Chinese state-owned enterprises do not necessarily act in
the interests of themselves. They have non-economic goals or social responsibility
established by the state authorities. They also have a sense of superiority over
private Chinese firms because they get support from the Central Bank and they
control China's strategic industries. However, when Chinese state-owned
enterprises (e.g. PetroChina, Sinopec) enter the U.S. market, they lose the protection
like they have in domestic market as well as the sense of superiority. In a highly
individual culture like the U.S., firms are much less submissive to state authorities
and businessmen are accustomed to doing business or interacting with people they
do not know well. Witkowski & Ma also showed that cultural differences can explain
why Chinese consumers have a higher satisfaction rate toward KFC than American
consumers.23 America is with an individualistic culture. When American
respondents are satisfied with KFC, they are more likely to go again, often by
themselves. Personal feelings take precedence. By contrast, in collectivist China,
people visit KFC more often as part of a group, which might attenuate the tie
between their own feelings and behavior.24

23 Terrence Witkowski, Yulong Ma; "Cross-Cultural Influences on Brand Identity Impressions: KFC in China
and the United States", Asia Pacific Journal o f Marketing and Logistics, Vol. 15, 2003.
24 Ibid.
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Figure 1.1
Culture Comparison between China and America
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Another dimension that makes China and America the two contrasting
cultures is pragmatism. This dimension was examined by Hofstede and Bond's
Confucian Work Dynamism.25 Long- term oriented societies foster pragmatic
virtues oriented towards future rewards. Most East Asian countries score high in
pragmatism and they are long-term orientation cultures. Their personal and
business relationships are maintained and reinforced through continuous, long
term associations and connections.26 These connections have different names in

25 Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond, "The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic
Growth," Organizational Dynamics 16, no. 4 ,1 9 8 8 .
26 Trompenaars, Fons and Charles Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves o f Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1998).
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East Asian countries—Kwankye in Korea, Guanxi in China and Kankei in Japan.27
East Asians consider relationships and ambiguity between people to be very
important, whereas Westerners consider contracts and explicitness between people
to be important Figure 1.1 shows that China scores almost 90 in the cultural
dimension of pragmatism while the U.S. is less than 30. In societies with a long-term
pragmatic orientation like China, people have a strong propensity to save and invest.
Thriftiness is obvious. For example, Taobao knew that the average Chinese people
like haggling and saving money. Thus, Taobao quickly launched a communication
platform, Ali Wangwang, which enables direct communication between the Chinese
buyers and sellers. EBay failed to do so in its early years in China.

D. Universalism vs. Particularism
Another theory that compares Chinese culture and American culture is
Trompennars's universalist versus particularist distinction. The U.S. is high in
universalism and advocates for global standards, democracy and universal human
rights, which are often challenged by China, a particularist culture. What is the
implication of universalist versus particularist cultures for MNCs? According to
Trompennars, in the U.S., the head office tends to hold the keys to global marketing,
global production and global HR management. However, within more particularist
national cultures like China, the writ of the head office might fail to shape local ways

27 Cavusgil, S. Tamer, Pervez N. Ghauri, and Ayse A. Akcal, Doing Business in Emerging Markets (Sage,

2012 ).
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of operating.28 Table 1.4 is a summary of characteristics of Universalism vs.
Particularism based on readings of Trompennars’s school.

Table 1.4
Universalism vs. Particularism
Consistency

Flexibility

Systems & standards

Pragmatic

Rules

Make exceptions

Uniform procedures

It depends

Demand clarity

At ease with ambiguity

Source: Riding the Waves of Culture

In a universalist culture, firms have strong propensity to follow standards and
uniform procedures. The designs and decorations of American grocery stores (e.g.
Walmart) and fast food chains (e.g. KFC) are very similar in different cities.
Standardization is a double-edged sword, however, which makes some succeed
while some fail. For example, eBay replicated its American models and have
succeeded in most Western countries, but its global platform failed in China. For
Americans doing business in China, they might often hear the words "Zou Hou Men"
(literally, through the back door), which means to make exceptions. Also, in the

28 Trompenaars, Fons and Charles Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves o f Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1998).
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particularistic culture, business practices lack consistency. According to
Trompenaars, China is a particularistic culture where people look at relationships
and circumstances in a specific situation to decide what is right. For the Chinese, the
legal contract communicates a starting point for an agreement. As circumstances
change so too should the terms of the agreement. For the Chinese, the situation and
the particular individuals involved are what define relationship.29

E. Rule-Based vs. Relation-Based
Li's study on governance environments shows that political, regulatory, and
cultural contexts have a major impact on foreign subsidiary success. He depicts the
U.S. and China as two contrasting cultures: rule-based and relation-based societies,
respectively (Figure 1.2). In a relation-based society, it is better for MNCs to hire
host country nationals or parent country nationals with host country origins.
Headquarters in the U.S. should decentralize decision-making and downplay global
standardization, because local knowledge and adaption to local market conditions is
of primary importance.30 Harzing's empirical study of executive staffing practices in
MNCs' foreign subsidiaries supports this argument.31 He found that MNCs operating
in industries such as food and advertising services tend to hire host country
nationals as managing directors. KFC in China is a strong case. Previous studies32
show that not only did KFC localize its food menus, but it also localized its
29 Fons Trompenaars, accessed June 1 5 ,2014, http://www.via-web.de/universalism-versus-particularism/
30 Judge, William, and Shaomin Li. "Organization Design for Foreign Subsidiaries of Multinational
Enterprises: A Contingency Perspective," International Journal o f Business and M anagem ent 7, no. 3,

2012.
31 Anne Harzing, "Who Is in Charge? An Empirical Study of Executive Staffing Practices in Foreign
Subsidiaries," Human Resource M anagem ent AO, no. 2, 2001.
32 Maggie Starvish, "KFC's explosive growth in China," HBS Working Knowledge, 2011.
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executives and managers in China. According to Zhao and Luo, KFC is a foreign
brand with Chinese characteristics, which expanded on its fried chicken staple and
converted some 40% of its menu items to Chinese flavors.33 In addition, KFC
recognizes the importance of Guanxi in China and maintains good relations with the
state and local Chinese governments. The majority of KFC managers in China are
either Chinese nationals or Taiwanese nationals. Some other American MNCs may
also hire parent country nationals with host country origins. For example, Meiwei
Cheng, an American national of Chinese origins, successfully directed several
American affiliates in China, including AT&T, General Electric, and Ford.34

Figure 1.2
A Comparison of Governance Environment Index
Country
Norway
Sweden
United States
United Kingdom
Taiwan
South Korea
France
Italy
India
Greece
Russia
China

Governance Environment
Index
6.02
4.69
4.47
4.26
2.45
1.15
1.09
0.56
-1.48
-1.99
-6.27
-7.26

Governance
Environment
Rule-based

\z

Relation-based

Source: Li & Filler, 2007

33 Zhao Hongxin and Luo Yadong, "Product diversification, ownership structure, and subsidiary
performance in China's dynamic market," MIR: M anagem ent International Review, 2002.
34 William Q. Judge, Li Shaomin:" Organization Design for Foreign Subsidiaries of Multinational
Enterprises: A Contingency Perspective", International Journal o f Business and Managem ent, Vol.7, 2012.
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To sum up, this section explores previous academic research on the
relationship between cultures and MNCs' overseas performance. IB and IPE scholars
agree that cultural differences are a primary factor to the success/failure of MNCs.
Despite the fact that their angles of analysis are different (e.g. collectivism vs.
individualism, universalism vs. particularism, and rule-based vs. relation-based
societies), they all support the hypothesis that in a comparison of foreign MNCs,
those investing in culturally similar countries will enjoy more success than those
which invest in culturally different countries.
Based on the existing literature, a cultural hypothesis of this study is:

H la : In a comparison o f foreign MNCs, those investing in culturally sim ilar
countries w ill enjoy more success than those which invest in culturally different
countries.

Given the cultural dissimilarity between China and the U.S., I expect the case
studies will show American MNCs and Chinese MNCs face more obstacles to
investment in each other's markets. For instance, while eBay replicated its American
model and established a foothold in Europe, it failed to do the same in China. The
cultural hypotheses can be validated by numerous cases. However, cultural
hypotheses are still insufficient. Cultural dissimilarity cannot fully explain why
General Motors are more successful than Ford in China in terms of sales? To better
understand MNCs' overseas development, I will introduce other factors (statism and
market) that can affect MNCs' success in foreign markets.
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Statism

The previous section discusses how two contrasting cultures affect MNCs'
success/failure from three perspectives: 1. Individualism versus Collectivism; 2.
Universalist versus Particularist; 3. Rule-based versus Relation-based societies. This
section will focus particularly on the role of the state and discuss how political
power can influence an MNC's overseas performance. This section is organized into
the following subsections: 1. sectoral politics, 2. interest groups, and 3. ownership.

A. Sectoral Politics
Beyond cultures, industrial sectors are another important factor that affects
success or failure of MNCs. Foreign investment flows into different sectors of the
host country. Existing studies35 show that the level of restrictions varies widely by
industrial sectors. For example, the airline industry was completely closed to FD1 in
the U.S. in the 1980s. A federal department of the U.S. government, the Department
of Homeland Security, names those sensitive sectors as "critical infrastructure",
which is officially defined:
Critical infrastructure are the assets, systems, and networks, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.36
When CF1US screens cases, it pays particular attention to critical
infrastructures such as nuclear power, telecommunications, energy, and

35 Lewis, 2004; Jackson, 2009; Sternberg, 1998.
36 "What Is Critical Infrastructure?" U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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transportation.37 Beyond the general rules of the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United State, some scholars38 argue that the main reasons for limiting foreign
ownership in services are non-economic, relating to national security or economic
nationalism. Industries such as telecommunications, banking, transportation and
electricity provision are often viewed by host countries as "strategic" or "sensitive."
In recent years, many examples support this argument. Transportation, for instance,
is relevant to U.S. national security and anti-terrorism. In 2006, The Dubai Ports
World, a state-owned company in the United Arab Emirates, attempted to purchase
six major U.S. seaports. Eventually, this transaction was blocked because some U.S.
politicians worried that these seaports might be vulnerable to the entry of terrorists
or illicit weapons if they were managed by the Dubai Ports World. Another
illustrative case is China's Huawei. Huawei, A Chinese telecommunication giant, had
several attempts to acquire American IT firms and also failed in the end due to
national security concerns. The U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Plan states
that "establishing a strategic framework for protecting the Nation's critical
communications infrastructure is crucial to ensuring national security."39
How can sectoral politics influence a MNC’s business practices in a foreign
market? Owen’s study shows that domestic firms in some sectors (e.g. oil,
resources) are politically skilled and can erect political obstacles to foreign MNCs.40
Owen cited the famous case of the CNOOC-Unocal acquisition. She argued that the
37 Jonathan G. Cedarbaum and Stephen W. Preston, "CFIUS and Foreign Investment," in Joe D. W hitley
and Lynne K. Zusman, eds. Homeland Security: Legal and Policy issues. American Bar Association, 2009.
38 Hoekman, 1995; Golub, 2009.
39 "Communications Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,"
Homeland Security, 2010.
40 Erica Lynn Owen, "Democratic Politics in an Age of Globalization: The Impact of Political Skills and
Institutions on Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment," PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2010.
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oil sector is characterized by high levels of capital flows and political skills, because
American oil and gas firms are usually some of the biggest donors for political
campaigns and elections. When the state-owned Chinese firm CNOOC bid high for
Unocal in 2005, its U.S. competitor Chevron was able to use effectively the supposed
threat to national security as a smokescreen and won political support from U.S.
Congress. Ultimately, CNOOC withdrew its bid under political pressure and Chevron
acquired Unocal with a lower bid.
Sectoral politics are not limited to the U.S, however. When U.S. firms are
doing businesses in China, they also face challenges caused by sectoral politics. The
level of openness to foreign investment vary varies by sector in China. Among the
three sectors (food service, auto and internet], the food service sector enjoys the
highest level of openness to foreign investment, the next is auto sector and the last is
internet (Table 1.5).41

41 Baker and McKenzie, "Revisions to the Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry 2011,"
Client Alert, January, 2012; James Jensen, Fabiola Suwanto, and Sarah Zhao, "China's New Foreign
Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue: Update," February, 2012.
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Table 1.5
China’s Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry
Industry

Government

sector

Attitudes

Food

Encouraged

processing

Example

Projects for production of natural food additives
and ingredients are no longer subject to foreign
shareholding restrictions. The New Catalogue has
removed storage of vegetables, dried and fresh
fruits, livestock or poultry products from the
encouraged category.

Auto

Encouraged/Neut

Although automotive manufacturing no longer

ral

falls in the "Encouraged" category, the
manufacture of key components of alternative
fuel vehicles has been added to the "Encouraged"
category and foreign investors may hold up to
50% of the equity interests in these types of
industrial projects

Internet &
media

Restricted

The 2007 Catalogue prohibited foreign
investment in news websites, network audio and
video program services, internet access service
venues, and internet cultural operations. The
2011 revision only excluded musical production.

Source: China's New Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue, 2007 and 2011.
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In 2005 the Chinese government issued the Administrative Measures on
Commercial Franchising, which allowed KFC and McDonald’s to establish wholly
foreign-owned franchises, instead of being limited to joint venture. By contrast, the
Chinese government still requires foreign automakers to establish joint ventures
with Chinese firms and their shares should not be more than fifty percent.42
Compared to the food service and auto sectors, the internet sector in China is the
worst case in terms of openness to foreign investment. American internet firms are
less welcomed by the Chinese people than American auto makers or food franchises.
For example, a recent report issued by China Internet Media Research Center (May
26, 2014) blames Yahoo and Google for stealing data of hundreds of millions of
Chinese customers.43 Unsurprisingly, the internet sector in China is deeply tied to
politics and some scholars call China a "networked authoritarian society."44
Although the Chinese government promotes the development of internet
technologies, the internet sector in China is still heavily regulated. Why did
American internet firms enjoy less success than American auto and food firms in
China? Existing studies show that American internet firms enjoy less success than
other American firms because they face at least three challenges regarding sectoral
politics in China:
1.

Internet Content Providers (ICPs). The ICPs are supervised by China’s State

Council Information Department. Overseas ICPs are allowed to operate in the

42 Long Guoqiang, "China's Policies on FDI: Review and Evaluation," In Theodore H. Moran, Edward M.
Graham, and Magnus Blomstrom, eds. Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2005.
43 "Full Text: The United States' Global Surveillance Record," Internet Media Research Center, PRC, May
26, 2014.
44 MacKinnon, Rebecca. "China's Networked Authoritarianism," Journal o f Democracy 22, no. 2 (2011).
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country under the condition that ICP subsidiaries must be registered in China, and
all the contents must be provided and self-filtered by locally registered subsidiaries
(Batjargal, 20 06)45 The case of Google is a good example, which will be addressed
in the empirical chapters.
2.

Internet filtering censorship. The Internet is a sensitive sector in China.

Western media news and academic publications (Economist, 2006; Beckman Center
for Internet and Society, 2005) show that China's filtering is considered as an
important daily duty of government officials. The mechanism of internet filtering is
very sophisticated and involves multiple departments and technical control.
Compared to foreign firms (e.g. Google), often domestic internet firms (e.g. Baidu,
Sina) are more cooperative with the Chinese government to filter out sensitive
online information.
3. Sectoral incentives of the local Chinese officials. In communist regimes, local
government officials are neither directly voted nor elected by the people in their
regions. Instead, they are promoted or appointed by higher-level government
supervisors. Existing studies46 show that the GDP growth rates and job creation are
two important factors for local Chinese officials' promotion. Government reports or
provincial yearbooks often contain detailed information on the relative rankings of
the provincial performance, ranging from GDP growth, to steel production, to
numbers of new jobs, and to miles of road constructed. In general, capital-intensive
sectors can lift GDP growth rates drastically (e.g. auto, steel, real estate, and

45 Bat Batjargal. "Internet Entrepreneurship: Social Capital, Human Capital, and Performance of Internet
Ventures in China.” Research Policy 36, no. 5, 2007.
46 Zhou, 2007; Li&Zhou, 2004.
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infrastructure construction) and also create huge personal gains for local Chinese
officials. Thus, foreign investment in capital-intensive sectors is favored by local
Chinese officials. Corruption is pervasive in capital-intensive sectors in China.
Labor-intensive sectors can create more jobs (e.g. clothing, food), which is helpful
for easing public anger and stabilizing local communities. Take Coca Cola for
example. Its independent suppliers have 350,000 Chinese employees. Its
independent vendors, wholesalers and retailers have 5,000 Chinese workers, and
the company itself directly employs 14,000 Chinese.47 However, fewer IT firms
could offer such incentives (1. Creating many jobs, 2. Building large construction
projects) to the local Chinese officials. They are thus more likely to fail in the
Chinese market.

B. Interest Groups
Unlike tariffs or administrative procedures of CFIUS, interest groups politics is
an informal barrier to the market entry. Scott's study shows that the U.S. aviation
and auto industries favor normal relations with China.48 American automakers and
Boeing have enjoyed many successes in China. In the mid -1990s, then chairman of
General Motors, John F. Smith Jr. argued that China’s "most-favored-nation" (MFN)
status is the basis for a stable, credible economic policy toward China. By contrast,
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFLCIO), U.S. Business Council and American makers of movies and computer software
47 Drake Weisert, "Coca Cola in China: Quenching the Thirst of Billion," China Business, July - August 2001
Issue.
48 James M . Scott, eds, After the End: Making US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold W ar World (Duke
University Press, 1998).
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pressed Washington to revoke MFN status of China due to China's human rights
violations and piracy of intellectual property. Interest groups are also called
pressure groups or special groups which are interchangeably used by various
scholars. Interest groups can be classified in a multitude of ways. The simplest is to
categorize them according to their primary purpose — economic and
noneconomic.49
Economic interest groups tend to promote favorable economic conditions and
opportunities for their members. Noneconomic interest groups focus on specific
issues and ideological perspectives instead of commercial and business interests.
With regard to China-U.S. conflicts, those specific issues include, but are not limited
to, environment protection, human rights, labor rights, religion, democracy and
Tibet. Chan's research shows that human rights advocacy groups are actively
pressuring MNCs on minimum wages, work hours, health, and safety conditions.50
Noneconomic interest groups often overlap with advocacy non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), which form to influence governments' policies. Schepers's
research shows that MNCs are the frequent target of NGOs in their advocacy
efforts.51 Many advocacy NGOs or noneconomic interest groups urge MNCs to
promote their corporate social responsibilities.
An interesting study by India's Central Bureau of Investigation shows that the
total number of NGOs in the U.S. is three times that in China (Figure 1.3). In addition,

49 Maxwell &Crain&Santos, 2012; Dautrich&Yalof, 2010.
50 Anita Chan, "Labor Standards and Human Rights: The Case of Chinese Workers under M arket
Socialism," Human Rights Quarterly 20, no. 4 ,1 9 9 8 .
51 Donald H Schepers, "The Impact of NGO Network Conflict on the Corporate Social Responsibility
Strategies of Multinational Corporations," Business & Society, 45, no. 3, 2006.
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1 NGO for every 209 Americans, while 1 for every 3,000 Chinese. (Figure 1.4).
Chinese MNCs grew up in China, a society where NGOs are controlled and the
disputes between NGOs and companies are often mediated by the state or local
governments. When Chinese MNCs come to the U.S., a contrasting society where
NGOs and social responsibility are encouraged, Chinese MNCs become quite
inexperienced in managing relationships with American NGOs.

Figure 1.3
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C. Ownership: State-owned Enterprises vs. Private Firms
Since China's "Opening-up Reform" in 1978, the relationships between the
Chinese government and its companies have gradually changed. Unlike Mao who
punished millions of Chinese businessmen and prohibited all private
entrepreneurships in communist China, Deng Xiaoping realized the importance of
private businesses for the economic health of a country. Deng started building
private sectors in Southeast China, like Shenzhen. He once said: "it doesn't matter
whether it's a white cat or a black cat, I think; a cat that catches mice is a good cat."52
Private companies have sprung up like mushrooms since Deng's reform. However,
Deng and his companies were cautious that the fast development of private
businesses would outperform state-owned companies. In addition, they thought
that liberal values and privatization would lead to social instability.53 Therefore,
they allowed the state-owned companies to keep control key industries in China,
such as railways, banks, energy and telecommunications. Today, most giant Chinese
MNCs are state-owned and they are top ranked in Fortune Global 500.54
State-company relationships are more transparent in developed countries
than in authoritarian regimes, because the relationships in democratic countries are

52 For more details, please refer to Orville Schell and John Delury's new book: Wealth and Power: China's
Long March to The Twenty-First Century. For instance, in Chapter 11 "Black Cat, W hite Cat: Deng
Xiaoping", the authors state that Deng summarily canceled two decades of Maoist policy with a single
sentence, "From this day forward, we renounce class struggle as the central focus, and instead take up
economic development as our central focus." pp.281-282.
53 A good example is The Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. Limited reforms and privatization brought
about fast economic development, but at the same they also caused inflation and corruptions of the party
elite. The business and government officials' personal interest are always heavily overlapped in China. The
young Chinese asked for more transparency, freedom, reform and privatization; however, their protest
finally became a tragedy.
54 Three Chinese MNCs are in the Top 10 list (Sinopec, China National Petroleum, and State Grid). They are
all state-owned Chinese companies. Two American companies are in the Top 10 list (W alm art and Exxon
Mobil). For a full list, please visit http://m oney.cnn.com /m agazines/fortune/global500/
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legalized by embedded regulations and laws. Scholars called most Western
governments "small governments" or “limited governments."55 The ownership
structure, leadership appointment and government relationships of Chinese MNCs
are not as transparent as those of Western counterparts. The existing studies show
that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to fail in the U.S.
market than private enterprises. The reasons can be disaggregated into two aspects.

1. SOEs are less efficient than private firms.
A substantial volume of literature indicates that SOEs are less efficient than
private firms. One of the most prominent studies was done by Boardman and Vining
(1989). They evaluated the performance of five-hundred of the world’s largest
MNCs for the year 1983. They found that controlling for a variety of factors, SOEs
and mixed enterprises perform worse than similar private companies.56 With
regard to China, this argument is also embraced by some Chinese scholars. For
example, Liu argues that Chinese private firms have a lower hierarchy in
organizational structure than SOEs and thus they are more efficient than SOEs.57 Bai
et al. argue that Chinese SOEs are less efficient in enterprise productivity than
private firms because Chinese SOEs are not profit maximizers.58

55 Barth, Alan, The Roots o f Limited Government, 1991.
56 Sumit K. Majumdar, "Assessing comparative efficiency of the state-owned mixed and private sectors in
Indian industry", Public Choice, Volume 96, Issue 1-2, July 1998.
57 Liu Xiaoxuan, "The Impact of the Structure of China's Industrial Enterprise's Ownership on Its
Efficiency," Economic Research Journal 2 , 2000.
ss Bai Chong-en, David D. Li and Wang Yijiang, "Enterprise Productivity and Efficiency: W hen Is Up Really
Down?" Journal o f Comparative Economics 24, no. 3 ,1 9 9 7 .
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2. Host countries view SOEs as arms of the home government.
Many SOEs are viewed as arms of the state by host countries and thus suffer
from transparency and accountability issues. To understand the relation between
the MNC and the home government is crucial for an understanding of the autonomy
of MNCs. Some observers argued that economic concerns focused on the possibility
that state-backed Chinese companies choose to invest ‘based on strategic rather
than market-based considerations/ and are free from the constraints of market
forces because of generous state subsidies.59 In 2012, the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission asked CFIUS to conduct mandatory reviews of all
controlling transactions by Chinese state-owned and state-controlled companies
investing in the U.S (e.g. CNOOC, Sinopec, PetroCina, and Huawei). The Commission
also called for prohibiting investment in a U.S. industry by a foreign company whose
government prohibits foreign investment in that same industry.60
This section examines how political power can influence MNCs’ overseas
performance from three aspects: sectoral politics, interest group and ownership.
First, existing studies show that sectoral politics exist both in China and America.
For example, U.S. state agencies (the Homeland Security Department and CFIUS)
have defined "critical infrastructure” and paid particular attention to those
acquisitions by foreign investors in sensitive sectors (energy, telecommunication
and transportation). Likewise, China's State Council Information Department erects

59James K. Jackson, "The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)," Congressional
Research Service, March 6, 2014.
“ ibid.
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obstacles to the internet sector as it requires foreign IT firms to obtain the Internet
Content Providers (ICPs) in China.
Second, the interest group politics is a hallmark of American politics. A
simplest categorization is economic and noneconomic groups. In the past, Chinese
MNCs faced challenges from both economic (e.g. Chevron Corporation, AFL-CIO)
and noneconomic interest groups (e.g. Human Rights Watch). Interest groups and
social corporate responsibility are encouraged in the U.S. while controlled by the
state in China. Some Chinese MNCs are not competent in dealing with American
interest groups and are more likely to fail.
Third, previous literature on MNCs’ ownership shows that the failures of
state-owned or state-controlled firms in foreign markets arise from two factors: 1.
they are less efficient than private firms in business practice; 2. they are viewed as
arms of the home state and thus the host state is cautious of them. Gilpin stated that
"The MNCs cannot be explained solely in terms of market forces and/or corporate
strategies. The state-centric position also assumes that MNCs are essentially
national firms competing with one another around the world.”61 Based on the above
discussions, two hypotheses are proposed:

H2a: In a comparison o f foreign MNCs, those with closer ties to the home state
are more likely to fa il in the host state than MNCs independent from the home state.
H2b: In a comparison o f foreign MNCs, those investing in sensitive sectors in the
host state are more likely to fa il than those investing in consumer goods.
61 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy, Understanding the International Economy Order: (Princeton
University Press, 2001).
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It is widely believed that SOEs act as agents on the behalf of their home
governments. For example, Chinese SOEs are less worried about capital shortage as
they can receive cheap loans from state-owned banks. In 2009,85% of loans were
issued to Chinese SOEs.62 Chinese SOEs also control key industry sectors in China.
However, when Chinese SOEs come to do business in the U.S., those financial and
political support from home government may become their weakness. Given that
China and America distrust each other, I expect the case studies will show Chinese
MNCs and American MNCs with close ties to their home governments will be
frustrated by political resistance from the host countries. I also expect that those
Chinese SOEs or private firms with government background investing in strategic
resources and critical infrastructures will trigger a CFIUS audit.

Market Entry

Traditionally, the debates on the roles of a government in a market can be
boiled down to two competing views: the statist views (e.g. Jackson, 2014; Gilpin,
2001), in which it governs the market, and the market-friendly view, according to
which government intervenes little in the market.63 The previous section has
already illustrated the relationships between MNCs' success or failure and state
support/intervention. This section will review some key studies that address the
relationships between MNCs' successes or failures and market entry.
62 Eve Cary, "Reforming China's State-owned Enterprises," The Diplomat, accessed on August 18, 2014,
http://thediplom at.com/2013/06/reforming-chinas-state-owned-enterprises/
63 Masahiko Aoki, etc.. The Role o f Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative
Institutional Analysis /Oxford University Press, 1998).
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A. Entry Modes
Business scholars believe that the choice of mode for market entry is very
important for a firm doing international business. Based on a review of several
international business textbooks,64 firms often use at least four major modes to
enter foreign markets: exporting, franchising or licensing, establishing joint
ventures with a host-country firm, and setting up or acquiring a subsidiary
partially/wholly through FDI.
First, different choices of entry modes will make an MNC face different
obstacles which can affect corporate success in a foreign market. For example, for
the export mode of entry, the foremost obstacle is duties and tariffs. China set high
tariffs on foreign-made cars to protect its infant industry. Thus, most foreign cars
sold in China were not directly imported from their home countries. Instead, they
were made by Chinese workers of joint ventures in China. For all foreign
automakers selling cars in China, establishing a joint venture with Chinese firms is a
must. Ford, Volkswagen, General Motors and Toyota all have Chinese partners with
which they have to share some technologies.
Lu shows that the success of international joint ventures investing in
emerging economies, most notably China, largely depends on the selection of local
partners and the performance of local partners.65 So far, many foreign automakers
have chosen Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as their partners (e.g.
Shanghai Auto and First Auto Works). They clearly knew that partnering with SOEs
64 Charles W.L. Hill, International Business (McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2012); Justin Paul, International Business
(Prentice Hall, 2011); Rugman, Collinson, Hodgetts, International Business (Prentice Hall, 2006).
65 Lu, Yadong. "Joint Venture Success in China: How Should W e Select a Good Partner?" Journal o f World
Business 33, no. 2 ,1 9 9 8 .
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in this country would allow them to enjoy more successes. Indeed, most of them are
successful so far (e.g. General Motors). According to figures from LMC Automotive, a
forecasting company; foreign joint ventures now capture three out of every four
new car sales in China, the highest level in six years.66
Second, the degree of risk varies by entry mode. Acquiring a wholly-owned
subsidiary (WOS) means greater control but also implies greater risks compared to
setting up joint ventures (JVs) and international franchising.67 Makino & Beamish,
using a sample of more than 900 Japanese foreign subsidiaries, argued that the
performance of WOSs was considerably lower than that of JVs.68 Likewise, Chinese
scholars69 examined activities of more than 14,000 foreign firms in China and
argued that WOS enjoyed less success than JVs in terms of profits. Also, Guisinger
and Li70 compared foreign-owned firms and domestically owned firms in the U.S.
They found that foreign-controlled firms entered through acquisitions are more
likely to fail than those with other entry modes. The degree of risk is ranked from
low to high by entry mode: exporting, franchising/licensing, JVs, and WOS.

66 Michael Dunne, "Chinese Auto Makers: Joint-Venture Junkies?" The W all Street Journal, 2012.
67 Hill, C. W . L., Hwang, P., Kim, W. C, "An Eclectic Theory of the Choice of International Entry Mode,"
Strategic M anagem ent Journal, 9 ,1 9 9 0 .
68 Makino, S., Beamish, P. W., "Local Ownership Restrictions, Entry M ode Choice, and FDI Performance:
Japanese Overseas Subsidiaries in Asia," Asia Pacific Journal o f Management, 1 5 ,1998.
69 Pan, Yigang, Shaomin, Li and David Tse, "The Impact of Order and M ode of M arket Entry on Profitability
and Market Share," Journal o f International Business Studies 3 0 ,1 9 9 9 .
70 Li, J., Guisinger, S., "Comparative Business Failures o f Foreign-controlled Firms in the United States,"
Journal o f International Business Studies, 22, 2 , 1991.
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B. Location Choice
Beyond entry modes, some scholars71 argue that location choice is another
important component of market entry and has direct effects on MNCs' overseas
success/failure. From 1978 to the late 1990s, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, then
the most powerful figures in China, favored the Eastern part of China for economic
reforms. Once Deng said: "Let some people get rich first!"72 During that period, the
Chinese government had established some Special Economic Zones (e.g. Shenzhen,
Shanghai Pudong) and gave favorable policies to FDI in those regions. Some MNCs
caught this opportunity and finally succeeded there. However, this state
intervention has created a huge wealth gap between East China and West China.
Today, the Eastern Coast of China has already become the most developed
area. According to a Chinese government report, in 2010 the East shared 78.32% of
FDI while the West only shared 7.86%.73 In order to narrow the gap, the state
government is now directing the flows of FDI from East China to West China under a
national policy called "Xi Bu Da Kai Fa" (The Great Development of China's West).
Moreover, the average labor costs and land prices of East China are much higher
than those of West China. Two decades ago, KFC was able to open its first Chinese
store near Tiananmen Square and thus attracted many Chinese consumers' eyes.
Nowadays, it is almost impossible and unwise for a new international food franchise
to obtain such an expensive location.

71 Agarwal&Ramaswami, 1992; Flores&Aguilera, 2007.
72 "Deng Xiaoping's Quote Meanings + Brief Profile," accessed on July 2 0 ,2 0 1 4 , http://blogs.swajkt.com /swa/10361/2013/04/23/deng-xiaopings-quote-m eanings-brief-profile/
73 An official report, "Invest in China, FDI Utilized by East, Central and West Parts of China in 2010,"
Ministry of Commerce, P.R. China, 2010.

Interestingly, KFC is more successful and popular than McDonald's in China,
which is in contrast to their situations in the U.S. market. The secret of KFC enjoying
more success than McDonald's can be traced back to their different choices of
locations at the veiy beginning. Many developing countries like China lacked formal
and reliable institutional systems in their early development of market economy. To
cope with this, MNCs could develop relational assets, such as Guanxi, which plays an
important role in facilitating business operations in China.74 KFC clearly knew that
Guanxi was a key determinant of location choice, and that the Capital city was the
most effective starting point to build Guanxi in a centralized governance model.
Therefore, KFC chose China's capital, Beijing, as the home of its first outlet (1987)
and then quickly spread to the east and south coast. According to David Bell,
associate dean of Harvard Business School, when the first Chinese KFC opened in
Tiananmen Square, Western-style fast-food restaurants were a novelty in China.
Many Beijingers still wore the tunic suits of the Mao era, and bicycles were the main
means of transportation.75
By contrast, McDonald's expansion has been relatively more conservative.
McDonald's opened its first outlet in Shenzhen (1990), then an emerging city in
South China. The primary reason why McDonald’s chose Shenzhen is because it is
close to Hong Kong where McDonald's had already established a foothold. However,
Shenzhen cannot match Beijing in terms of market size, reputation, and strategic

74 Leff, H.N., "Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries: the Economic
Groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 4 ,1 9 7 8 ; and Khanna, T., Palepu, K., "Why
Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets," Harvard Business Review, No. July-August,
1997.
75 David E. Bell and M ary L. Shelman, "KFC's Radical Approach to China," Harvard Business Review,
November, 2011.
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importance of corporate relationship with the government. Also, in its early years of
development, McDonald's limited its entry to only a few big cities close to Shenzhen,
which made McDonald’s far less influential than KFC.
In summary, two major points regarding to market entry are addressed in this
section. First, typically the entry modes of joint ventures and franchising (e.g.
Shanghai General Motor, KFC) involve less control and risk than the wholly-owned
subsidiaries entry mode (e.g. Google China, eBay established eBay China after it
acquired a Chinese company called Yiqu). Compared to joint ventures and
international franchising, wholly-owned subsidiaries by foreign MNCs in certain
sectors may make a host country with strong nationalism feel uncomfortable.
Second, beyond market size, labor costs and land prices, relational assets are
another important determinant of location choice. In China, a country with a
centralized government and collective culture, big cities often provide more
relational assets. Foreign MNCs usually set up their first outlets in those famous
Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. However, choosing big American cities
may not be the best strategy for Chinese companies. Gary Locke, former U.S.
Ambassador to China, said: "When considering where to invest, Chinese companies
often gravitate toward cities they know. Usually this means big cities such as New
York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles....But, some of the best opportunities for a
good return investment can be found in second-tier cities."76
In this dissertation, I anticipate that there are some interactions between
statist and market factors. For instance, in the case of CNOOC buying an American

76 Fleishmanhillard, "A Conversation with Former U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke," March 10, 2014.
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firm Unocal, the geopolitical rivalry is overlapped with domestic market
competitions. American oil firm Chevron, a domestic competitor against CNOOC,
raised national security issues and lobbied U.S. Congress, which caused CNOOC to
fail in acquiring Unocal.
In addition, we may wonder among cultural, statist and market factors, which
is the most important factor for explaining an MNC's success or failure. Actually, the
degree of their importance varies by different conditions. So, under what condition
are statist factors more important than the other? Numerous cases show that when
Chinese state-owned enterprises invest in U.S. sensitive sectors or strategic
resources, statist interventions are the most important factor for explaining their
successes or failures. In contrast, when American consumer goods producers invest
in China, those market factors, such as choice of location, entry modes, localization
and corporate strategies, are more important for their successes.

Summary of Chapter One

In this chapter I start asking the research question, why some MNCs have
failed in foreign markets while others have succeeded there. There are two
categories of causes, internal factors and external ones. A strong body of literature
shows that external factors of culture, statism and market can affect an MNC’s
success or failure in foreign markets. First, cultural dissimilarities can create
numerous obstacles to MNCs. Some obstacles may be unavoidable. The U.S. and
China are starkly different cultures identified in three dimensions: universalism vs.
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particularism, individualism vs. collectivism, and rule-based vs. relation-based
cultures. Three hypotheses regarding culture are proposed in the first chapter. I
expect that the failures of some Chinese MNCs and American MNCs in each other's
markets are caused by their difficult adaption to local cultures. However, cultural
explanations are not the whole picture because cultural explanations have limits
(Cultures do not vary within the U.S. and China). Therefore, I introduce statist
explanations in this dissertation. I will explain how sectoral politics, ownership and
interest group politics can affect a MNC’s success or failure in foreign markets.
Those MNCs investing in strategic resources or critical infrastructures and in the
meantime keeping close ties to home government are more likely to fail in the host
country, particularly when the home government and the host government distrust
each other (e.g. China and the U.S.).
The study of MNCs is an interdisciplinary field of both International Politics
and International Business. Therefore, in this chapter I also borrow some
knowledge from International Business. I examine mode of entry and choice of
location in the market section. I briefly discuss how entry modes and choices of
location can affect MNCs' overseas success. Different entry modes pose different
levels of risks. Usually, joint ventures and international franchising imply less
control but lower risk than wholly-owned subsidiaries. Location choice is also an
important factor that can affect an MNC's early development in foreign market. In a
centralized-power like China, foreign MNCs tend to choose big cities where they can
expect more relational assets and market demands, whereas some of the best
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opportunities for Chinese investors in the U.S. do not necessarily exist in America's
big cities.
Finally, I wish to point out the significance of the study. The result of this
study will be useful for explaining the recent increase of investments by Chinese
private investors in the U.S. For example, following China Shuanghui’s 2013
acquisition of Virginia-based Smithfield Foods, in |une, 2014 Shandong Tranlin
Paper, a private Chinese pulp and paper company announced it would invest $2
billion over five years to establish its first U.S. operation in Chesterfield, VA. This
move is welcomed by the Virginia Governor.77
How can my studies explain this recent investment? First, from the
perspective of statism, both Shuanghui and Tranlin are private Chinese investors.
No media reports show that they are affiliated with the Chinese government like
Huawei. They are also investing in consumer goods rather than sensitive sectors or
strategic resources. Therefore, they face less resistance from American sectoral
politics. In addition, local officials often welcome those investments that can create
jobs. Governor McAuliffe said: "An investment of this magnitude, with the creation
of 2,000 new jobs by 2020, represents the largest Chinese greenfield economic
development project in the United States."78 Second, from the perspective of
culture, Tranlin's subsidy in the U.S. will be led by University of Virginia Darden
Graduate Jerry Peng, who understands both American culture and Chinese culture.79

77 "Governor McAuliffe Announces 2,000 new jobs in Chesterfield County," accessed on August 19, 2014,
https://governor.virginia.gov/news/newsarticle?articleld=5033
78 "Governor McAuliffe Announces 2,000 new jobs in Chesterfield County," accessed on August 19, 2014,
https://governor.virginia.gov/news/newsarticle?articleld=5033
79 M att Charles, "Chinese Company Led By U.Va. Darden Graduate Invests $2 Billion and Will Create 2,000
Jobs in Virginia." University of Virginia Media, accessed on August 19, 2014,
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Third, from the perspective of market and location, why did Tranlin choose Virginia?
Because Mr. Peng has roots in Virginia where he can gain relational assets and
Chesterfield is also close to the political center of Virginia, Richmond. Arguably, my
studies provide an integrated framework (culture, statism and market) for
analyzing MNCs’ penetration in countries of mutual distrust.

An Overview of Dissertation Organization

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: In the next chapter I look
at American Internet firms in China. First, I will present an overview of China's
Internet Industry. Then, three cases (Google, EBay and Facebook) will be discussed
in details. Through case studies, I can show how my independent variables (cultural,
statist and market) relate to their failures. Beyond difficult adaption to the Chinese
culture, many American internet firms face statist and market obstacles to their
penetration in China. The internet is one of the most heavily regulated industry
sectors in China. Unlike foreign investments in consumer goods (e.g. food and
automobile), foreign investments in China's internet industry lack enough
protection by local Chinese officials and also receive some political resistance. In
Chapter 3 ,1will study cases of American firms succeeding in China. Generally,
American fast food chains and American auto makers are more successful than
American Internet firms in China. However, it is more meaningful to compare firms
when industry sector is controlled (e.g. KFC vs. McDonald's, General Motors and
http://www.darden.virginia.edu/web/Media/Darden-News-Articles/2014/Chinese-Company-Led-By-UVaDarden-Graduate-lnvests-2-Billion-and-Will-Create-2000-Jobs-in-Virginia/
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Ford). I will discuss why KFC and General Motors are more successful than
McDonald's and Ford, respectively. Put simply, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 compare
cases of American MNCs in China. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 turn to discussing cases
of Chinese MNCs in the U.S. Due to the nature of Chinese politics, I group Chinese
MNCs into two kinds: state-owned (Chapter 4) and private (Chapter 5). State-owned
4

Chinese enterprises investing in strategic resources (PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC)
or private Chinese firms with government background investing in critical
infrastructures (Huawei, Sany Heavy) are more likely to be examined by the host
country than others (e.g. Shuanghui). Finally, Chapter 6 presents conclusions and
implications.
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CHAPTER II
CASE STUDY 1: AMERICAN INTERNET AND MEDIA COMPANIES FAILED IN CHINA

China is now the world's largest Internet user - which is why we were so
pleased to include the Internet as a part of today's event. This country now
has the world’s largest mobile phone network, and it is investing in the new
forms of energy that can both sustain growth and combat climate change and I'm looking forward to deepening the partnership between the United
States and China in this critical area tomorrow.1
Barack Obama

Introduction

This chapter highlights American internet and media firms and their fates in
China. Two kinds of corporate failures will be examined: 1. Failure in gaining market
share and establishing an enduring presence. Google and eBay are successful in the
U.S. and many other areas of the world. However, they were defeated by Baidu and
Taobao in China, respectively. When the host and home country have uncertainties
and conflicts caused by starkly different cultures and political regimes, an MNC
investing in sensitive sectors is more likely to face pressure from the host country
and finally exit the host county, unless there is adequate interest for the MNC to
stay. This study finds that Google's and eBay's exits were not only caused by cultural
dissimilarity between China and the U.S., but were also caused by statist
interference and market competition. For example, the Chinese government can
erect obstacles to Google through holding on issuing Internet Content Provider (ICP)
1 Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meeting with Future Chinese
Leaders", Whitehouse.gov, November 16, 2009.
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license. Moreover, due to political resistance from the host country, Google's
services and products were not fully available in China. With regard to market
competition, this chapter shows that both Google and eBay faced strong Chinese
competitors who received state support in the past. 2. Failure in entering China, let
alone market penetration. This kind of failure might be more severe than the
previous one. Google and eBay exited from China, but they are allowed to reenter
the market. In contrast, Facebook along with numerous other American social
network sites (SNS) are blocked in China. Their absence in China has created a
vacuum in the SNS sector that Chinese firms have rushed to fill, which makes
Facebook’s future penetration in China almost impossible. Based on analyses and
comparisons, in the last section this chapter offers some recommendations for
American MNCs doing business in China.

A. An Overview o f the Internet Industry in China
China is currently the largest prize for global internet companies. According to
KMPG and China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
565 million people were using the Internet at the end of 2012, up from 513
million in 2011: an increase of 140,000 Internet users per day. China's
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology forecasts over 800 million
Internet users by 2015, a 700 percent increase in 10 years, yet only a 59
percent penetration rate; this is less than the penetration rate from the US,
Japan and Germany, at 78 percent, 80 percent, and 82 percent respectively.2
Today, internet technologies and social media are highly intertwined. China's
Internet and media market has great potentials. China Internet Network

2 "Social media in China: Local innovation connecting the country," China 360, KPMG April 2013
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Information Center (CNNIC) reported that from 2005 to 2014, China's online
population has increased dramatically. Giant American Internet and media firms are
catching opportunities to set up businesses in China. However, numerous pioneers
have failed in China. As defined in the first chapter, there are different levels of
corporate failures in a foreign market. Numerous American internet firms or media
firms experienced at least two kinds of corporate failures in China: 1. Never entered
China, let along market penetration (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) 2.
Entered China, but finally failed to establish an enduring presence (e.g. Google, eBay,
and the New York Times).
There are many factors leading to their failures. However, in this chapter, I will
focus on my independent variables (IVs) and try to build a causal relationship
between the IVs and DVs. First, from a statist perspective, American internet and
media firms are frustrated by China’s internet censorship. China has a special
system called the "Great Firewall", which is a national project developed by a group
of Chinese computer scientists. The Great Firewall blocks foreign websites that
China's government does not want its people to visit. Today, two popular U.S. social
network sites, Facebook and Twitter, still remain unavailable in China. Some
Chinese Internet users know how to evade the Great Firewall, whereas most
average Chinese Internet users do not. Due to Internet censorship and regulatory
resistance, Google.cn has much less information than Google.com. Google users in
China achieved only limited success from their Google searches, and they started to
use the Chinese search engine website, Baidu. In 2009 when President Obama
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visited Shanghai, China; he criticized Internet censorship at a gathering of 400
young Chinese students.
And that is why America will always speak out for these core principles
around the world. We do not seek to impose any system of government on
any other nation, but we also don't believe that the principles that we stand
for are unique to our nation. These freedoms of expression and worship -of access to information and political participation -- we believe are
universal rights.3
Second, cultural differences thwart efforts by U.S. providers. For instance, a
recent Chinese television program selected elderly people randomly in the streets of
Chinese cities and asked them, "Do you agree with the proposal that your children
must visit and take care of you, or else they will violate the law?" One elderly
Chinese man astonished Chinese viewers with his answer. Asked by a chic female
reporter, he responded furiously: "My daughter is your age. I do not mind if she does
not visit me regularly. But it is a crime that she does not want to get married. Crazy!
She is turning 30 years old. You know, too late!" Today, many Chinese still refer to
single women older than age 27 as "left-over ladies." In Western society, people are
more accepting of unmarried women. Language is an important component of
culture. Language differences can bring challenges for American internet and media
firms when they attempt to adapt their products and service to the Chinese context.
For example, some Chinese internet users just scoffed at Facebook’s name, because
the word "Facebook" expressed in English sounds like the Chinese word

E'F oJ"

(must die). Put simply, American internet and media firms face some unavoidable
cultural obstacles to their market penetration in China.

3 Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meeting with Future Chinese
Leaders", Whitehouse.gov, November 16, 2009.
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Third, from the market perspective, strong competition from rival Chinese
firms limited American firms’ penetration into the Chinese market. After China’s
economic reform in the late 1970s,4 Chinese people were eager to learn from
foreign countries. Like Japanese parents did thirty years ago, Chinese parents are
sending their children to study in the U.S. Most Chinese students in the U.S. are
studying science. The founders of many popular Chinese websites have traveled to
or studied in the U.S., where they gained ideas and learned about inventions. They
also understand the Chinese market, the psychology of Chinese consumers and their
needs better than an average American business executive. Thus, following their
entries into China, American internet and media firms immediately experienced
fierce competition from their Chinese counterparts. In addition, China’s slack
supervision of intellectual property rights creates a hotbed for Chinese internet
firms. Numerous Chinese internet firms simulated or even copied American
platforms. A popular Chinese social network site, Renren, is very similar to
Facebook.5
American internet and media firms differ from each other in various ways.
For example, their offered products or services are different. Google is a search
engine site. EBay is an e-commerce platform. Facebook is a social network site
(usually known as SNS). Despite the fact their fate in China are the same; their
experiences and lessons are different. Therefore, in the next section I will discuss
them in detail.
4 Refer to the Chinese economic reform since the late 1970s. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping
advocated "Change, reform, and open up."
5 Wei Yanpeng, Zhigang Wen, Chunxiao Fan, and Jie Liu, "The Simulation Platform for Mobile Social
Networking," in Broadband Network and Multimedia Technology (IC-BNMT), 2010.

53

Google's Development in China

On March 23, 2010, Google officially announced that it would discontinue its
search business in mainland China and move its Chinese operations to Hong Kong.
Google’s exit from mainland China quickly drew much attention from media
agencies around the globe. American media criticized China for strict internet
censorship.6
In response, Chinese state media Xinhua and China Daily fought back against
their Western counterparts by saying that Google did not follow Chinese rules and
broke promise made to the Chinese government. A Chinese official in charge of the
Internet bureau under the State Council Information Office said,
Google has violated its written promise it made when entering the Chinese
market by stopping filtering its searching service and blaming China in
insinuation for alleged hacker attacks
Online opinion exchanges are very
active in China and e-commerce grows rapidly here. As facts have
demonstrated, the environment for internet investment development in
China is sound.7
Google and the Chinese government are the two players in the dispute over
censorship of Internet searches. One of Google's goals is to establish a foothold and
then penetrate the Chinese market without much interference from the host
government. In the meantime, the Chinese government aims to make Google accept
its strict supervision. As time passed, Google became reluctant to comply with
regulations and policies imposed by the Chinese government. And, the Chinese

6 For example, "Google and China", The New York Times, March 23, 2010.
7 "China says Google breaks promise, totally wrong to stop censoring," Xinhua News, March 23, 2010.
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government erected numerous obstacles to Google's expansion in China.8 In the
globalized today, many neoliberal scholars believe that MNCs have tremendous
influence on world economy, politics and mass media. However, Google's exit shows
that MNCs still have their limits when they confront powerful nation states.

A. Google: An Internet Giant and "Don't be evil."
Google is the world's largest internet search engine company, which has
billions of visits per day. It is also one of the most valuable brands.9 Scholars and
business reports attribute its success to Google's innovation, corporate culture and
social responsibility.10 Google is always a pioneer in the high-tech sector. For
instance, Google Glass is a recent breakthrough in technology. It combines new IT
technologies with regular eyeglasses. By wearing Google Glass, a person can record
what he or she sees and then sends videos, images and texts to friends. Google’s
driverless car is another innovation that has been admired by many car aficionados.
Google Glass and Driverless Car are not publicly available yet, but they have already
received overwhelming inquiries and orders.
Google has expanded its overseas market to obtain more customers. For
instance, Google Maps is currently used in every continent of the world. It is
definitely a symbol of globalization as well as a symbol of U.S. soft power. The
"street view" function of Google Maps makes people's daily lives easier and is

8 For example, Google + and Google Map's street view remains unavailable in Mainland China.
9 According to Interbrand's 2013 ranking, Google's brand value is No.2 next to Apple.
10 Google is the pipeline of innovation. It has many channels for employees to express their ideas, such as
Google Cafes, Google Moderator, Google Universal Ticketing Systems and Google +. For more details,
please read "Google's Secrets of Innovation: Empowering Its Employees" by Laura He.

finding acceptance in many countries. Most U.S. allies have permitted the use of
Google Maps in their countries, including both developing countries [e.g. Mexico,
India, and the Philippines) and developed countries (e.g. South Korea, Europe, and
Japan). However, due to political mistrust and concern over military facilities, some
countries block Google Maps. For example, China blocked Google Maps' "street
view" function. China's concern is that Google's business satellite may take photos of
its military facilities. So, instead of using Google Maps, China encouraged a Chinese
company to build its own map search service like Google Maps called QQ Maps.
Google executives believe that Google has the ability to promote democracy
and freedom through spreading information. Google’s informal corporate motto is
"Don’t be evil."11 Google, together with other U.S. companies, are often viewed as a
part of American soft power and world supremacy. They played an important role
in the Arab Spring and protests in Ukraine. However, Google seems incompatible
with China, an ancient civilization currently mixed with communist regime and
capitalist economy. After five years of investment and development in China, Google
had to depart. Google's annual revenues are larger than some small nation-states in
the world. Google is not only influential in world business and technology; it can
also shape U.S. foreign policies. However, when Google faces communist China, it is
still very vulnerable.

11 The full motto is "Do the right thing: don't be evil. Honesty and Integrity in all we do. Our business
practices are beyond reproach. W e make money by doing good things." See, "Corporate Information. Our
Philosophy, Google." (http://www.google.com /about/com pany/philosophy/)
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ft Google Failed to Establish an Enduring Presence in China
1.

Infancy
Currently, China's market is the world's largest prize for business investment.

Some commentators have asserted that the 21st century belongs to China.12 With
China's accession to the WTO in 2001, China gradually became the world's
manufacturing powerhouse. More and more global companies flooded into China
and set up businesses. Google is one of them. In 2005, Google established its first
research and development center in Beijing, China. Like many other American
companies, Google hoped to capitalize on the Chinese market.
In 2006, Google launched its Chinese website Goolge.cn. Then, Google
appointed the Taiwanese business leader, Lee Kaifu as its China chief. Google
opened three offices in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. It employed hundreds of
sales personnel and technicians in 2006. But, at that time its competitor Baidu
already had 4,000 employees. A report from the China Internet Network
Information Center (CNNIC) shows that in 2006 Baidu’s Chinese market share was
62.1 %, whereas Google accounted for only 25.3%. Local cultures and location
choice matter. The report also shows that Beijing residents prefer Baidu, while
Shanghai residents prefer Google.13 Empirical studies14 indicate that Beijing as
China's political center is more relationship-driven. Beijing is good starting place for
foreign MNCs to build up relational assets. Shanghai is virtually the opposite.
12 There are tw o camps. One holds that the 21$t century is China's century. China is in rise while the U.S. is
decline. The other opposes this view and insists the dominance of U.S. power. See, Michael Beckley,
"China's century? Why America's edge will endure." International Security, winter 2011/12
13 CNNIC Report: "Beijingers prefer Baidu while Shanghers prefer Google" (Chinese), accessed on August
22, 2014, http://tech.sina.com .en/i/2006-09-14/14551139185.shtm l
14 Lai Karen: "Differentiated Markets: Shanghai, Beijing and Hong Kong in China's Financial Centre
network," Urban Studies 49, no. 6, 2012
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Shanghai as China's economic center is famous for its openness and welcoming
attitude to outside influence and foreigners. The Bund of Shanghai is a street with
different styles of foreign buildings. Shanghaiers are more open-minded, but
sometimes other Chinese mock Shanghaiers'"Chong Yang Mei Wai" (worship of
foreign things and fawning on foreign countries).15

2.

Early Development

Google’s development in China was not smooth. After 2007, however, Google
encouraged Chinese employees to innovate and gave full play to their talents.
"Google's 20% Time" is a successful management style. The basic idea is that Google
employees may use 80% of their time to do work projects, while they may spend the
other 20% of the time on their hobbies, new ideas and inventions. 2007 was the
most productive year for Google China. For instance, Google China released twenty
four new products and services such as the Google Chinese Pinyin input method, hot
Chinese topics, and 265.com (a website navigation service). All products, operations
and services launched in China were based on decisions from local Chinese teams
and did not require approval from Google's headquarters in the U.S.
In 2008, China experienced a devastating earthquake in Sichuan province.
Google China immediately released a link to a useful website www.google.cn/qinren - that helped people to find their families and friends who
lost contact in the earthquake. It was very popular and highly praised among the
Chinese general public and state authorities. Also, in 2008, Google China released a
15 Xuanmeng Yu and Xirong He: "Shanghai: Its Urbanization and Culture," Chinese Philosophical Studies
XXIV, 2004, p.238.
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new online advertisement product, Google AdSense, for small and medium Chinese
companies. When then-Google China chief Lee Kaifu was interviewed in December,
2008, he was very optimistic about Google China’s future. He said "Google China's
market share increased about 5% from 2007 through 2008."16

3. Decline and Farewell to China
Year 2009 is the watershed for Google China. In the afternoon of June 18,
2009, Google China’s administrators were summoned by the Chinese government.
Google was then ordered to shut down its overseas search in mainland China.
China's state media CCTV reported this incident and blamed Google for spreading a
large amount of pornography images and videos. Google China was also sued by a
Chinese company because of similar Chinese names.
In September, 2009, Lee Kaifu, a Chinese-American entrepreneur and the
founding president of Google China, announced his decision to resign, saying that his
cancer forced him to leave. This was great shock to both Google China and the
Chinese general public. Lee Kaifu was an outstanding business leader in eyes of
many Chinese. Many young Chinese business students adored him.17 His effort led
Google market share to increase steadily from 2006 to 2009 although Google was
still far behind to Baidu in 2009. Many believed that Lee's resignation was a great
challenge for Google because it was uncertain if his successor John Liu would be able
to advance Google’s development in China. It was reported that following Lee's

16 Beijing Youth Daily, December 30, 2008.
17 Clive Thompson, "Google's China Problem (and China's Google Problem)," The N ew York Times, April
23, 2006.
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resignation, several Google China employees involved in customizing the company's
programs for the Chinese market, had left.18
John Liu was unable to reverse Google's deterioration in China after Lee’s
resignation. When Google was in trouble, its rival Baidu continued to grow and also
got support from the government. Finally, on January 12, 2010, Google announced
that it had been attacked by Chinese hackers. Google asked for negotiations with the
Chinese government and requested for waiver of censorship. Not surprisingly,
Google's request was rejected by the Chinese government. On January 21, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a speech on the Internet freedom and
severely criticized the Chinese government. In a press conference, Chinese
government spokesman Qizheng Zhao responded by reiterating China’s stance that
all foreign companies must obey Chinese law. But, he illustrated the point with yet
another analogy: "Darwin's theory of evolution tells us a species needs to adapt to
its environment in order to evolve. I've never heard of the environment adapting to
the species.”19
Google's exit from China is viewed as corporate failure in China. Why did
Google leave China? In the next section, I will try to relate my IVs (statist, market,
culture) to the DVs and build the causal relationship.

18 Malcolm Moore, "Is Google China Throwing in the Towel," China Economic Review, December 15, 2009.
19 "CPPCC Spokesman Waxes Metaphorical on U.S.-China Ties, Google" The W all Street Journal, March 2,

2010.
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Why Did Google Finally Exit From China?

A. The Host Country Is Concerned about Google's Close Ties to Its Home Government
Some Chinese media reports have suggested that Google has a close tie to the
U.S. government.20 Particularly, after the Snowden Incident, Google, Facebook and
other major American Internet companies were blamed for releasing private
information to the U.S. government. Google denied this charge, saying that Google
was independent and did not violate laws of privacy and that NSA hacked into
Google.
However, the Chinese government and some Chinese nationalists did not buy
this idea. China was afraid or distrustful of Google. For instance, Google Earth has
never been admitted into Mainland China. Why? Many Chinese believe the primary
reason is Google Earth's high-defmition world map, which uses images taken by
Google's business satellites, would allow its home government to spy on military
facilities in China.21 Chinese military analysts often question Google's satellites and
whether there is a relationship between Google's business satellites and U.S.
intelligence satellites, or if Google's satellites are really independent of the U.S.
government and military. Given that Google's services and products were not fully
available in China, Google had some disadvantages in attracting internet users
compared to its Chinese competitors.

20 http://tech.ifeng.com /internet/detail_2013_07/15/27502754_0.shtm l
21 Sumner Lemon, "Google Earth Captures China's New Ballistic-Missile Sub", abcNews, July 9 2007.

B. Sectoral Politics in the Host Country: ICP and China's Internet Sector
The internet sector of China is heavily regulated by a set of laws. Google, in
order to operate a website in China, must obtain an Internet Content Provider (ICP)
license every other year from China’s Internet authority, the Chinese Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology.22 In reviewing renewal applications, the
Ministry inspects operations over a period of time and verifies that the website
qualifies for renewal. Google had trouble getting an ICP license in 2009 because it
was involved in spreading pornography, although Google eventually was able to
renew its ICP license. It remains unclear what obstacles Google faced and what
changes Google had to make in order to secure approval of its Chinese ICP
certificate.

C. Attacks from Chinese Hackers
Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber-attacks of
varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly
sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure
originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property
from Google.
David Drummond, Google senior executive

In January 2010, David Drummond, Google's corporate development and chief
legal officer, published an article "A New Approach to China" on Google's official
blog. He pointed out three major reasons why Google left China: First, Google and
other U.S. Internet companies had been the victims of a sophisticated cyber-attack
22 This ICP license regime was introduced in September, 2000. It is regarded as a part of China's Internet
censorship.

62

originating from China in January, 2010. Second, Gmail accounts of several Chinese
human rights activists are under surveillance for years. Third, in 2009 China further
limited free speech on the web including the persistent blocking of websites such as
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Google Docs.23
Why did Google enter China in 2005? David Drummond argued that at the very
beginning Google can tolerate some censorship, because Google wanted to let more
Chinese have the access to obtain information freely. Since then, Google had been
closely watching the limits of Chinese laws and regulations on Google’s service.
However, in the past few years, Chinese restrictions on freedom of speech on the
Internet had completely broken Google’s bottom line, which caused Google to
reevaluate the feasibility of its operation in China24 Finally, Google decided not to
follow the Chinese rules and stopped eliminating sensitive information on
Google.cn. This angered the Chinese government, which blamed Google for
spreading pornography.

D. Fierce Market Competition with Baidu
Baidu is currently the largest Chinese search engine. It was established in
2000 by Yanhong Li. It is necessary to introduce Li’s life because his personal
experience is related to Baidu's competition with Google.
Li’s overseas experience benefited Baidu's development. Li studied at Peking
University, China's Harvard, where he gained some useful relational assets. Later, he

23 David Drummond, "A New Approach to China," Google Official Blog
(http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html)
24 Ibid.
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studied at the State University of New York and majored in computer science. After
graduation, Li fortuitously landed an engineering job in Silicon Valley. During his
work in the U.S., he developed the Rankdex algorithm.25 Later, he utilized this
technology for Baidu's search engine. Li's work experience in Silicon Valley
including Infoseek was very important to the build-up of Baidu, because he honed
his technical and business skills in the U.S. In 1999, Li raised $120 million in venture
capital to fund his search engine concept.26
Li established Baidu in ZhongGuan Chun in January, 2000.27 Seven months
later, Baidu started to provide search services for Sohu and Sina, two popular news
websites in China. China's intellectual property law (IPL) was then less strict than it
now. In addition, Baidu’s establishment was prior to China's admission to the WTO.
There was no strong external force that pushed Baidu to obey international
standards set by the WTO. Therefore, in its early years Baidu was able to provide
free music and videos and allow users to download them for free. By contrast,
Google could not do the same as Baidu did, because the U.S. had strict intellectual
property laws. If Google did the same as Baidu did, Google would get lawsuits from
other American companies. After 2004, the piracy issue was getting worse, so the
U.S. government urged the Chinese government to follow international practices
and to solve the piracy problem. Even though China joined the WTO in early 2002,
the Chinese government did not take this issue seriously, because the WTO gave

25 Yanhong Li, "Toward a Qualitative Search Engine", IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 2, no. 4, July/August
1998.
26 Yu Zhou, The Inside Story o f China's High-tech Industry: Making Silicon Valley in Beijing,
(Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2007), p.123.
27 ZhongGuan Chun is a technology hub in Beijing. In the late 1980s, Chinese governmental officials visited
the U.S. and realized that China should also build a high-tech area like Silicon Valley.
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China a five-year transition period. During the five years of transition, the Chinese
government actually tolerated piracy and protected its infant industries including
Baidu. To some extent, Baidu’s fast development benefited from China’s state-led
development. However, we cannot argue that Google’s failure and Baidu's success is
merely due to state intervention or support. We should also consider market
competition.
Market competition was ruthless. As Google's major competitor, Baidu
repeatedly attributed Google's failure to fierce market competition and Google's
wrong strategies. Zhansheng Wang, Baidu’s financial director, said,
With the development of Chinese language and the growth of China’s
unique economy, we believe that fully dependence on imported technology
will not last, and we also believe that Chinese people will better understand
their culture using their own search engine technology.
Some surveys have shown that Baidu is better than Google for searching
Chinese words.28 Both Google.com and Google.cn exist side by side. Google founder
Sergey Brin said: "Only one percent of Chinese surfers use the censored site. But the
American site is frequently slow and intermittently inaccessible inside China."29
Many Chinese Internet users also pointed out that Google's search results were
often less relevant compared to Baidu. Indeed, the quality and substance of results
on Google.cn can vary radically from the main search engine.30 Despite the fact that
Google had invested a lot in China, its search engine was not widely accepted by the
Chinese public. According to statistical data published by CNNIC in September 2009,

28 http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2179779/Baidu-We-Do-Semantic-Search-Better-Than-Google
29 Thomas Crampton, "Google Is Voicing Some Doubt over China-Technology-International Herald
Tribune", The New York Times, June 7, 2006.
30 Thomas Crampton, "Google is voicing some doubt over China-Technology-International Herald
Tribune", The New York Times, June 7, 2006.
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only 12.7% of Chinese Internet users chose Google China as their first choice, down
3.9% from 2008. By contrast, 77.2% Chinese Internet users chose Baidu.31

£. Difficult Adaption to Host Country
Most people attributed Google's exit to censorship, hacking or market
competition in China. However, some had other explanations. They thought
Google's failure was due to its failed adaption to Chinese culture.32 When Google
was doing business in China, Google itself should have expected some differences
arose from the rule-based & relation-based cultures. According to Financial Times,
the chief executives of Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have declined to back
Google's threat to pull out of China over censorship and cyber-attacks. Steve
Ballmer, former Microsoft chief executive, described Google's row with China as "the
Google problem.”33 He argued that "every large institution is being hacked."34 So,
attacks from hackers cannot be an excuse to withdraw from China. Mark Hurd, CEO
of HP, mentioned that China is "an amazing market with tremendous growth"35 and
Google should overcome challenges instead of leaving the world's largest online
market. Both Microsoft and HP played down the threats to Internet security which
Google mentioned.
China is a relation-based country, where the enforcement of laws and
regulations was on the books in some situations (e.g. Intellectual Property). China is

31 "Google is simply not successful in China." China Daily, January, 2010.
32 "CPPCC spokesman: Google should adapt itself to Chinese culture," People's Daily, March 3, 2010.
33 "Microsoft, HP fail to back Google's China move", China Daily, January, 2010.
34 Ibid.
35
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also a developing country. It is costly for an average Chinese wage earner to
purchase authentic Windows software. Thus, piracy was rampant in China.
Microsoft along with HP did not support Google's explanation for exit. Instead,
Microsoft thought Google itself failed in adapting to China. Microsoft leaders argued
that Microsoft did not leave China because of piracy. Instead, Microsoft took efforts
to persuade more Chinese people to buy authentic copies and is experiencing more
success now.36 With more and more Chinese having the means to afford Microsoft
products and the development of intellectual property laws, the situation is
improving in China and Microsoft continues to profit.
Google set up a research and development center in China in 2005. In 2010, it
exited mainland China. Some Chinese college students and well-educated urban
residents are disappointed by Google's exit. In order to obtain foreign information
accessible through Google, they have to evade China's Great Firewall, which is timeconsuming and requires special computer skills and software. However, Google's
exit did not affect most average Chinese internet users. During the intervening five
years, Google encountered numerous problems. China, as one of several emerging
markets, had unique cultural and political circumstances with which Google had to
contend. The case of Google’s Chinese development shows that American internet
and media firms are facing either one or two of these issues while doing businesses
in China: cultural relevance for the Chinese users, fierce market competition and
statist intervention from the host country. The next two cases, eBay and Facebook,
will further support the above argument.
36 Microsoft News Center, "HP and Microsoft Simplify Technology Environments W ith Solutions Built on
New Infrastructure-to-Application Model", January 13, 2010.

67

eBay China

Ten to 15 years from now, I think China can be eBay's largest market on a
global basis.... We think China has tremendous long-term potential and we
want to do everything we can to maintain our No. 1 position.37
Meg Whitman, former eBay CEO, 2004

eBay along with Google entered China with confidence and expectation.
However, both failed to establish their enduring presence in China. Unlike Google,
eBay did not receive regulatory resistance or censorship from the host government.
So, what led to eBay's failure in China? Before answering this question, let's look at
what motivated eBay to enter China and how did it enter China.

What Motivated eBay to Enter China?

The emerging online consumer-to-consumer (C2C) market is shaping China's
economy. It has benefited both buyers and sellers. Online shopping has at least three
advantages compared to shopping at a physical store. First, online products are
usually cheaper than those in physical stores. Second, buyers can get products not
available in the stores nearby their homes. Third, it can lower sellers' costs and thus
increase the number of potential sellers. Over the past two decades, China's fast
development is largely due to its export-led economy model. For this matter,
China's domestic household consumption is weak. In recent years, the Chinese
37 William Barnett, Xiaoqu Luo, Mi Feng: "Taobao vs. eBay China", Stanford Graduate School o f Business,
Case No IB88, 2010.
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central government has realized that China's growth could not depend on exports in
the long run. Thus, China needs to shift from exports to domestic consumption. In
order to increase domestic consumption, the Chinese government has opened up ecommerce market to foreign investment since the early 2000s. Under this
background, eBay chose to enter China.
On August 18,1999, Eachnet was established in Shanghai, China. It was the
first C2C e-commerce platform in China. The founders are Yibo Shao and Haiyin Tan.
They were both Shanghai residents and graduated from Harvard business school. At
the very beginning, in order to attract customers, Eachnet was free for both buyers
and sellers. With fast development and expansion, Eachnet started to charge users
in 2001.
In March, 2002, eBay invested 30 million dollars in Eachnet and became a
strategic partner with Eachnet.38 In a short time, Eachnet developed into the largest
online seller in China. In June 2003, eBay officially purchased Eachnet and entered
China. At the same time when eBay entered China, a Chinese rival Taobao was
established. It was also free for all users at the beginning.
Eachnet was once a leading online seller in China, accounting for 80% of
market share in China, because it was experienced in sales either internationally or
domestically.39 In addition, Eachnet maintained good relations with its customers.
Thus, at that time many business analysts believed that with purchase of Eachnet,
eBay would become a leading online commerce platform in China. Although eBay

38 Nicolas Ning, "Going, Going, Gone: eBay Plans Exit?" Shanghai Daily, September, 2006.
39 eBay invested US$180 million to capture 80% of China's ecommerce market in 2002, only to see that
shrunk to 36% by 2005 (http://www.psycheselling.com/eNewsletter%20Jun%202008.htm)
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had failed in Japan prior to entering China, many business observers optimistically
believed that eBay could succeed in China through learning lessons from the past.
Moreover, eBay was then growing very fast and dominated the online market in the
U.S. However, eBay's later failure in China let down those optimists.

How Did eBay Exit from China: Cultural, Statist and Market Causes of eBay's Failure

The year 2006 was the watershed for eBay and Taobao, a leading Chinese Ecommerce firm. By the end of 2006, eBay had invested three hundred million dollars
in China, but with little success. Its market share was decreasing yearly. By contrast,
its Chinese rivals, Alibaba’s Taobao and Tencent’s Paipai surpassed eBay. EBay's
market share was only 20% in 2006 and former Eachnet leader Yibo Shao left eBay.
Taobao actually became the largest online seller in Asia in 2006. According to
Bloomberg Business Week, Taobao occupied 72% market share. Its transaction was
more than 1.7 billion US dollars. It had more than eighteen millions items online and
its registered users were increasing faster than eBay.40 In December 2006, eBay had
to shut its main website in China and entered into a joint venture with a Chinese
company instead.41

40 Frederik Balfour, "Tom Online: eBay's Last China Card", Bloomberg Business Week, December 19, 2006.
41 Katie Hafner, "EBay Is Expected to Close Its Auction Site in China," The New York Times, accessed on
August 22, 2014, http://w w w .nytim es.com /2006/12/19/technology/19ebay.htm l7_rs0
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A. A Cultural View: eBay Failed in Localization
Localization is a popular term used in many areas, such as computing,
website building, language, video games and human recourses. In the field of
international political economy, localization often comes with glocalization, which
refers to the idea of "think globally, act locally."42 There are many comparison
studies of Taobao and eBay 43 They compare websites, customer service, corporate
cultures and localization strategies of the two companies. EBay as an American MNC
faced more localization problems than Taobao, such as website translation,
decision-making between Chinese officers and officers in the U.S. headquarters.
EBay's Chinese leaders complained that the eBay headquarter in San ]ose did not
listen to their opinions. The former head of strategic planning at eBay China, Charles
Shen, complained,
As the service is now running from the global platform in San Jose,
California, if we have to add a new feature, it takes quarters, instead of
months. Taobao is more flexible and faster in responding to users.44
EBay's Chinese leaders felt that they were remotely manipulated. Although
eBay's CEO Meg Whitman had spent some time in China, her knowledge of the
Chinese market is still limited. EBay has succeeded in Europe. However, China's
different culture made eBay's adaption to the Chinese market more difficult. One
example shows that the lack of cultural awareness from some U.S. managers can
cause problems. A senior eBay manager visited China and brought some green hats

42 Luigi Dumistrescu, Simona Vinerean: "The Global Strategy of Global Brands", Studies in Business and
Economics, Volumes, Issue3, 2010.
43 Dahui Li, Jun Li, Zhangxi Lin: "Online consumer-to-consumer market in China-a comparative study of
Taobao and eBay", Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, vol. 7, issue 1, 2008.
44 William Barnett, Xiaoqu Luo, Mi Feng: "Taobao vs. eBay China", Stanford Graduate School of Business,
Case No IB88, 2010.
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as gifts for his Chinese colleagues. His Chinese colleagues were shocked and felt
very embarrassed. In the U.S. people wear green hats on Saint Patrick's Day. But, in
China wearing a green hat signals that you are a cuckold.45
To some extent, eBay failed in localizing its managers as well as services.
When eBay entered China, it copied its formula from the U.S., such as charging
multiple listing fees and a final price percentage while Taobao did not have such
fees.46 In 2006, eBay had to cancel the fees for basic service, but it was too late. At
that time Taobao had already attracted many customers from eBay. Another factor
which makes Taobao more popular than eBay in China is its instant messaging
service. In 2003, Taobao started Aliwangwang, an instant communication tool to
help buyers and sellers interact.47 Paul Pavlou, professor of management
information systems at Temple University said: "Those Chinese buyers really want
to get to know the sellers."48 Culturally, most Chinese buyers have the habit of
cutting the price. But, eBay China's website did not allow buyers to contact sellers
directly at the beginning. Rosella said:
Successful in dozens of countries, the multi-billion dollar business was no
match for China, where citizens place a premium on interpersonal
relationships and high-quality social interactions.49
Besides, many Chinese customers prefer to use Taobao's Alipay than eBay's
Paypal. They think Alipay is a more comfortable way to pay online. As Ma said,

45 Prem Ramburuth, Christina Stringer, Manuel Serapio: Dynamics o f International Business: Asia-Pacific
Business Cases, Cambridge, 2013, p.222
46 Guang Yang, Rishuang Wang: 'The Institutionalization of an Electronic Marketplace in China, 1 9 9 8 2010", Product Innovation Management, January 2013.
47 Mark Greeven, Shengyun Yang, etc. "How Taobao bested eBay in China," Financial Times, March 12,

2012.
48 Rosella Elenanor Lafevre, "Why eBay failed in China?" Pacific Standard, June 2013.
49 Rosella Elenanor Lafevre, "Why eBay failed in China?" Pacific Standard, June 2013
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All for the summarize of the success of Taobao are simple two sentences,
because we are a very native of local Chinese pioneering group, so we know
what Chinese consumers need and eager, because we know, we respect
everyone's needs, we have to make it out, thus is our secrets of success.50

B. Market Competition
Paipai is another rival to eBay besides of Taobao. Taobao in Chinese means
find treasures while Paipai means auction. Paipai was launched in September, 2005.
Less than half a year after its establishment, Paipai announced that its total listings
had already exceeded that of eBay Eachnet.51 Why could Paipai overtake eBay in
such a short period of time? Paipai is a subsidiary of China's largest internet firm,
Tencent. Compared to eBay, Paipai could take the advantage of Tencent’s QQ (QQ is
a well-known instant message software in China). As of March 2013, there were
around eight hundred million active QQ accounts.52 Through the platform of QQ, an
E-commerce firm can quickly reach majority of young Chinese people who are
actually the most active online shoppers. Indeed, QQ served as a powerful marketing
tool for Paipai in competitions.
Moreover, Paipai and Tencent's founder Huateng Ma majored in computer
science and is familiar with online marketing and new technologies. In the early
stage of development, Paipai did the same thing that Taobao did, that is, getting risk
investments from foreign countries, particularly the U.S. In the 1990s, Tencent
received risk investments from at least two American companies, International Data

50 Dahai Dong and Xiumin Jiang, "The Construction of Shopping Website Cultural - Case Analysis of
Taobao." M anagem ent and Service Science, 2011 International Conference on, 12-14 Aug. 2011.
51 "Tencent's PaiPai Overtakes eBay Eachnet," Pacific Epoch, March 14, 2006.
52 'Tencent Announces 2012 Fourth Quarter and Annual Results," PR Newswire, March 20, 2013.
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Group Inc. and Pacific Century CyberWorks Limited.53 Tencent and Taobao also
learned or copied some technologies from U.S. companies in the 1990s when many
Chinese IT companies ignored intellectual property rights. For instance, Huateng Ma
copied American messaging software ICQ and developed its Chinese version called
QICQ, which caused ICQ to sued Huateng Ma. Although Mr. Ma lost the lawsuit and
had to change the name QICQ to QQ, this did not bring much trouble to him. With a
better understanding of the Chinese market and invisible Guanxi, Ma's QQ beat MSN
messenger and ICQ in China. Today, QQ is an inseparable part of Chinese people's
daily life. As a powerful marketing and messaging tool, QQ helped Paipai
outperformed eBay in China.

C. A Statist View: Taobao Has State Support While eBay Doses Not
Admittedly, cultural and market factors play important roles in the case of
eBay vs. Taobao and Paipai. However, we should never neglect the role of state. In
China's sectoral politics, Chinese firms in young industry sectors are often
encouraged by the state. E-commerce is a young industry sector. Given that Taobao
is a Chinese firm, it does enjoy some benefits from the state that eBay does not. Yun
Ma, founder of Taobao, beat eBay and made the Chinese leadership proud of Chinese
firms. In recent years, he was greeted by top Chinese leaders including President Xi
and was cited as an example of China's national pride. Indeed, we have to
acknowledge that the success of Taobao is mixed with China's rapid economy
growth, nationalism, and political support from the government. Today, Yun Ma (or
53 Stella Zhang, "M a Huateng Co-founder of the QQ Empire," accessed on August 20, 2014,
http://cib.shangbao.net.cn/epaper/cib/285qi/2012/0314/86522.htm l
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Jack Ma) is one of the richest Chinese businessmen. He is frequently interviewed by
Western media such as CNN, Financial Times and Forbes. Paul Gillis of Peking
University said,
People say China hasn't created a Steve Jobs but I think they have, 1think it
is Jack Ma
and he doesn’t want to make the same mistake Steve Jobs did,
which is to give other people control over his company.54
TaoBao's success over eBay is related to two points: Ma’s U.S. experience and
his Guanxi with the Chinese government. Previous studies show that Yun Ma had no
idea of the Internet until a lucky trip to the U.S. In early 1995, Yun Ma had a chance
to visit the U.S. With his friends’ help, Yun Ma got to know the trend of Internet
development in the U.S. He envisioned the bright future of Internet business in
China. So, he immediately collected 20,000 Chinese Yuan and started a website
called "China Yellow Pages",55 which is one of the earliest websites in China. Less
than three years later, he made 3 million Yuan from this website.56
Yun Ma's ambition is beyond the 3 million Yuan. He wanted to build a business
empire in China. He clearly knew that without support from the government, he
could not make it. Thus, in 1997 he traveled to Beijing and persuaded government
officials to build government websites. Yun Ma suggested that he would like to build
those websites for free. It turned out that Chinese government officials were
amazed at the U.S. new technology, the Internet. They praised Yun Ma for his
innovation and contribution. With money earned from his first website and support
from the Chinese government, Yun Ma became much more self-confident. Therefore,

54 Jamil Anderlini, "Jack Ma, the Mogul heading to Wall Street." Financial Times, September 27, 2013.
ss Jamil Anderlini, "Jack Ma, the Mogul heading to Wall Street." Financial Times, September 27, 2013.
56 Ibid.
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in March, 1999, he started Alibaba, one of the earliest e-commerce websites in
China. Several months later, he received five million US dollars of risk investment.57
In 2003, he used some of this investment to build Taobao. Without support from
local and state governments, Taobao could not grow such fast and reach every
province in China. When Taobao beat eBay in 2006, Ma's business empire reached
its climax.

Facebook and Social Network Sites (SNS) in China

Google and eBay entered China, but they failed to establish a foothold. They
may learn lessons from the failures and later reenter the market. Their situation is
better than those American internet and media firms which are banned in China.
Due to the absence of Facebook, YouTube and Twitter in China, their Chinese
counterparts have emerged quickly and gained large market shares. For instance,
Youku is the most popular video website in China. Renren, China's Facebook, has a
webpage layout extremely similar to that of Facebook. Weibo is the Chinese Twitter.
Facebook is built upon the "six degrees of separation" or "small world
phenomenon." This theory suggests that the average number of steps to know a
stranger between any people is six.58 Like many other Internet companies,
Facebook’s success is largely due to its innovation. Facebook makes the world and
people more connected.

57 http://new s.xinhuanet.com /politics/2013-ll/20/c_118225908.htm
58 Reza Bakhshandeh and Medi Samadi, etc. "Degrees of Separation in Social Networks," AAAI
Publications, Fourth Annual Symposium on Combinatorial Search, 2011.
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Facebook is the world's largest social network website. Its users are about
one billion a month, accounting for one seventh of the world population.59 Its major
founders started it when they were still college students. Today, Facebook has
already developed into a business giant Mark Zuckerberg's success is encouraging
more and more young entrepreneurs. Freedom of speech is a major characteristic
of Facebook. Basically, you can find or discuss any topics on Facebook, like the U.S.
election, India's social movements, and China's human rights issue. The world is
divided into the Haves and Have Nots. China, North Korea, Syria and Iran do not
have Facebook, because authoritarian leaders know that political and social stability
is crucial to their interests and survivals. In the Arab Spring, Facebook served as an
online gathering place for anti-government riots. There are also many sensitive
topics regarding Chinese politics on Facebook, including Fa Lun Gong, human rights,
Tibet, leadership scandals and corruptions. Yongkang Zhou and Yunshan Liu, two
members of China's Politburo Standing Committee, were tasked with stability
maintenance. Under their guidance, China built the "Great Firewall."60

59 Jemima Kiss, "Facebook Hits 1 Billion Users a Month", Guardian, October 2012.
60 Ken Sofer, "M eet the New Politburo Standing Committee: China's 2012 Party Leadership Transition",
Center for American Progress, November 16, 2012.

A. The Great Firewall o f China
"If you open the window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in."
Deng Xiaoping

Two thousand years ago, China’s first emperor Qin Shihuang built the Great
Wall to stop barbarians invading China. The Great Wall is one of the world's seven
wonders. Although it has already lost its military function, it is a symbol of China
tourism today. The Great Wall had many drawbacks and actually did not fully
protect China. In history, Mongolians broke some corners of the Great Wall and
invaded China. Likewise, the Great Firewall also has its drawbacks. It cannot stop
every Chinese to visit Facebook or YouTube. Immediately after the Great Firewall
was invented, Chinese Internet users found new methods to evade it. For example,
they can use foreign proxy servers or install special software. By doing so, it is either
time-consuming or much slower than normal visit. Moreover, for average Internet
users who have limited computer skills, they probably do not know how to find
foreign proxy servers. Until today, there is no accurate statistic to show how many
websites have been blocked by the Great Firewall.
Economic development and democracy is not necessarily causal to each other.
Shue argues that,
In light of "modernization" in Asia generally, we certainly cannot assume
that systemic "reform”, pursued primarily to attain economic efficiency and
administrative rationalization, will necessarily bring with them enhanced
• political influence or democratic freedoms for the masses of rural people.61

61 Vivienne Shue, The Reach o f The State: Sketches o f the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford University Press,
1988), p l5 7 .
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Facebook was in China for a while. It has been blocked by the Great Firewall
Since 2008. Mark Zuckerberg with his Chinese-American girlfriend visited China
several times.62 However, as long as Internet censorship is strict in China, Facebook
has no plans to launch in China. Many people thought that the Chinese authority
would make China become more democratic with double digit GDP growth rate
from 2000 to 2008. But, they were wrong. The Great Firewall, an Internet
censorship system, was invented at the time when China's economy was fastestgrowing. Senior public security leaders were very cautious about mass incidents
caused by land expropriation and huge income gap. The Great Firewall helps
prevent separatist and terrorist movements in China, which is embraced by some
Chinese people. However, it blocked many foreign websites and received much
criticism either domestically or internationally.

B. Social Network Services (SNS) in China
Innovation in Chinese SNS helps explain the lack of market penetration by
American firms. According to iResearch, in 2011 the population of China's social
network users is 370 million and is expected to reach 510 million in 2014.63 The
population of U.S. social network users is 150 million. iReasearch divides the
development of SNS in China to three periods: 1. Infancy (1999-2004); 2 Start-up
and slow development period (2005-2007); and 3. Populace and fast development
period (2008-present). iResearch also categorizes four types of SNS in China:
entertainment; marriage and dating; business and others. Entertainment SNS has
62 "Mark Zuckerberg visits China, sparking 'new business' speculation", Telegraph, December, 2010
63 iResearch China Social Network M arket Research 2010-2011.
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the much more users than other types of SNS, accounting for 75.1%. Dating and
marriage SNS are second, accounting for 16.1% of the total population. Since many
foreign SNS platforms are not available in China, Chinese SNS companies did not
face strong competition. Moreover, their initial features and functions are very
similar to foreign SNS platforms, but now find themselves innovating beyond the
initial look and feel of Facebook or Twitter.64 Today, there are various SNS in China.
The top ones are QQ, Sina Weibo, Renren, Tencent Weibo, Douban, KaixinOOl and
WeChat. On the next page is a chart of top Chinese SNS platforms provided by KPMG.

64 "Social media in China: Local innovation connecting the country," KPMG: China 360, April, 2013.
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Table 2.1
Top SNS Platforms in China
Owner

Active
users
(million)

Platform(s)

Description and functions

QQ

Tencent
Holdings

800

Desktop, PC,
Mobile

Qzone

Tencent
Holdings

600

Desktop, PC,
Mobile

Weixin
(WeChat)

Tencent
Holdings

300

Mobile only

Sina Weibo

SINA
Corporatio
n
Tencent
Holdings

350

Mobile, Desktop
and PC accessible

250

Mobile, Desktop
and PC accessible

China
InterActive
Corp
Yang Bo,
private
equity
investors

100

Desktop, PC,
Mobile

100

Desktop, PC,
Mobile

One of Tencent’s oldest
applications. Used as a
person-to-person (P2P)
communication tool. Works
on any smart phone, even 2G
versions.
Facebook-like SNS website allow users to create home
pages, blog, upload photos
and videos. Links seamlessly
withQQ
First China-base app to launch
in English. Instant message
and talk platform
Twitter-like blog with
Facebook advertisement
features.
Very similar to Sina Weibo,
capitalizes on its large user
base from QQ.
Facebook-like SNS niche
website. Popularity among
college students.
SNS niche website - allows
users to record information
and create content related
film, books, music, and recent
events and activities in
Chinese cities.

Tencent
Weibo
RenRen

Douban

Source: KPMG

Many SNS and TV programs in China are relatively new. They are only two or
three years old, "yet they are tailoring innovative and fun platforms that not only
meet the needs of China’s online population, but also satisfy government
regulations.”65 Like YouTube in the U.S., there are various Chinese TV programs and
videos on the Internet. One of the most famous TV programs is called "Fei Cheng Wu
65 "Social media in China: Local innovation connecting the country," KPMG: China 360, April, 2013.

Rao (If you are the one)". This TV program serves as a good example of statist
intervention. In 2010, Chinese central government propaganda officials issued a
directive calling the shows "vulgar" and faulting them for promoting materialism,
openly discussing sexual matters and "making up false stories, thus hurting the
credibility of the media."66

Summary and Suggestions for American Internet Firms

In this chapter, I have chiefly discussed several major factors that resulted in
the failures of American Internet companies in China. First, China did not take piracy
seriously until recently, because when China joined the WTO in early 2002, the WTO
gave China at least five years of transition. In other words, China was not required to
fully open its market in the transition period, which benefited Baidu, Google's major
competitor in China. For example, in its early years of development, Baidu put free
movies and music on its website. By contrast, Google could not put any Hollywood
movies or American music on its Chinese website because Google is an American
firm and might be sued by other American firms if it did so. Second, Google's failure
is not merely due to the intervention by the Chinese government. In terms of
searching Chinese words, Baidu did a better job than Google. Google advocated for a
higher degree of internet freedom. On one hand, it exposed much sensitive
information regarding Chinese politics that the Chinese internet users could not find

66 Xiyuan Yang, "China's Censors Rein in 'Vulgar' Reality TV Show," The New York Times, July 18, 2010
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through Baidu. But, on the other hand Google did a poor job of blocking
pornography compared to Baidu.
Third, similar to Google's situation in China, eBay also faced a strong
competitor in China. Taobao beat eBay in both government-company relations and
market entry. Prior to eBay’s launch in China, Yun Ma, founder of Taobao, had
already established good relations with the Chinese government as he built a series
of websites for the Chinese authorities for free in the late 1990s. In addition, eBay
lost market competition at the very beginning when it entered the Chinese market.
For instance, eBay charged fees for basic services and its Chinese website did not
have an instant messaging tool between buyers and sellers. Taobao knew the
Chinese consumers better than eBay. Taobao promised free listings to the Chinese
consumers and also created Aliwangwang, a free online tool, through which buyers
could haggle with sellers.
Fourth, unlike eBay and Google who voluntarily exited the Chinese market,
Facebook did not really enter China as it was blocked by the Great Firewall of China.
Due to the absence of Facebook in China for years, Chinese SNS have already grown
up and the Chinese internet is already accustomed to using them. Even though the
Chinese government lifts bans on Facebook in the future, it would be very difficult
for Facebook to gain a huge success in China, because the market for SNS in China is
already saturated.
Finally, it is necessary to draw some lessons from the failures of Google, eBay,
andFacebook. Not all American companies failed in China. Some are doing good
business in China. IBM, Intel and Apple provide high-tech physical products, which
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are welcomed by the Chinese public and government. They do not have strong
Chinese competitors. In addition, they do not publicly comment on Chinese politics
and just focus on doing business. By contrast, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook only
provide online services. In their online content, there is criticism of Chinese politics
which upset the Chinese government. As I discussed before, government
intervention and localization are the two major causes of failures for American
Internet companies.
EBay does not talk about Chinese politics, but it still has failed in China. The
major cause of its failure is market competition instead of government censorship.
Taobao, EBay’s Chinese rival, has a better understanding of the Chinese customers'
demand than eBay. The founder of Taobao, Yun Ma said, "eBay maybe a shark in the
sea, but I am a crocodile in the Yangtze River. If we fight in the sea, I’m sure to fail;
but if we contest in rivers, we can win.”67

67 Dahai Dong and Xiumin Jiang, "The Construction of Shopping Website Cultural - Case Analysis of
Taobao." M anagem ent and Service Science, 2011 International Conference on 12-14 Aug. 2011.
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Table 2.2
Comparisons among American Firms in China
Type

U.S.
companies

Strong

Service/products

Discuss

Chinese

Chinese

rivals

politics

Result

Google

search engine

Baidu

Service

Yes

Failed

eBay

e-commerce

Taobao

Service

No

Failed

YouTube

video

Youku

Service

Yes

Failed

Facebook

social network

RenRen

Service

Yes

Failed

Twitter

Social network

Weibo

Service

Yes

Failed

Apple

hardware

None

Products

No

Succeeded

IBM

comprehensive

None

Service/Products

No

Succeeded

Intel

hardware

None

Products

No

Succeeded

Source: author’s data

Based on Table 2.2, there are some suggestions for American internet
companies in China.
1. Depoliticization of services and products. Google, YouTube, Facebook and
Twitter all failed in China due to their criticism of Chinese politics or connection
with the U.S. government.
2. Provide online services as well as high-quality physical products. Chinese
companies emulate American companies' websites or IT services at first and later
make them better adapted to Chinese consumers. However, high-quality physical
products (e.g. iPhone, Intel CPUs, ThinkPad, and iPad) are not easy to be copied by

Chinese companies. American companies should think about how to provide
physical by-products beyond online services.
3.

Do not invest by yourself. American IT service providers often face the

problem of localization. Therefore, Cooperating with Hong Kong or Taiwan
companies can help lower investment risks. Hong Kong and Taiwan companies can
serve as a bridge between mainland China and the West. At the same time, we also
hope that China could continue to reform its political and financial systems.
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CHAPTER III

CASE STUDY 2: AMERICAN COMPANIES THAT HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CHINA

With only 5% of the world's population, the U.S. controlled about 75% of its
television programs. Combined with the influence of brands and products
such as Hollywood, Kentucky Fried Chicken, McDonald's, jeans and CocaCola, American culture has permeated almost the entire world.
Complained by a Chinese propaganda official, January, 20111

Introduction

Unlike an Internet company, a fast food chain or an auto plant hires more
people. For instance, by the end of 2007, KFC has employed more than 160,000
Chinese employees. KFC announced that it would insist to employ more local
people.2 In 2013, McDonald's has approximately 90,000 employees in China.
McDonald's is planning to hire 75,000 more new employees.3 KFC together with
other fast-food companies have also created huge tax revenues and stimulated
China's domestic market demands which are exactly desired by the Chinese
government. Even though in recent years KFC was warned by the Chinese
government due to its "45-day-old chickens" problem, the Chinese government and
public's positive attitudes toward KFC are still unshakable.

1 "Sun Tzu and the art of soft power," The Economist, December 17, 2011.
2 Longyu Zhou and Qinjie Zhang: "Cultural Adaptation Pattern Analysis of McDonald's and KFC in the
Chinese M arket", Uppsala University, spring 2012.
3 M ark Yagalla: "Coca-Cola's Enormous Potential in China", The M otley Fool Blog, M ay 23, 2013.
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In the life of Chinese people,

(clothing), 1st (food), f i (shelter) and I f

(transportation) are usually the four most basic necessities and often come
together. In other words, their daily lives and survivals depend on the four basic
aspects. However, the concepts of the four necessities have changed a lot alongside
China's fast economic development. Thirty years' ago, a bike was a necessity of an
average Chinese family. Many old photos showed that Beijing was a city on bike.
Today, an average Chinese family could afford to buy one or two cars. Instead of
owning a bike, owning a car gradually becomes the necessity of Chinese people's
daily lives. Also, Fan Piao (food ticket) was a necessity of Chinese people's daily lives
under the planned economy, because many people had to use Fan Piao to exchange
food in schools, factories, and other public sectors. Today, people no longer use Fan
Piao and just collect them for fun like stamp collecting.
In this chapter, I will examine both American fast food firms and auto makers
in the Chinese market. How and why have they succeeded in China? The goal is to
find out factors that differentiate American IT firms from American restaurant
franchises and automotive manufacturers. This chapter is divided into two major
parts: American fast food companies and American auto companies. Under each
part, there are two cases (KFC and McDonald's, Buick and General Motors). At the
end of chapter is a brief summary that draws inferences from the case studies.
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An Overview of American Fast Food Firms in China

American fast food is very popular in China. Walking on major streets of any
Chinese city, you are very likely to come across an American fast food restaurant,
such as KFC, McDonald's, and Pizza Hut. Their advertisements are everywhere.
Despite the fact that some Chinese people think that fast food is not healthy,
American fast food is still getting more and more popular among urban residents in
China. Why did American fast-food companies succeed in China when IT companies
failed?
There is an old saying in China,

[Food Comes First

to Human, So Does Safety to Food).4 China is rich in cuisine culture. Basically, there
are eight culinary traditions in China (Sichuan, Fujian, Cantonese, Hunan, Jiangsu,
Anhui, Shandong, and Jiangsu). My hometown is Chongqing, Southwestern China,
which has the Sichuan food style. Chongqing food is usually spicy and numbing. Hot
pot is the symbol of my hometown. In ancient China, many peasant revolutions
were directly caused by natural disasters and great famines. Thus, most Chinese
emperors put food production as their top priority. In Mao's China, the three years
of Great Famine caused about 36 million deaths from 1959 to 1961.5 My father was
born during the Great Famine. My grandparents were too poor to feed my father
well. So, they had to find some wild fruits and plants in mountains. One of my close

4 Originated from Book o f Han, AD 111.
5 Jisheng Yang "Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962". Book Review, The N ew York Times.
March 3rd, 2013.
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American friends, now in his fifties, told me that back to then his elementary teacher
told him not to waste food as the Chinese were still hungry.
Since economic reforms in 1978, China has transformed from a centrally
planned economy to a semi-free market economy today. According to the World
Bank, China's GDP growth averaging about 10 percent a year has lifted more than
500 million people out of poverty.6 With the improvement of living standards,
Chinese people's consumption level has increased. Today, they are not just satisfied
with enough food. They are looking for various food and exotic tastes. Some
American food companies caught the great opportunity and entered China two
decades ago. KFC and McDonald's were the pioneers. They opened branches in
China in 1987 and 1990, respectively. Their success stories have encouraged more
American food companies to set up businesses in China. According to China Daily,
there are about 1,300 franchise companies in the U.S. but only 15 percent of them
have entered the Chinese market. A group of American franchisors visited four
major Chinese cities in 2013. They look to follow KFC's lead.7 Nancy Weingartner,
editor of the Franchise Times, said:
Franchises such as Wing Zone, CKE, Rita's, Fuddruckers, Round Table Pizza,
Right at Home, Jani-King and Sotheby's International Realty are hoping to
follow KFC's path to success and view China as a great long-term growth
opportunity. Food and beverage brands are usually the first to enter
international markets, and we believe more US restaurant brands will come
to China, following the success of the large franchisors.8
Following KFC's and McDonald’s huge success, Hooters, the Atlanta-based
restaurant chain, opened its first restaurant in Beijing in 2007. It attracted the
6 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview
7 Yu Wei: "Franchisors look to follow KFC's lead", China Daily USA, Nov. 2013.
8 Ibid.
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Chinese news media immediately after its opening. Although the waitresses are all
Chinese girls, their outfits are much like their counterpart in the U.S. Beijing
Hooters has attracted many young customers, particularly the Chinese returnees
from the U.S. When customers come in, they call out in garbled English, "Welcome
to Hooters!"9 For those elder Chinese, their opinions are divided into two groups:
the open-minded and the stubborn. The former think that importing Hooters is
good because it is a new addition to the Chinese food market. Hooters is full of
excitement and enthusiasm which most Chinese restaurants do not have. The latter
cannot accept the outfit of the Hooters girls. They think those girls are too sexy and
are worried that this may mislead their young children.
Hooters has not received any intervention from the Chinese authorities so far.
Beijing, once a forbidden city during Qing Dynasty, has become an international
metropolis full of vigor and variety. Hooters's launch in Beijing is a good example of
globalization and American culture spreading in China. Compared to the internet
sector, the Chinese government's control on foreign food companies is much looser.
In the next section, I will address the success of three major American food
companies in China in more details.

9 Lily Kuo: "Hooters restaurant underscores mixed sexual messages in China", Los Angeles Times, April 10,

2010.
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KFC and McDonald's in China

A KFC: A Subsidiary o f Yum! Brands
Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) is the world's chicken restaurant chain with
more than more than 40,000 KFC chain stores around the globe. There are more
than ten million customers buying KFC products every day. In China, KFC is ranked
number one in the fast food sector. It has 4,600 chain stores in over 900 cities in
China.10 The KFC logo can be seen from the Great Wall of China to the bustling
downtown area of Chongqing. After KFC is McDonald's which has about 1,800
restaurants in China.11
KFC was founded by Harland D. Sanders in the early 1950s. "Colonel Sanders"
is a modern business legend and chicken cooking genius. People liked the fried
chicken cooked by him personally. He wore a white suite and black tie. He smiled a
lot. His image became the KFC logo which is one of the world's most recognizable
brands. Today, KFC is a subsidiary of Yum! Brands. Two other powerful subsidiaries
of this firm are Pizza Hut and Taco Bell. Yum! Brands has more than 40,000
restaurants around the world.12 Yum! Brands ranks number one in the world of
food and beverage industry. Its U.S. headquarter is in Louisville, Kentucky and the
Chinese headquarter is in Shanghai, China.

10 http://w w w .yum .com /com pany/
11 Yu Wei: "Franchisors look to follow KFC's lead", China Daily USA, Nov. 2013.
12 ,u -^i
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B. Why Did KFC Enter China in the Late 1980s?
In 1986, China was still in the early stages of market liberalization. Its planned
economy was gradually shifted to a market economy. The Chinese government
started to set up various special economic zones in the coastal areas and gave
foreign companies many preferential policies. Market liberalization made Chinese
people eager to communicate with the international market and seek advanced
management concepts. Prior to China, KFC had launched stores in Japan, Singapore
and Hong Kong. Therefore, KFC had learned many lessons from those stores before
it entered China. Besides, Tony Wang, then-vice chief of KFC in Southeast Asia, had
successful cooperation with the Chinese government in Tianjin city.
China has the world's largest population and the demand for new flavors is very
strong. The huge Chinese market is very attractive to KFC. YumlBrands, parent
company of KFC, has a statement on its official site:
YumlBrands is focused on building leading brands in China in every
significant category. We think China is the best restaurant opportunity of
the 21st Century with a consuming class that is expected to double from
300 million to more than 600 million people by 2020.13
China is also a multi-ethnic country. The majority is Han people. There are 55
minority groups like Zhuang, Tibetans, Mongolians, Koreans, Hui and others. In
history, the Han Chinese continued to absorb new flavors, new ideas and new ways
of doing business from other ethnic groups. For example, my former college, Beijing
Normal University, has a Moslem restaurant for the Hui people and Uyghurs. The
Hui people and Uyghurs are Chinese Muslims. The restaurant offers a popular dish
called "DA PAN JI" (literally, Big Plate Chicken). Most Chinese families like eating
13 http://www.yum.com/brands/china.asp
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Chicken. In the traditional Chinese cuisine culture, chicken has the function of "yang
sheng bu shen" (preserving heath and invigorating human kidneys).14

C. KFC Chose the Right Location: A t the Center o f Downtown Beijing
On November 12,1987, KFC opened its first store in Qian Men, Beijing. What is
Qian Men? Qian Men is a famous pedestrian street crowded with various stores. It
is located at the central axis of Beijing. Not far away from Qian Men are the
Tiananmen Square, Mao Zedong's tomb and the Forbidden City. Buildings in Qian
Men are traditional Chinese styles. At that time, KFC was probably the first foreign
fast food company in China and the housing price was very low. China's housing
price has soared in the past decade. Nowadays, when other American fast food
companies enter China, they have to go to other locations farther away from the
center of Beijing or go to the second tier of major Chinese cities for cheaper rent.
Taking Beijing as a starting point, KFC's development is like "a little spark that
kindles a great fire." By 2001, there were more than 500 KFC units throughout
China. In 2007, the 2,000th store opened in Chengdu, and the 3,000th outlet opened
in Shanghai three years later. In 2012, a new KFC railway station branch which
opened in Dalian's Xinghai Park became the 4,000th KFC units in China.15 Now we
are expecting the 5,000th KFC store at some point in the next five years. However,
KFC's fast development was not always smooth. In the next section, I will discuss
what major problems KFC had met in China.

14 http://baike.baidu.com /view/3209384.htm
15 Ranran Liu: "Number of KFC Restaurants Reaches 4,000 in China," CRIENGLISH.COM, September 26,

2012.
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D. Treated Differently in the 1989 Tiananmen Protest and the 1999 Anti-American
Protest
Opportunities and challenges both existed when KFC entered China. First,
during the 1980s the Chinese economy and politics were experiencing a difficult
transition. There were many unstable factors for KFC's business in China. For
example, two years after KFC's launch in Beijing, the Tiananmen Square Incident
happened. Thousands of Chinese college students flooded to the Tiananmen Square,
protesting corruption and asking for democracy. KFC is on the edge of Tiananmen
Square, just across the street from Mao Zedong's tomb. In this incident, the KFC
store served as a gathering place for some protestor:
As numbers grew, protesters began circulating their own daily newspaper
and erected a broadcasting tent. Many conducted meetings and shared
ideas in the southwest corner of the Square at the Kentucky Fried
Chicken.16
They set up, in the heart of the ancient nation, their own world within the
world, complete with a daily newspaper, a broadcasting tent, even a 30-ft.
plaster-covered statue they called the "Goddess of Democracy." Their
"conference hall" was a Kentucky Fried Chicken parlor on the southwest
corner of the square, and their spokesmen were 3,000 hunger strikers who
spilled all over the central Monument to the People's Heroes.17
On May 8,1999, the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia was bombed by an
American aircraft. Three Chinese died and more than twenty were injured. This
incident immediately triggered the outbursts of anger among the Chinese public.
Thousands of Beijing residents and college students marched in streets and threw
stones at the U.S. embassy in Beijing. Some college students also came to McDonald's
and KFC's stores in Beijing and persuaded other people not to buy American
16 Megan Bedard, "Little Known Facts about the Tiananmen Square Protests," Takepart, June 4, 2010.
17 Pico Lyer, "The Unknown Rebel," Time, April 13,1998.
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products. It is said that in Changsha city three KFC stores and one McDonald's were
attacked on May 9. These examples illustrate challenges KFC faced in the Chinese
market.

E. Challenges and Market Competition
Price and costs were challenges for KFC during its early development in
China. The Chinese people's average income was quite low in the 1980s. Even
today, China’s GDP per capita is one seventh of America’s. In addition, due to
differences in species, the right potatoes for making mashed potatoes and fries were
also hard to find in China. So, KFC had to import them from the U.S., which increased
the cost. KFC is pricy for average Chinese people. Take myself for an example; I had
not got a chance to eat KFC until I was in high school. I remembered a simple KFC
meal was about twenty Yuan while an average Chinese meal was about three or four
Yuan in the early 2000s.
KFC is popular among young Chinese; however, many elder Chinese without
international experience cannot accept its price and taste. The attitudes toward KFC
are starkly different between the young Chinese and the elders. In the U.S., KFC is
just so regular. But for young Chinese, they think KFC is clean and well decorated.
They even choose KFC for dating. They post their KFC meals on social network
websites like Weibo and Renren. By contrast, their parents do not think KFC is
worth the money. Besides, the elder Chinese are still not get used to hamburgers
and the flavor of ketchup.
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There is increasing competition from local Chinese fast food companies.
Chicken chain Dicos, Country Style Cooking, and Kung Fu Catering are local fast food
brands. They are innovating new kinds of food by combining KFC style with the
Chinese food style, like rice burgers with lotus roots. Weitang Zhuang, spokesman
for Dicos said: "After all, since ancient times rice has been the key staple of the
Chinese people."18 Besides, lunch at Dicos costs less than 17 Yuan ($2.80) compared
with a similar offering from KFC, which costs 25 Yuan ($4.11), according to Mintel.
Dicos says it aims to "break the traditional Western fast food mould."19

F. KFC’s Valuable Experience in China
Despite of those challenges, KFC provides valuable experience for both
American and Chinese fast food companies. For example, KFC demands every store
to follow the principle of "CHAMPS" (Clean environment, hospitable service,
accurate orders, maintains facilities, product quality and speed of service). I have
observed a number of average Chinese restaurants here in the U.S. and back in
China, and I have to admit that they are dirtier than their American counterparts.
According to Mintel, a London-based market research company, "foreign outlets
have the advantage in terms of hygiene perception - with 18% of Chinese
consumers saying foreign fast food outlets perform a lot better in this area
(compared to 1% for Chinese outlets) as well as ambience - with 14% of Chinese

18 "Chinese Fast Food Firms Challenging McDonald's, KFC," China Daily, October 30, 2013.
19

il:j
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consumers thinking foreign fast food outlets perform better in this area compared
to 1% for Chinese."20
American fast food companies are also more professional than the Chinese.
Their employees have outfits. They print their logos and slogans on boxes, bags,
cups and menus. They build pretty websites and provide by-products like T-shirt,
cups, and photo frames. Credit cards are widely used here in the U.S., which makes
order service quicker. In China, most restaurants still do not accept credit cards.
Sometimes, the Chinese restaurants owners have to inspect those large bills (like
100 Yuan) very carefully in case they are counterfeit. A large amount of cash also
makes them more cautious. After a full day of busy work, they often lock their
money in a secure hidden place.
KFC's localization strategy is successful in China. For example, in the 2003
Spring Festival, over 800 KFC stores in China changed their outfits to the traditional
Chinese costume "Tang Zhuang." Due to competition from local Chinese fast food
companies, KFC further implemented its indigenization policy in China. For
example, "the Chinese KFC menu may include fried dough sticks, egg tarts, shrimp
burgers, and soymilk drinks, as well as foods tailored to the tastes of specific regions
within China."21 Furthermore, KFC maintains good relationships with the Chinese
local governments. Some local officials of small Chinese cities are trying to attract
KFC to their cities. On the one hand, a KFC store can benefit local economy. On the
other hand, having a KFC store means a higher degree of modernity or globalization

20 "Breakfast key to growth of foreign fast food market in China, reports Mintel," Food and Drink, August
16, 2012.
21 Maggie Starvish: "KFC's Explosive Growth in China," HBS Cases Harvard Business School, June 17, 2011.

98

for a small city. Indeed, globalization or modernization gradually changes Chinese
people's daily lives either visibly or invisibly. Sometimes, people may ask "Does your
city have KFC, Starbucks or something like that?" I clearly remember I was asked
the question several times by some same-age children from bigger cities before my
hometown had KFC. I was a little bit disappointed and answered "We do not have
KFC in my hometown, but we have Country Style Chicken (a local Chinese fast food
restaurant) which is quite similar to KFC." Then, I could see their pride from their
facial expression.
Also, KFC and McDonald's are doing great for attracting children. They have
facilities for children's fun. Besides, they play English-language songs and have
American cartoon characters and some simple English words on the wall. When
walking in the street, the kids beg for KFC food in front of their parents. Besides,
many Chinese parents want their children to learn English at an early age. So, they
are willing to buy KFC food despite its price. KFC is keen on public service. KFC has
invested a lot in the Chinese youth education. China's state news agency Xinhua
News praised KFC for its social responsibility. According to Xinhua News, over the
past decade KFC has contributed more than sixty-six million Yuan to the education
of Chinese children and teenagers.22 McDonald's did the same. According to a 2006
Modern Weekly interview with Gary Rosen, McDonald's Marketing president in
China, the company had commenced a long-term "beef education" campaign
targeted at children under the slogan "Do you have enough beef?" McDonald's

22 http://new s.xinhuanet.com /food/2011-05/16/c_121422673.htm
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invited children to join the Beef Club online."23 Both KFC and McDonald's have built
up positive images in the view of Chinese consumers as well as the Chinese
government. People trust their brands and food safety.

G. KFC Enjoys More Successes than McDonald's in China
McDonald's was founded in Des Plaines, Illinois in 1955, three years later
than KFC. KFC is the world's largest fried chicken chain. McDonald's is the world's
largest hamburger chain. In its home market, the U.S., McDonald’s has a larger
market share than KFC. But, in China McDonald’s is no match for KFC. Euromonitor
International is a London-based research firm. Several sources have used its data to
compare KFC and McDonald's in China and the U.S., respectively. For example,
KFC's parent company Yum had a 40 percent market share among fast-food chains
compared with 16 percent for McDonald's in China in 2010.24
McDonald's entered China in 1990, three years later than KFC. Unlike KFC
choosing Beijing for its first store, McDonald's chose Shenzhen. Shenzhen was a
small fishing town before China's economic reform. After Deng Xiaoping's visit,
Shenzhen became a special economic zone. Due to its geographic advantages
(bordering with Hong Kong), Shenzhen attracted huge FDI in a short time and
quickly became the most successful city in China. In the early 1990s, Shenzhen was
still in its prime time of fast development. As a latecomer, McDonald's did not want

23 Jason Gandelman: "Exporting Obesity to China", Harvard Political Review, March 20, 2012.
24 William Mellor: "McDonald's No Match for KFC in China as Colonel Rules Fast Food", Bloomberg,
January 26, 2011.
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to compete with KFC directly in Northern China. Thus, KFC chose Shenzhen, a
vibrant city in Southern China.
Why is McDonald's less popular than KFC in China? After more than two
decades' development, both KFC and McDonald's became successful in China, but,
KFC is more successful. KFC is usually two or three Yuan more expensive than
McDonald's in China. KFC has three times as many stores as McDonald’s. According
to the China Expat, there are four reasons that make McDonald's less successful than
KFC in China:
First, marketing campaigns may have convinced people that KFC is
healthier in China than America - Their message is that KFC in China is the
new fast food - healthier than other fast food options abroad and in China.
Second, More Chinese people like fried chicken more than hamburgers Although McDonald's rolled out a new marketing plan aiming at young
adult Chinese consumers last year. Third, KFC has more China-specific
choices than McDonald's - by far. They have a much more China specific
menu. Fourth, KFC has better coupon deals than McDonald’s - which is very
important to most Chinese consumers. About half of customers of either
restaurant use coupons - but the best tasting stuff at McDonald’s, the beef,
rarely has good coupon deals.25

H. American Fast Food Chains: Globaiism and Localism
Compared to China, McDonald's and KFC's global penetration in South Asia is
also limited by local cultures and religions. India has more than one billion
population and is also one of the major emerging countries like China. The market
demands for fast food should be strong. However, India is still a small market which
just has 271 McDonald’s restaurants in 2012. Why? It is said that "religiously
observant Hindus see cows as sacred and avoid beef, while Muslims view pigs as

25 "KFC in China - 4 Reasons W hy KFC Kills McDonald's", The China Expat, April, 2014.
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unclean and avoid pork."26 By contrast, most Chinese people today have no food
taboo (except a small number of ethnic minorities like Hui and Uyghur). For
instance, many Chinese people from other provinces often mock China's Cantonese
people: "they eat everything with four legs except tables."27 The breakout of SARS
epidemic in Southern China Canton in 2002 wds caused by eating non-farm animals
like the masked palm civet.
Globalism and localism are equally important. Big American fast food firms in
foreign markets often keep some of its traditions (e.g. classic American food recipes,
logos, and similar store decorations) and in the meantime they are also seeking
some adaptions to the local market. For example, with competition from KFC and
local Chinese fast food firms, around 2005 McDonald’s started to offer rice burgers
in some of its Asian stores. From Big Macs to rice burgers, this is a great move for
McDonald's.28 In 2013, all 1,700 McDonald's stores in China added four new menu
items: chicken rice wrap, beef rice wrap, chicken rice bowl and beef rice bowl.
Kenneth Chan, CEO of McDonald's China, said:
Our new platform is all about winning the night by listening to what
consumers want from McDonald's for dinner and after
They want more
filling portions but at the same great value, quality and convenience they
have come to expect from McDonald's.29

26 "McDonald's Opens Vegetarian-only Restaurant", BBC News, September 4, 2012.
27 This saying was first reported by the French writer Simone De Beauvoir in her 1958 book, The Long
March, p.81 .
28 Kathy Chu, "Fast-food Chains in Asia Cater Menus to Customers", USA Today, September 7, 2010.
29 Anita Chang Baeattie, "Catering to Local Tastes, McDonald's Finally Adds Rice to the Menu in China",
Advertising Age, June 7, 2013.
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An Overview of American Auto Makers in China

A. The WTO and Foreign Cars in China
According to the Wall Street Journal, China surpassed the U.S. to become the
world's largest auto market in 2009.30 With a growing middle class, more and more
average Chinese families are able to own a car or two. For American auto
companies, they experienced market decline in the U.S., whereas their cars are
welcomed by the Chinese public and the sales are still increasing.
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was not smooth. In
the early 1990s, China's several attempts failed as it did not reach a deal with
Western countries led by the U.S. The Chinese leaders did not stop negotiating with
their American counterparts. China was so eager to integrate itself into the world
economy. Joining the WTO was such an important step for China to stimulate its
exports as well as import natural resources and high-quality products. After years
of negation, President Clinton came to reach a deal with the Chinese. In the late
1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. accepted China's admission to WTO. I remember I
watched the live broadcasting show at night on November 10, 2001. When the
fourth WTO ministerial conference Chairman Mr. Kamal knocked his wood hammer
on the table, announcing China was approved to be a member a WTO, I could hear
sounds of excitement from my neighbors in our big apartment complex. Joining the
WTO brought opportunities and challenges to China. Before China joined WTO, the
import tariffs on foreign cars were 70%-80% of the price. The WTO gave China five
30 Patricia Jiayi Ho, "China Passes U.S. as World's Top Car Market", The W all Street Journal, January 12

2010.
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years to lower the tariffs down to 25%. By the end of the 1990s, there were not
many choices for Chinese car buyers.

B. Chinese Consumers'Stereotypes on Foreign Cars
After China joined the WTO, foreign cars flooded into the Chinese market,
which brought about more competition and thus benefited the Chinese consumers.
Foreign auto companies are continuously setting up new branches and releasing
new models in China. The Chinese consumers have gradually formed some
stereotypes on foreign cars. They think the Japanese cars are cheaper but unsafe,
because the Japanese sell their best cars in Europe and the U.S. and sell their worst
cars in China. Japanese cars often described as light and made of plastics. But, the
Japanese cars can save gas compared to American and European cars.
The Chinese consumers think American and European auto makers do not
"Tou Gong Jian Liao" (cheat in work and cut down on materials) like the Japanese
did. American cars are built with more good steels. So, American cars are heavier
and safer than the Japanese ones. On Chinese blogs and social network websites,
there are many photos comparing Japanese cars and American cars in some real
accidents. American and European cars are often ranked in the first tier, then the
Japanese and Korean cars, the last choice is the Chinese ones. Even though many
Chinese still think that buying Chinese cars may lose their face in front of relatives,
friends and colleagues, there is still increasing demand for the Chinese cars because
foreign brands are more expensive.
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C. China's Nationalism and Hatreds toward Japan: Do Not Buy Japanese Cars
China's nationalism and hatreds toward Japan are still popular among the
general public despite of the close economic tie between the two countries. Some
Chinese radicals damaged Japanese cars and beat the Chinese owners in several
anti-Japanese protests in 2012 and 2013. For example, in 2012 due to the Diaoyu
Islands dispute, an anti-Japanese protest broke out in Xi an, Central China. Jianli Li
became a victim of a mob that stopped his Japanese car. His skull was smashed in
and later he became partially paralyzed.31 At that time, similar cases happened in
other Chinese cities. Many Chinese owners of Japanese vehicles were scared. So,
they either covered their Japanese cars' logos or gave up driving. Some put bumper
stickers that attempt to discourage potential vandals. A popular one reads: "The car
is Japanese, but the owner's heart is Chinese. The Diaoyu Islands belong to China."32
After this incident, the Chinese government and media blamed those Chinese
radicals and educated the public to treat China-Japan disputes rationally. Those who
inflicted severe injuries on the Japanese car owners were arrested and put into
prison. However, this did not stop some potential car buyers shifting from Japanese
cars to American cars. Thus, in 2013 there was a decline in the sales of Japanese
cars while the sales of American cars increased dramatically.
Definitely, the success of American cars in China is not due to China's antiJapanese sentiments. Then, what makes American auto companies successful in
China? There are many factors, such as advanced technology, safety, management,

31 Amy Qin, "Smashed Skull Serves as Grim Symbol of Seething Patriotism", The New York Times, October

10, 2012 .
32 Adam Century, "Running Away From Japanese Cars in Chongqing", Sinosphere, November 22, 2013.
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Chinese consumers' attitudes toward American products, and American auto
makers' good cooperation with Chinese companies. In the next section, I will
address two major American auto makers in details: General Motors and Ford.

General Motors in China

A. A B rief History o f General Motors
General Motors (GM) was founded in 1908. It is headquartered in Detroit,
Michigan. From its inception to the world's largest auto maker, GM has acquired
famous auto brands such as Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Pontiac, and Saturn. In 2007,
according to Fortunes, GM is ranked 7th among 500 global multinational
corporations after Wal-Mart, Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and Apple.33
The GM official website lists seven periods of GM history. First, the creation is
1897-1909. There were fewer than 8,000 cars in America at the turn of the 20th
century. GM was the pioneer of auto industry in the world. William "Bill/' Durant
founded this company. Second, the acceleration is 1910 - 1929. During this period,
new innovations emerged. GM embraced the philosophy and strategy of "a car for
every purse and purpose." Third, the emotion period is 1930-1959. GM made
contributions to World War II. "By 1942, one hundred percent of GM's production
was in support of the Allied war effort." Then, the fourth, fifth and sixth periods are

33 "Fortune 500", CNNMoney, 2013.
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revolution (1960-1979), globalization (1980-1990) and challenges (2000-2008),
respectively.34 The current period is the new GM after its reform in 2008 and 2009.
Like other auto companies in the U.S., GM's sales were not good since the
2000s. GM tried to obtain government loans but failed. In June 2009, GM filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in New York City.35 Later, GM closed its Hummer, Saturn
and Pontiac brands. GM sold SAAB to Spyker. The U.S. government started reduced
its holdings of GM shares. At the end of 2013, "the U.S. Treasury sold the last of its
GM stock bringing an end to the controversial government ownership of the car
company. The final cost of the GM bailout cost the U. S. taxpayer $12 billion."36
GM's decline in the U.S. leads to job cuts and increased taxes for Americans.
But President Obama and former GM CEO Fritz Henderson both promised that a
more viable GM will emerge from bankruptcy.37 Today, GM is focusing on selling
cars in foreign markets, particularly China. China is the key market for GM.
According to CNNMoney, "GM has roughly roughly 15% market share in China now,
and has said it will introduce 17 refreshed models there in 2013."38 Former GM CEO
Dan Akerson visited GM's Shanghai office in 2011. He made a speech about GM's
expansion and success in China.
Seven out of ten automobiles were made outside of the United States. We
have 11 joint ventures in China with Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp
(SAIC) and FAW Group. We operate 11 assembly plants in China, four
power train plants in eight cities across the country. We have more than
2,700 dealerships and sales outlets nationwide. We regard our eleven joint
ventures as 11 keys to success. Not just in China but globally. Our

34 http://www.gm china.com /gm /front/about/legacy
35 Wikipedia: Healey, James R: "Government Sells Last of Its GM Shares", USA Today, December 10 2013.
36 Wikipedia: Healey, James R: "Government Sells Last of Its GM Shares", USA Today, December 10 2013.
37 Chris Isidore: "GM bankruptcy: End of an era", CNN Money, June 2, 2009.
38 http://m oney.cnn.com /m agazines/fortune/fortune500/2013/snapshots/175.htm l
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commitment to working in China, with China, for China remains strong and
focused in the future. We are now building out the advanced technology
center which will bring our research and development that is centered
largely in the U.S.; we are going to diversify that more into China because
we think this market is so critically important to the success of our
company. GM is a company well established for the future in China.39
Immediately, this speech drew some criticism in the U.S. Some think that GM is
not American government motors, but China motors. They blamed GM for sending
jobs and moving research centers to communist China.40

B. GM's Buick Won Success in China
Buick, a brand of GM, has a long and interesting history in China. Both GM and
Ford are successful in China. But, GM is doing better than Ford. According to recent
released documents, Ford missed a great opportunity 90 years ago to become Sun
Yat-sen’s favorite brand, the founder of modern China. Sun Yat-sen was the founding
father of democracy in China and also the founder of China's Nationalist Party (the
current regime in Taiwan). In the 1910s, Sun Yat-sen and his companies overthrew
the Qing Dynasty, the last dynasty in China. Sun Yat-sen had traveled to Japan and
Hong Kong before he returned to China. So, he knew the industrial revolution and
new technology in Western countries.
In the 1920s Sun Yat-sen invited Henry Ford to build factories in China. But an
assistant in Ford's office rejected Sun Yat-sen's request, saying "We desire to advise,
however, that Mr. Ford has made no plans for visiting China in the very near

39 http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/48732
40 http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/48732
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future."41 Sun Yat-sen was disappointed and had to look for other American cars.
Finally, he chose GM's Buick. David Chen, vice president of GM elaborated GM’s early
history in China in an interview.
GM first entered China in the 1920s. There was a Chevrolet dealer in
Shanghai during that time. Records also show that the father of Chinese
democracy, Sun Yat-sen; the first premier of China, Zhou Enlai; and the last
emperor, Puyi, owned Buicks. If you're wondering why Buicks are doing so
well in China; the historical linkage may help. I've heard that in the 1930s,
one out of every six cars in China was a Buick. GM stopped operating in
China in 1949 and restarted in late 1993 or early 1994 when we began
negotiating our first JV, Shanghai GM, with our partner Shanghai
Automotive Industry Corp (SAIC).42
Today, GMC is thriving in China. In September 2013, G.M. shipped 71,002
Buicks to dealers in China - compared to only 15,623 Buicks in the U.S.43 The
Chinese people have a different view of Buicks. They regard Buick as a luxury
brand. They think Buicks are the choice of businessmen. Although Buicks are
not as good as BMW or Mercedes, Buicks are still better than most Japanese and
Korean brands. Chinese drivers of Buicks will not lose their face at least. An
interesting article in the New York Times compares stereotypes of car brands in
China and the U.S., saying "the Buick, long associated in the United States with
drivers who have a soft spot for the early-bird special, is by contrast one of the
hottest luxury cars in China."44 Moreover, in the U.S. Buicks are viewed as old
man's car. In China Buicks do not have this negative image. With many young
buyers from China, Buicks actually lower the average age of buyers.
41 Keith Bradsher, "After Nearly 90 Years, Ford Wants China to Give It a Second Chance", The New York
Times, October 20, 2013.
42 "General Motors Races Ahead in the China Market", China Business Review, April 1 2011.
43 Keith Bradsher, "After Nearly 90 Years, Ford Wants China to Give It a Second Chance", The New York
Times, October 20, 2013.
^Andrew Jacobs, "In China, Car Brands Evoke an Unexpected Set of Stereotypes", The N ew York Times,
November 14, 2011.
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C. GM's Relationship with the Chinese Government
GM believes that a multinational corporation must understand the
political situation in a foreign country or a new market. GM must win official
recognition and support from the foreign government. If so, GM can smooth
away obstacles and sell cars effectively. Back in 1978, then-CEO of GM Thomas
Murphy visited Beijing. He proposed the joint venture as a way to "jumpstart
China's automotive industry."45 Six years later, China’s first automotive joint
venture, the Beijing Jeep Corporation, was established with GM.46 GM saw that
the Chinese labor cost and land price were very low. In the meantime, the
Chinese badly wanted advanced automotive technology from the U.S. The
Beijing government also wanted to improve the Sino-U.S. relations after Mao’s
death. Beijing Jeep immediately became a well-known brand to the Chinese
people. Its early classical model was BJ212 which was commonly used by the
Chinese government and military in the 1980s and even the 1990s.
Thirty years later, GM's advanced research center was set up in Shanghai,
China. The Shanghai research center is focusing on developing new and clean energy
vehicles in China. GM unveiled its electric car, the Chevrolet Volt, in 2011. At the
same time, the Chinese government enthusiastically advocated the development of
electric vehicles (EV) in China. From 2010 to 2013, the Chinese government has
announced three groups of test cities. The government built power chargers and
facilities in these cities. The Chinese customers will get compensation if they buy
EVs. According to Boston Consulting Group, China and Europe - not the U.S., as many
45 Kevin W ale, "China's Automobile Industry: Taking the Next Step", Boao Forum, April 21, 2006.
46 Wikipedia: Qiao Yu, "JV renamed Beijing Benz-DaimlerChrysler", China Daily, December 7, 2004.
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might think - will be the largest markets for EVs in 2020.47 Currently, no one
company is dominant in the EV market in China. Nissan, GM, Volkswagen and other
foreign auto makers are competing for huge orders from the Chinese government.
At the same, Chinese auto makers are also developing their own EVs.

D. GM's Chinese Partner: Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC)
When foreign auto makers entered China, they had to find a Chinese
partner and built joint ventures together. GM's major Chinese partner is SAIC, a
large state-owned auto company in Shanghai. The fast development of SAIC is
largely due to FDI, market demand, government guidance and new technologies
from Volkswagen and GM. In the 1970s, SAIC was just a small company. In
1984, SAIC started to contract with Volkswagen. In 1985, SAIC built its first joint
venture with Volkswagen. At that time, SAIC was simply an extension of the
Shanghai Municipal government. The Shanghai Municipal government wanted
to make SAIC as a pillar for the local economy. Thus, SAIC was the top priority
and got many resources from local government. From 1985 to 1996, SAIC's
annual production capacity increased ten-fold.48
SAIC enjoyed the successful cooperation with German auto maker
Volkswagen and decided to build a second joint venture. SAIC chose to
cooperate with GM. They built Shanghai GM together in 1997, with 50%
investment from each other. Their proud car is the Buick Regal. SAIC absorbed
47 Xavier Mosquet, Mythili Devineni, etc., "Report: Powering Autos to 2020-The Era of the Electric Car?"
The Boston Consulting Group, July 2011.
48 Richter, Frank Jurgen, The Dragon Millennium: Chinese Business in the Coming World Economy (Praeger,
2000), p. 68.
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technologies from Volkswagen and GM. Later, the Chinese joint venture made
90% of the components locally.49

Ford in China

A. Ford: A Revolution to the U.S. Auto Industry
Ford is headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan. It was founded in 1903 by
Henry Ford. Henry Ford liked small animals, so logo designers painted the English
letters "Ford" into a pattern of small rabbit.50 On Ford's Chinese official websites,
there are some important historical events. For example, in 1914 Ford's model T car
revolutionized the auto industry. Prior to model T, cars were not mass produced
and were very expensive. Ford model T was called “the car that put the world on
wheels."51 In the 1930s more and more American families could afford cars due to
economies of scale and reduced costs of Ford's mass production.
In 1941, Ford released the Lincoln Continental, which became the U.S.
president's favorite choice. In the 1950s, Ford released the Mercury and the
Thunderbird. In the 1960s, Ford released Volvo 1800s and the Ford Mustang. The
Ford Mustang debuted in New York Auto Show in 1964. Even today it is still a
popular brand for young drivers. Volvo was a Swedish car. It was called "the safest
car in the world." In 2010, Ford sold Volvo Car Corporation to the Chinese

49 Becky Chiu, Mervyn Lewis: Reforming China's State-owned Enterprises and Banks, Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2006.
50 Ford Chinese official website: http://www.ford.com .en/clubford/history#overlaysl248990254681
51 Lindsay Brooke, "Ford Model T: The Car That Put the World on Wheels", Motorbooks, 2008.
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automaker, Geely.52 In 1994, Aston Martin became a part of Ford. Aston Martin is a
luxurious car from the U.K. In 1995, Ford China Corporation was founded. So, in the
next section I will discuss Ford's history in China.

B. Ford's Development in China
In the 1910s, Ford made its first show in China as model T cars were sold to
China. In the 1920s, when the founder of modern China, Sun Yat-sen, invited Ford to
build factories in China; Ford actually rejected. Ford missed this opportunity. So,
GM's Buick became Chinese leaders' car.
When Mao started to rule China from 1949, Ford stopped selling cars to
China. In Mao's China (1949-1976), almost all American companies and
missionaries left China. In 1978, the new Chinese leader Deng invited Henry Ford II,
then-CEO of Ford to build factories in China. After Henry Ford II's personal meeting
with Deng, Ford opened an office in Beijing in 1978. Although Henry Ford II
expressed an interest in China, Ford did not really enter China and build factories
until the early 2000s. Compared to GM and Japanese auto makers, Ford is a late
mover.53
In the early 1990s, the Chinese government encouraged its largest domestic
producer of passenger cars, SAIC, to build join venture partnership with a foreign
company. Both GM and Ford bid. Finally, Ford lost. After this failure, Ford waited to
pursue other opportunities. From the mid-1990s to late 1990s, China and the U.S.

52 Chris V. Nicholson, "Chinese Carmaker Geely Completes Acquisition of Volvo from Ford", The N ew York
Times, August 2, 2010.
53 Yadong Yang, How to Enter China: Choices and Lessons, University of Michigan Press, 2000.
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were in negotiations regarding Permanent Norma Trade Relations (PNTR) status.
The U.S. government pressed the Chinese government to loosen restrictions on
foreign investors. Finally, the two parties reach an agreement which eliminates
many restrictions for the automobile industry in China.54 Ford seized this
opportunities and built a joint venture with the Chinese auto manufacturer, Chang
An, in 2001.
Although Ford entered China much later than GM and Volkswagen, Ford is
catching up. According to Angelo Young, "Ford is working hard to become a
significant presence in China, where it surpassed Honda and Toyota in sales volume
in 2013, for a total volume of 935,813 commercial and passenger vehicles. The
company tripled the number of models offered in China in 2013 compared to
2 0 12."55

C. Ford's Chinese Partner: Chang An
On April 25, 2001, Ford and Chang An established Chang An - Ford
Automobile Co., Ltd. Chang An traced its origin back to the Shanghai Foreign Gun
Bureau which was founded by Hongzhang Li in 1867.56 Hongzhang Li was a major
politician in late Qing dynasty. He advocated the Self-Strengthening Movement in
the 19th century. Basically, he sought Western technologies to make China strong
and rich. During the World War II and Mao’s China, Chang An still served as a

54 Kelly Sims Gallagher, China Shifts Gears: Automakers, Oil, Pollution, and Development (M IT Press, 2006),
p.81.
ss Angelo Young, "Ford Delivers Over 73,000 Cars in China in February 2014 As It Plays Catch-Up in World's
Largest Auto M arket", International Business Times, March 6, 2014.
56 Chang An's official website, "About Chang An", http://www.globalchangan.com/About/
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military factory. In the 1980s, Chang An gradually shifted from military to civil
production under the background of Deng's economic reform.
Most Chinese auto makers are located in East China which is more developed
than the West. But, Chang An is a state-owned auto maker from my hometown,
Chongqing, Southwest China. Chongqing is a major city in Southwest China. In 1997,
Chongqing separated from Sichuan province and became one of China's four
municipalities directly under the central government. After Chongqing's
independence from Sichuan province, Chongqing experienced fast economic
development. In 2010, Chongqing became one of the five national cities in China (the
other four are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou}.
Chang An has made a great contribution to Chongqing's rapid development.
Chang An is said to be the largest company in Chongqing. Chang An has been the
No.l taxpayer in Chongqing for years. It provides at least 43,000 jobs in
Chongqing.57 In 1983, Chang An learned minibus technology from the Japanese
company, Suzuki. Since then, Chang An has become one of China's largest domestic
producers of minivans.58 Thanks to government policies including "a halved
purchase tax for small vehicles", Chang An's minivans are in great demand.59

D. Ford’s Relationship with the Chinese Government
China has become an area of tremendous potential for companies as the
nominally communist country has embraced capitalism. The hybrid result,
57 Bernhard Bartsch, "Sustainable City Development-Chongqing", Siemens Global Website, 2006.
58 Kelly Sims Gallagher, China Shifts Gears: Automakers, Oil, Pollution, and Development (M IT Press, 2006),
p.84.
59 Xiaomin Chen, "Chongqing Chang’an plans 4 billion yuan add-issuance", Global Times, February 11 2010

according to Ford CEO Alan Mulally, is in some ways an improvement on what's
been a pretty sluggish and inefficient democratic process elsewhere in the world.60
Unlike American internet companies, American auto companies do not mind
Chinese politics and human rights issues. In some ways they even think the current
Chinese political regime is better than some sluggish democracies like India and the
Philippines. When Ford CEO, Alan Mulally, was interviewed by Bloomberg, he
praised the Chinese communist party and government. Asked if the Chinese are
easier to work with than democracies, Mulally answered: "They are a pleasure to
work with. You're welcomed; you're part of the fabric. 'What can we do to help?
What can we do to work together?' There's nothing like it in the world

It's

fantastic. The working relationship between the party and the government is tight.
They both have the same objective, to grow the economy."61
Another example also supports the fact that Ford has a sound relationship
with the Chinese government. Geely is a Chinese auto company in Zhejiang province.
Geely attempted to purchase Volvo's passenger car division from Ford in 2009.
Before the final purchase, Geely must obtain the necessary approvals from the
Chinese government. The Chinese government fully supports the purchase between
Geely and Ford and approved paperwork very quick. Obtaining Volvo can increase
national pride and improve the public's confidence in the Chinese government. The
Chinese government welcomed Ford's Volvo sale. Ultimately, the transaction was

60 Max Nisen, "Ford CEO Alan Mulally Explains W hy Chinese Communism Is ’Fantastic1", Business Insider,
August 8, 2013.
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very smooth in 2010. The Chinese government left a good impression on Ford
through this transaction.
In March 2014, the new Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Europe. He and
the first lady Peng Liyuan toured the Chinese-owned Volvo plant in Ghent, Belgium.
The Chinese media reported Xi's visit in details with videos and images. Xi stood in
front of a Volvo XC60 with the Belgian King Philip, both clapping their hands and
smiling.62 Nationalism is popular in the communist China. It has been criticized by
Western media as a tool for strengthening the legitimacy of Communist Party's
rulership in China. Ford's Volvo sale is beneficial to both parties. On the one hand,
Ford shed the heavy burden Volvo which was in a great deficit. On the other hand,
the Chinese are willing to buy Volvo for the purpose of increasing national pride and
economic benefits.

Summary 63

In a nutshell, there are at least four factors that explain the success or failure
of American firms in the Chinese market. First, "indigenization", the ability of firms
to cater to the demands of Chinese consumers rather than simply replicating
products designed for the Western market. In its early years of development eBay
simply replicated its American website, it might work in Europe, but it failed in
China. Also, in the previous chapter I mentioned that eBay’s Chinese leaders
complained that the eBay headquarter in San Jose did not listen to their opinions. By
62 News.Sina
63 This summary draws on suggestion from Dr. Earnest.
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contrast, KFC and McDonald have done much better in localization. KFC adapted its
menu to local tastes. KFC insisted to employ more local people and respect local
managers.
Second, the success of American auto makers in China tells that partnerships
with Chinese firms are extremely important. This seems really apparent with Buick
partnership with SAIC. As required by the Chinese government, Buick accepted to
build a joint venture and share some of new technologies with SAIC. By contrast,
Google competed fiercely against Baidu instead of seeking cooperation
opportunities and compromising with the Chinese government.
Third, American IT companies are selling services in China, whereas
restaurants and automotive firms are selling products. IT service providers are new
companies and have relatively low levels of direct investment, whereas automakers
have high levels of direct investment. Instead of attracting service providers, the
local Chinese officials and leaders are more interested in big construction projects,
because they could gain huge private interests from selling lands and building
concretes. Moreover, building an automotive plant can also create thousands of jobs
and stimulate local GDP and revenues. However, IT service providers do not need a
large land, because they can do their work virtually online. IT service providers do
not create many jobs, either. Thus, they have few opportunities either for
partnerships or for developing support among local and regional leaders in China,
whereas American automotive manufacturers have built good relations with the
local government. This seems really apparent with the Buick partnership with the
Shanghai government.
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Finally, although there are differences between service and product industries,
the within-industry comparisons also show that an earlier entry plus better
government-company relations make American companies more likely to succeed in
China. KFC and General Motors entered China earlier than McDonald's and Ford,
respectively. General Motors have a stronger tie to the Chinese government than
Ford as it accepted China's offer that Ford rejected at first. Today, although GM and
Ford are both successful in China, GM is more popular than Ford. Also, when KFC
launched its first store in China, it chose Beijing, the political center of China,
whereas McDonald's chose Shenzhen, far away from Beijing. Today, it proves that
KFC's early choice of location was very correct. This chapter concludes the cases of
American companies in China (either success or failure). The next chapter will
examine the cases of Chinese companies in the U.S.

119

CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDY 3: CHINA'S STATE-OWNED OIL COMPANIES IN THE U.S.1

Introduction

The previous two chapters discuss American MNCs doing business in China.
Their failures were caused by cultural, statist and market factors. For example,
American MNCs suffered from numerous problems regarding to piracy and Chinese
hackers. This can be explained by cultural theories. China is relation-based country
where the enforcement of numerous laws is on books. Beyond cultural dissimilarity,
statist interference and market completion also pushed some American MNCs out of
China. Likewise, when Chinese MNCs come to the U.S., they also face numerous
dilemmas caused by culture, the state and market. Therefore, this and the next
chapter will probe Chinese MNCs doing business in the U.S. First, Chinese MNCs
which emerged in a particularist and relation-based culture will be frustrated by the
universalist and rule-based culture of the host country. Second, empirical studies of
the three giant Chinese state-owned oil companies show that Chinese MNCs
investing in strategic resources are more likely to receive political resistance from
the host country and thus fail in acquiring U.S. assets. Those failures were not only
caused by cultural factors, but were also caused by statist factors (e.g. ownership,
interest group politics and CFIUS investigation) as well as market competition
(China National Offshore Oil Corporation - CNOOC vs. Chevron in 2005). Third,
1 Part of this chapter draws on Shiwei Jiang, The China Lens, A Political-Economic Analysis o f Changing
China (Xlibris Corporation, 2013).
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given the nature of Chinese state-owned enterprises (arms of the home
government) and rising Chinese military power, we can expect that it will be more
challenging for Chinese state-owned oil companies to obtain U.S. assets in the near
future.

An Overview of Chinese State-Owned Oil Companies

With a large amount of foreign reserves, the Chinese government is
encouraging Chinese companies to speed up their internationalization and purchase
overseas assets, especially oil assets. There are three major state-owned companies
in China: PetroChina, Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC), which are called the "Big Three."2 Their success at entering those markets
in developing countries is chiefly based on three strategies: first, to choose the place
where Western oil companies are not willing to enter because of high risk and
instability; second, to help build local infrastructure; and third, to provide financial
aids to oil-rich developing countries.3 However, these strategies do not apply to
Chinese oil companies' business in the U.S.
In the past, when it came to oil and security, scholars have focused on the
Middle East oil trade, terrorists and security issues. There was a sea of literatures
and studies on the Middle East and oil.4 By contrast, the studies of China-U.S. oil
trade were few. Despite the fact that China-U.S. trade is increasing and China-U.S.
2 Changxin Gao, "Big Three Oil Companies See Earnings Fall", China Daily, March 26, 2013.
3 Ian Taylor, "China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa", International Affairs, Volume 82, Issue 5, 2006.
4 For example, Steve Yetiv's tw o books, Crude Awakenings: Global Oil Security and American Foreign
Policy and The Petroleum Triangle: Oil, Globalization, and Terror.
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relations are improving, the two countries are still cautious about each other's
investment in some sensitive sectors, such as oil and telecommunications.
In this chapter, I will address why and how China’s state-owned oil
companies (CSOOC) have failed in the U.S. market. First, many American readers
may wonder what are the rankings of CSOOC in international business? And, how
does the Chinese government influence CSOOC? An overview of CSOOC answers the
two basic questions at the beginning. Second, after the overview, I examine the big
three CSOOC in details. I find that their results are different in the U.S. PetroChina
faced a lawsuit from American investors. Sinopec was forced to terminate three
agreements in Wyoming. CNOOC received investigations from the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) which led to its failure to purchase the U.S. oil
firm - Unocal. Third, admittedly, their failures in the U.S. market are due to complex
factors (e.g., political interventions, America's strict environment protection,
different cultures and more); however, I need to boil them down to some key factors
relevant to international political economy. These key political-economic factors are
categorized into three aspects: the U.S. government (CFIUS and the interaction
between anti-China interest groups and U.S. Congress), the company itself
(weaknesses of CSOOC), and the Chinese government (its rising military power
makes it more difficult for Chinese companies to purchase oil assets in the U.S.).
China's three big oil companies are all state-owned enterprises; thus they
have some advantages that their Western counterparts do not have. According to
the 2010 American magazine, Fortune, PetroChina and Sinopec were listed as the
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7th and 10th of the Global 500, respectively.5 In terms of market value, their
rankings are even higher. PetroChina was ranked the first by Financial Times Global
500.6 Although CNOOC was listed as the 252th in 2010, it is growing very fast (it
was ranked 318th in 2009). PetroChina and Sinopec always occupy the first and
second place of the China's top 500 enterprises, respectively. According to Ping
Deng, by the end of 2004, "Of the top 500 Chinese firms - the dominant source of
Chinese outward FD1 - only one is privately owned and 25 are collectives, which are
usually owned by county and municipal government; the rest are state-owned
enterprises (SOEs)."7
The energy sector is the priority of Chinese government's international
investment. Actually, a majority of Chinese government's overseas investment was
directly or indirectly operated by the big three Chinese national oil companies. Over
the past decade, China has boldly used billions of its foreign reserves (mostly U.S.
dollars) to invest in oil-rich countries, including some dangerous places like
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. With strong political support from the state
government, the three oil companies have gained tremendous benefits globally. In
Africa, PetroChina and Sinopec are prestigious companies because African
businessmen and politicians know that the Chinese national oil companies are
backed up by the Chinese central government. For this reason, their financial
condition is very stable and will not have the capital shortage that some Western

5 http://m oney.cnn.com /m agazines/fortune/global500/2010/
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_corporations_by_market_capitalization
7 Ping Deng, "Outward Investment by Chinese MNCs: Motivations and Implications", Business Horizons,
June 2004.
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companies might have. Today, thousands of young Chinese college graduates are
competing fiercely for jobs in those state-owned oil companies.
Although the Chinese oil companies have gained a certain degree of autonomy
from the Chinese government in recent years, they are still under the great influence
of state-controlled bureaucracy. First, the development of Chinese state-owned
companies is driven by officials' promotion instead of profits-making, because the
primary instrument of power that the party-state exercises over China's stateowned oil companies is the power to appoint, dismiss, and promote the companies'
general managers.8 Second, their large investment projects must get approval from
the National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC). In addition, their oil
prices are also regulated by NDRC. Third, as they are state-owned companies, a
large part of their revenues will be taxed by the government or be turned over to the
state treasury.
In 2013, China's new president Xi vowed to crack down on both "tigers and
flies" - powerful leaders and lowly bureaucrats - in his campaign against
corruption.9 Afterwards, a series of investigations have been carried out. In early
2014, Chinese state media exposed PetroChina and Sinopec's domestic and foreign
corruption. For example, Jiemin Jiang, the head of NDRC that oversees state-owned
companies is under investigation for "severe disciplinary violations."10 Before he
became the head of NDRC, Jiemin Jiang was leading, PetroChina, China's largest oil

8 Erica S. Downs, "Who's Afraid of China's Oil Companies", in Energy Security edited by Carlos Pascual and
Jonathan Elkind (Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
9 Tania Branigan, "Xi Jinping Vows to Fight 'Tigers' and 'Flies' in Anti-corruption Drive", The Guardian,
January 22, 2013.
10 Jeremy Page, Wayne M a and Brian Spegele, "China Probes Former Oil Company Head", The W all Street
Journal, September 1, 2013.
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company and also the most profitable one. Jiang received expensive gifts and a large
amount of cash when he was in charge of PetroChina. Jiang's downfall showed that
there was a great intersection of senior Chinese leaders' private interests and the
state-owned companies. Jiang's downfall also exposed the non-transparency of
Chinese government's decision-making and thus caused PetroChina to face a lawsuit
in the U.S.

PetroChina

A. Expansion in Africa versus Lawsuit in America
PetroChina is largest state-owned oil company in China. On its official
website, it says "It is not only one of the companies with the biggest sales revenue in
China, but also one of the largest oil companies in the world."11 Since the mid1980s, PetroChina started to explore rich reserves of oil fields, especially in the
Tarim basin in Xinjiang, China. In the 1990s, it began oversea expansion in the
efforts to achieve its goal at that time: become a multinational company as soon as
possible. PetroChina had two different experiences in Africa and the U.S. In Africa, it
has expanded its business and purchased large oil fields. In the U.S., it has faced
lawsuits. In 1997, PetroChina defeated other international oil companies and won
the exploitation rights of Muglad basin in Sudan. This is the first time that
PetroChina successfully bid the large-scale overseas oil and gas exploration

11 http://www.petrochina.com.cn/Ptr/About_PetroChina/Company_Profile/default.htm
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project.12 To some extent, Sudan is the point when PetroChina started its global
competition.
Many African countries are developing countries rich in natural resources.
Their laws regarding anti-corruption and exploiting natural resources are not strict,
or may lack enforcement. Moreover, China did not have a law like the American
Anti-Corruption Act which can investigate Chinese companies' briberies overseas.
Some corruption arose from China-Africa oil business and was occasionally
reported by Western media. For example:
At Chinese-run mines in Zambia's copper belt they must work for two years
before they get safety helmets. Ventilation below ground is poor and deadly
accidents occur almost daily. To avoid censure, Chinese managers bribe
union bosses and take them on "study tours" to massage parlours in China.
Obstructionist shop stewards are sacked and workers who assemble in
groups are violently dispersed. When cases end up in court, witnesses are
intimidated.13
Chinese oil companies' bribery strategy works in Africa, but does not work in
the U.S. I observe that there are still some Americans complaining about corruption
in the U.S. There might be more corruption in the U.S. than in some Northern
European countries.14 However, compared to China and most African countries, the
U.S. government officials seem free of corruption.
Unlike in Africa where PetroChina has purchased large oil fields and employed
thousands of workers, in the U.S. PetroChina has just set up an office in Houston,
Texas, where the number of employees just reached over 50 in 2013. In Africa,

12 An Official Report: "Review of 15 Years of Sino-Sudanese Petroleum Cooperation", China National
Petroleum Corporation, 2009.
13 "Trying to pull together: Africans are asking whether China is making their lunch or eating it", The
Economist, April 20, 2011.
14 Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway are among top 5 in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 by
Transparency International. The U.S. is ranked 19.
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PetroChina is doing upstream operations (exploiting oil fields), while in the U.S.
PetroChina is doing mostly midstream work (transportation and storage of refined
petroleum products).15 According to Shaolin Li, president of PetroChina
International America Inc, in the U.S. they basically buy petroleum products at Point
A, move them to Point B and do some processing for added value, and then move
them to Point C to sell.16
PetroChina's expansion in the U.S. is not as successful as that in Africa. For
example, in 2013, Pomerantz, a New York-based law firm, filed a class action against
PetroChina. Several top leaders of PetroChina were involved in corruption and were
investigated by the Chinese government. PetroChina's stock share value dropped
due to the corruption scandal. But, PetroChina did not report this immediately to its
U.S. investors. So, there were some losses to American investors who think
PetroChina’s financial statements were false and misleading. They accused
PetroChina of “failing to disclose a corruption scandal that has tainted the company
and led to the downfall of several senior executives."17
In addition, Jiemin Jiang, former PetroChina chairman, Jiping Zhou,
PetroChina's current chairman, former CFO Mingchun Zhou and current CFO Yibo
Yu were accused of violations of the securities laws of the U.S.18 Later, PetroChina
said it would "vigorously contest the complaint to protect its rights and interests.”19
Currently, there is no much information about this incident, because the lawsuit is

15 The oil industry is divided into three major sectors: upstream, midstream and downstream. For more
information, please refer to http://www.psac.ca/business/industrv-overview/. accessed on April 16 ,201 4
16 May Zhou: "PetroChina poised for expansion", China Daily USA, November 22, 2013.
17 "PetroChina Sued in US Over Failure to Disclose Corruption", Caijing, September 4, 2013.
18 "PetroChina sued in US court", Xinhua, November 27, 2013.
19 "PetroChina says to contest class action suit in U.S. court", Reuters, September 6, 2013.
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still ongoing and will probably continue for two to four years.20 However,
according to a Chinese news report, PetroChina is very likely to lose the lawsuit and
pay high attorney fees and compensation.21 This failure may thwart PetroChina's
expansion in the U.S. market.
In China, private business or individuals do not often file lawsuits against the
government or those giant state-owned companies, because they know it is very
difficult to win lawsuits against government or state-owned companies and get fair
compensation. In the U.S., filing a civil or business lawsuit is much more common
than in China. In addition, there are more detailed categories of courts in the U.S.,
such as traffic court, civil court, and small claims court. In the U.S., lawyers and
doctors are generally viewed as admired jobs, whereas in China millions of college
students are taking exams for jobs of "Gong Wu Yuan" (government employees).
Either for lawsuit filing or job-seeking, many Chinese still believe that "Guan Xi"
(personal connection/relationship) is more important than rules. Shaomin Li
argued that in China the governance environment is based on private enforcement
that can efficiently regulate market and resolve disputes and thus China is a
"relation-based society". By contrast, the U.S. is a "rule-based society," in which
firms and individuals primarily rely on laws to resolve disputes and enforce rights
and contracts.22 So, when contemplating U.S. market entry, Chinese companies need
to perform due diligence on the rule-based environment in the U.S.23 The U.S.

20 http://m onev.163.com /13/0906/13/983H R DlU0Q 251LK 6.htm l. accessed on April 20, 2014.
21 http://finance.china.com .cn/industrv/hotnews/20130908/1795770.shtm l. accessed on April 20, 2014.
22 Shaomin Li, Managing International Business in Relation-Based versus Rule-Based Countries: (Business
Expert Press, 2009).
23 Clarence Kwan, Karl P. Sauvant, "Managing International Business in Relation-Based versus Rule-Based
Countries", U.S. Chinese Services Group, October 2008.
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regulations regarding foreign investment are evolving. In next chapter, I will
examine the involvement of CFIUS through three major U.S. regulations.

Sinopec

A. The"Going-out" Campaign
In 1998, with the restructuring of state-owned companies, Chinese oil
companies expanded their business to almost every aspect of the oil industry,
including oil field exploration, drilling, oil refining, and transportation. Moreover,
the 1998 reform of state-owned companies also stimulated Chinese oil companies to
pursue oil fields globally. From then on, the domestic and foreign sales of Sinopec
have tripled. In recent years, Sinopec is implementing the "going-out" strategy.24
Although Sinopec started its overseas expansion later than PetroChina, it is
catching up very quickly. In 2001, Sinopec established Sinopec International
Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation (SIPC). Afterwards, Sinopec
adopted the strategy of “going out". The going-out strategy is part of China's
international petroleum policy, which was proposed by the State Development
Planning Commission (NDRC) in 2003. According to China’s Jingji (Economic Daily),

24 Numerous studies are on the "going out" strategy of Chinese companies, such as, F Leverett's
"Managing China-US energy competition in the Middle East" (2005) and "The New Axis of Oil" (2006), C
Alden's "Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy", The China
Quarterly, 2 0 0 9 , Cambridge University Press, WS Chen's China's Oil Strategy:"Going Out" to Iran, Asian
Politics & Policy, 2010, H Zhao's "China's oil venture in Africa", East Asia, 2007 and etc.
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the NDRC put forward six strategies to protect the country's oil security, which are
as follows:25
1. To implement the going-out strategy;
2. To carry out the diversification strategy;
3. To build globally competitive flagship oil companies;
4. To conduct petroleum diplomacy;
5. To build domestic oil tanker fleet and expand the Chinese Air Force and the
Chinese Navy; and
6. To set up national petroleum investment funds.
Under the international petroleum policy drafted by NDRC, in 2004 Sinopec
signed an evaluation deal with Gabon. In the same year, former Chinese President
Hu paid a visit to Gabon and signed a series of bilateral trade treaties with his
Gabonese counterpart, Omar Bongo, including a "memorandum of agreement aimed
at showing the parties’ desire to develop exploration, exploitation, and refining and
export activities of oil products."26 In 2006, China announced that it would loan $2
billion to Angola and build a joint venture between Sonangol Refineries (Sonangref)
and Sinopec.27 The same as PetroChina, Sinopec also has great interest in Sudan. "In
November 2005, Sinopec Group announced plans to partner with PetroChina to
purchase an oil field in Sudan, and has reportedly indicated an interest in expanding
its business in Sudan."28

25 Bo Kong, China's International Petroleum Policy (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2010).
26 "Sinopec signs evolution deal for three oil blacks in Gabon", People's Daily, February 4, 2004.
27 "China in Africa: The Role of China's Financial Institutions", African Growing Enterprises File, Institute of
Developing Economies and Japan External Trade Organization.
28 "Statement of Sinopec Divestment", Harvard Gazette Archives, March 2 3 ,2006.
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The early road map of Sinopec's going-out campaign has covered almost every
continent except North America.29 There are at least three explanatory factors.
First, the U.S. is not willing to exploit its own oil, so it is very difficult for Chinese
companies to get oil from the U.S. During one speech, Obama said "With only 2% of
the world's oil reserves, we can't just drill our way to lower gas prices." However,
many Chinese believe that the oil reserves in the U.S. are underestimated. They also
argue that Americans are just smart and do not use their own oils.30 In addition, as
a rule-based country, the U.S. has a series of U.S. environment laws (e.g. Clean Air
Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act). For
example, in 2011, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) forced Shell to give
up oil drilling plans in the Arctic Ocean off the northern coast of Alaska.31
EPA updates some statistics on its enforcement website ever fiscal year. Figure
4.1 shows that from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013, it conducted 1,904
energy extraction inspections and compliance evaluations. However, only 132 cases
have been concluded, which accounted for less than 7% of the total cases.32 The
enforcement actions have included companies operating gas plants, compressor
stations, and oil and gas production facilities in several of the most active U.S.
onshore oil and gas plays.33 Many cases will be ongoing for years, because the
review and investigation process is slow. How much will it cost to resolve? This

29 Bo Kong, China's International Petroleum Policy (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2010).
30 http://club .china.co m /d ata/th read /1011/2286/79/92/6_l.htm l
31 Dan Springer: "Energy in America: EPA Rules Force Shell to Abandon Oil Drilling Plans", Fox News, April
25, 2011.
32 "National Enforcement Initiative: Ensuring Energy Extraction Activities Comply with Environmental
Laws", EPA, 2014.
33 Georgette Reeves, "Heads Up for Oil and Gas Companies Regarding EPA's National Enforcement
Initiative", Trinity Consultants, May 28, 2013.
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definitely varies based on multiple factors such as the severity of the damages, the
violators' attitudes, legal defense and more. According to EPA's annual trends
analysis for fiscal year 2013, EPA assessed more than in $1,000 million
administrative and civil judicial penalties, a big increase from 2012 ($200 million).34
Indeed, the time and cost-consuming process of investigation from EPA set up high
entry barriers for Chinese oil companies to invest in the upstream oil sector in the
U.S. (exploration and production).

Figure 4.1
Annual Number of EPA Energy Extraction Inspections/Evaluations and Concluded
Enforcement Actions
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34 "Fiscal Year 2013 EPA Enforcement and Compliance Annual Results", the Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, January 13, 2013.
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Second, high labor costs and strict immigration system have reduced Sinopec's
motivation to invest boldly in the U.S. According to the Bureau o f Labor Statistics, in
2009 China's average hourly compensation costs were only $1.74, which was far
behind the U.S.35 Moreover, the strict immigration system in the U.S. has basically
ruled out low-skilled cheap Chinese laborers. Hiring foreign workers in the U.S. is a
time-consuming process, because United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) require the wage and education degree to meet certain criteria.
Besides, the employer has to pay high fees to an immigration lawyer for filing legal
paperwork. By contrast, there are fewer visa restrictions in Africa. Chinese oil
companies can easily hire thousands of cheap Chinese workers and then send them
to those oil fields in Africa, which is quite impossible in the U.S.
Third, previous failures of Chinese companies in the U.S. hampered Sinopec's
going-out campaign in the U.S. As discussed in the next section, in 2005, CNOOC,
another Chinese oil company, bid high but failed to purchase Unocal, an American
oil company. CNOOC spent over $2.2 million on hiring American lobbying firms for
the purchase of Unocal, but finally gained nothing.36 Chengyu Fu, chairman of
CNOOC, was then very disappointed by the result. He argued that CNOOC's failure in
the U.S. was largely due to the U.S. government intervention and the lack of mutual
political trust between China and the U.S., which might hurt other Chinese investors'
confidence in investing the U.S. market and generated lasting negative feelings in
both countries.37

35 "International Labor Comparison", U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 7, 2013.
36 "China National Offshore Oil Corporation", Lobbying Database, Center for Responsive Politics, 2014
37 Qiang Wang,

F

T

Sohu Chinese News, December 21, 2005.
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B. Sinopec: Three Agreements Terminated in Medicine Bow, Wyoming
In 2012, Sinopec Engineering Group (SEG), a subsidiary of Sinopec, signed
three agreements with Fuel & Power LLC of Medicine Bow, Wyoming, to build an
advanced coal-to-gasoline plant. Medicine Bow is a very small town with population
less than 300 and is probably unknown to most Americans. Sinopec was selected to
build the plant because "Sinopec brings to the potentially expensive and
complicated project less pricey Chinese components and materials. It may also open
up the doors to attractive Chinese capital" according to the Wall Street Journal.39
Chinese media also reported this and praised Sinopec for further opening the U.S.
market. Some Chinese scholars were optimistic about Sinopec’s move in the U.S.
Boqiang Lin, who ran the China Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen
University and advised the Chinese government on energy policy, said: "Sinopec
winning engineering work in the U.S. was important to establishing itself as a global
brand." He believed that moves up the U.S. value chain would continue, and that
Chinese oil majors such as Sinopec could establish retail gas stations in the U.S. in
the next few years.39
However, the reality is harsh. During the past two years, SEG was not able to
build the plants in Medicine Bow successfully due to various reasons. On February
28, 2014, Sinopec Engineering Group said it had received written notice from Fuel &
Power LLC purporting to terminate the three agreements from 2012. Jiming Zou, a
Moody's analyst said, "Although we don't expect major impact on Sinopec
38 Brian Spegele, "China's Sinopec Moves Into Small U.S. Town", The W all Street Journal, November 5,

2012.
39 Brian Spegele, "China's Sinopec Moves Into Small U.S. Town", The Wall Street Journal, November 5,

2012 .
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Engineering Group's business operations and financial profile, the incident will have
a negative impact on its plans to expand into overseas markets."40

CNOOC

A. An Attempted Acquisition o f Unocal and Interventions from U.S. Congress
China National Offshore Oil Corporation is the third largest oil company in
China. It is also the largest natural gas supplier in China. In 2006, visiting Chinese
President Hu Jintao and Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki witnessed the signing of the
oil exploration agreement between Kenya and CNOOC. In 2005, it topped the bid by
Chevron Texaco to buy American oil company Unocal Corporation. However, due to
the U.S. Congress opposition, its bid did not succeed. CNOOC has been accused of
abuses of Human rights in Burma. The campaign group Arakan Oil Watch stated in a
report that CNOOC "left behind such a trail of abuses and environmental
contamination on Ramree Island that outraged locals attacked their facilities."41
The U.S. Congress has great influence on China-U.S. trade and often blames
China for human rights issues, the Tibetan issue, ad shortcomings of freedom of
speech and democracy. Sometimes, U.S. Congressmen's actions are decisive to the
success or failure of Chinese companies in the U.S. On June 23, CNOOC announced
$18.5 billion bid for U.S. oil firm Unocal, higher than Chevron's $16.5 billion 42 Four
days later, Joe Barton, Texas Republican and chairman of the House Energy and

41 William Boot, "Chinese Oil Giant Accused of Human Rights Abuses in Burma", lrrawaddy.org, October
24, 2008.
42 Edward Iwata, "Chinese takeover bid for Unocal up in air", USA Today, July 14, 2005
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Commerce Committee, wrote a letter to President Bush, saying the U.S. is
"threatened by China's aggressive tactics to lock up energy supplies around the
world that are largely dedicated for their own use."43
Many U.S. Congressmen believed that CNOOC was manipulated by the Chinese
government. CNOOC made a bid of $18.5 billion cash among which $13 billion are
from the Chinese government. They argued the sale of Unocal to CNOOC was not a
free market transaction and should be prohibited. Moreover, they stated that the
Chinese government prevented American companies from buying similar assets in
China.44 So, they think the trade between China and the U.S. was unfair.
On June 30, the House passed H. Res. 344 and H. Arndt. 431. H. Res. 344
called for a thorough review of CNOOC by the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the U.S. (CFIUS), while H. Arndt. 431 prohibited use of Treasury funds to approve
sale of Unocal to CNOOC. So, on July 2 CNOOC had to quickly file a CFIUS notice. On
July 13, Frank Gaffhey Jr., president of the Center for Security Policy, told the House
Armed Services Committee that the sale "would have adverse effects on the
economic and national security interests of the United States." He also pointed to
"the folly of abetting Communist China's effort to acquire more of the world's
relatively finite energy resources" and warned of "the larger and ominous Chinese
strategic plan of which this purchase is emblematic."45 On July 20, Chevron raised
its offer to about $16.5 billion; still $2 billion lower than CNOOC's bid, which pushed

43 Paul Bluestein, "Many Oil Experts Unconcerned Over China Unocal Bid", The Washington Post, July 1
2005
44 Ben W hite, "Chinese Drop Bid to Buy U.S. Oil Firm", The Washington Post, August 3, 2005.
45 James A. Dorn, "U.S.-China Relations in the Wake of CNOOC", Policy Analysis, No. 553, November 2,
2005.
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CNOOC to withdraw its bid on August 2. Finally, on August 10, Unocal accept
Chevron's offer.46
Table 4.1 is a comparison of CNOOC's and Chevron's bids.

Table 4.1
CNOOC and Chevron Competing for Unocal in 2005 47

CNOOC

Chevron

Country

China

The U.S.

bid per share

$67

$60.65

Total bid

$18.5 billion

$16.5

Payment methods

Cash

Cash + stock

Preferred by Unocal

Yes (because of higher

No (lower bid)

bid)
Intervention from Congress

Yes

No

Final result

Lost

Won

B. Why Was CNOOC Interested in Acquiring American Oil Assets?
Chinese oil companies are seeking foreign oil assets to transform themselves
into world-class oil companies. Former CNOOC general manger Liucheng Wei used a
soccer analogy to make that point, arguing that "China's oil companies cannot just

46 Dick K. Nato, James K. Jackson, Wayne M . Morrison, etc. "China and the CNOOC Bid for Unocal: Issues
for Congress", CRS Report fo r Congress, February 2 7,2006.
47 Data is based on Edward Iwata, "Chinese takeover bid for Unocal up in air", USA Today, July 14, 2005.

play in the domestic league. We should also compete in the World Cup."48
Compared to purchasing oil assets in Africa or in the Middle East, acquiring
American oil companies have the following advantages. First, China's oil companies
can gain technical expertise. One objective of CNOOC's bid for Unocal was to gain
deep-water exploration and production capacity. Likewise, its acquisition of a stake
in Canada's MEG Energy was said to be targeted at securing advanced oil sands
extraction technology.49 Second, China's oil companies can learn large project
management skills from American oil companies. Compared to Western oil giants
like ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell, China's oil companies are latecomers to the
international oil business and have less experience in "executing complex projects
that involve employing cutting-edge technology, arranging huge financing packages,
managing environmental impacts, and finishing on time and on budget."50 Third,
China was invaded by a group of Western countries in the 19th centuries, such as the
two Opium Wars and Boxing Rebellion. Today, still many Chinese people feel that
China is a victim of Western powers. They also feel sympathy for Africa which was
colonized by Europeans for hundreds of years. Therefore, buying oil companies in
America can make them feel more proud of China's rise than doing so in Africa. In
the 1980s, when Japanese firms made purchases in America, nationalist sentiment
also arose in Japan.

48 Erica S. Downs, "Who's Afraid of China's Oil Companies", in Energy Security edited by Carlos Pascual and
Jonathan Elkind (Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
49 Erica S. Downs, "Who's Afraid of China's Oil Companies", in Energy Security edited by Carlos Pascual and
Jonathan Elkind (Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
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Barriers for Chinese State-owned Oil Companies to Enter the U.S. Market

A. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
When CFIUS was established in 1975, it chiefly targeted at Japanese
companies, because Japan was then an economic threat to the U.S. Today, Chinese
companies replaced Japanese companies and are easily subject to be investigated by
CFIUS. Figure4.2 shows that the numbers of CFIUS-covered transactions led by a
Chinese buyer has been increased rapidly since 2006. In 2007, only 2% of
transactions with Chinese buyers were investigated by CFIUS. In 2012, it rose up to
20 %. In other words, one fifths of Chinese investments in the U.S. were challenged
by CFIUS in 2012. In the meantime, CNN conducted a survey which argued that
"most Americans want U.S. leaders to be tough with China on trade and economic
issues."51 This is not a good signal for the long-term development of China-U.S.
trade. With increasing economic conflicts between China and the U.S., CFIUS's status
in international business has become much more important than ever before. Thus,
in the section I will probe into CFIUS and several important regulations that CFIUS
has used to block foreign Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) in the U.S.
CFIUS is probably a little known government agency in the U.S. Reuters called
it "the mysterious agency that can block a global merger.” In the past few years,
companies from China, Russia, Europe and Japan are snatching up U.S. firms which
have exposed CFIUS more to media reports.52

51 Charles Riley, "Americans: China Is An Economic Threat", CNNMoney, September 19, 2012.
52 Jill Priluck, "The Mysterious Agency That Can Block A Global Merger", Reuters, July 8, 2013.
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Figure 4.2

CFIUS-Covered Transactions Led by a Chinese Buyer, 2006-2012
a
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Source: CFIUS Annual Report to Congress, Public Version

Although U.S. Congress has the right to speak and suggest, CFIUS is still
independent from Congress and answers directly to the President. On its official
website, CFIUS defined itself as,
An inter-agency committee authorized to review transactions that could
result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person ("covered
transactions"), in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the
national security of the United States.53
CFIUS has its origin back to the Cold War as the Executive Branch of the U.S.
government's "economic kill-switch" for FDI.54 In 1975, it was established by
President Gerald Ford under the Executive Order 11858. At the section 1 of the

53 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-on-Foreign-lnvestment-inUS.aspx
54 David C. Hoyt, "The Geoeconomic role of CFIUS in U.S-Sino Relations", CSPC Fellows Review, 2011.
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Executive Order 11858, it reads: "International investment in the U.S. promotes
economic growth, productivity, competitiveness, and job creation. It is the
policy of the U.S. to support unequivocally such investment, consistent with the
protestation of the national security

there is hereby established the

committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S."55
In addition, the Executive Order 11858 also stated that CFIUS would have
"primary continuing responsibility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the
impact of foreign investment in the United States, both direct and portfolio, and for
coordinating the implementation of United States policy on such investment."56 To
implement this mandate, CFIUS was directed to:
1. Arrange for the preparation of analyses of trends and significant
developments in foreign investments in the United States,
2. Provide guidance on arrangements with foreign governments for
advance consultations on prospective major foreign governmental
investments in the United States,
3. Review investments in the United States which, in the judgment of the
Committee, might have major implications for United States national
interests,
4. Consider proposals for new legislation or regulations relating to foreign
investment as may appear necessary.57
Apparently, when CFIUS was established in mid 1970s, its major target was
not Chinese companies, because China was then a closed economy under Mao.
Actually, the establishment of CFIUS was a response to the rising Japanese
companies in the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, in 1983, a Japanese firm sought to
acquire a U.S. specialty steel producer. The steel was used in making military

55 Executive Order 11858, U.S. Treasury.
56 David C. Hoyt, "The Geoeconomic role of CFIUS in U.S-Sino Relations", CSPC Fellows Review, 2011.
57 Ibid.
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aircraft. So, the Department of Defense and CFIUS stepped in investigation and
finally forced the Japanese firm to withdraw its offer.58
Over the past decade, U.S. media reports have downplayed the competition
and acquisitions from Japanese companies, and highlighted the case of Dubai Ports
World in 2006 and several purchases by Chinese companies. There are several
reasons for this shift. First, 9/11 changed U.S. foreign policies. The Dubai Ports
World Controversy in 2006 is a good example to show how terrorism concerns
during the Bush Administration determined the failure or success of foreign
investment in the U.S. Second, Japan was once a threat to the U.S., but it has declined
since the 1990s. Due to its stagnant economy; Japan has slowed down its speed in
overseas merging and acquisition (M & A). Japan is even regarded as America’s "best
ally in Asia." Today, both American public and government no longer think Japan is
a competitor to U.S. By contrast, they view China and the Middle East as major
threats. The pivot of U.S. foreign policy was shifted to the Middle East during the
Bush Administration and now is being shifted to the Asia-Pacific region.59 Third,
China's communist regime makes the U.S. public more afraid of Chinese companies
than Japanese ones. Many Americans still hold a negative image toward China. A
CNN Opinion Research Corporation Poll conducted in 2009 found that 71% of
Americans considered China to be an economic threat; two-thirds saw China as a
source of unfair competition, and 51% regarded it as a military threat.60

58 James K. Jackson, "Congressional Research Service-The The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS)", March 6, 2014.
59 Ian Bremmer, "U.S. Needs Japan As Its Best Ally in Asia", Financial Times, September, 9, 2012.
60 Friedrich Wu, Lim Siok Hoon, and Yuzhu Zhang, "Dos and Don'ts for Chinese Companies Investing in the
United States: Lessons From Huawei and Haier", in Thunderbird International Business Review, New York:
Wiley, 2011.
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B. Another Barrier to Market Entry: Anti-China Interest Groups in the U.S.
The case of Dubai Ports World showed that American interest groups have a
great deal of leverage on U.S. politics. In October 2005, Dubai World, a company in
United Arab Emirates, attempted to acquire the right of managing businesses in six
U.S. seaports. Eller& Company, a U.S. firm, opposed this sale and thus hired semi
retired lobbyist Joe Muldoon to persuade Congress to block the deal. Muldoon got
support from Democratic New York Senator Charles E. Schumer and an Associated
Press reporter who put this deal in the national spotlight.61 Finally, Dubai Ports
World failed to shrug off concern of terrorism and had to sell the operations to a U.S.
entity. According to The Washington Times, "Intelligence and security officials
opposed to the deal with Dubai Ports World said ports are vulnerable to the entry of
terrorists or illicit weapons because of the large number of containers that enter U.S.
territory, regardless of who manages them."62
Unlike the case of Dubai Ports, American interest groups do not associate the
purchases by Chinese investor with terrorism. Instead, they blame China for its
communist regime, suppression, human rights, unfair trade and more. The antiChina interest groups in the U.S. are strong, including organizations (Labor Union,
Human Rights Watch), social media, internet, blogosphere and celebrities. But,
there are also pro-China interest groups in America like the US-China Business
Council and lobbyists hired by Chinese companies. They compete to influence the
Congressional decisions on China. For instance, table 4.2 shows that in 2005 when
CNNOC attempted to purchase Unocal, it spent more than $2.2 million on lobbying.
61 Peter Overby, "Lobbyist's Last-Minute Bid Set Off Ports Controversy", NPR, March 8, 2006.
62 "Security fears about infiltration by terrorists", The Washington Times, February 22, 2006.
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CNNOC hired Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, one lobbying firm in Texas, to assist
its purchase. Immediately, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld drew criticism from
anti-China politicians. On July 12, 2005, Rep. Frank Wolf, R-Va., a member of the
Congressional China Caucus, sent a strongly worded letter to Akin Gump's lobbyists
questioning their representation of CNOOC. "When 1noted that CNOOC was one of
your newest clients, I immediately thought, ‘Is there no bright line to separate who
the lobbyists in Washington will or will not represent?”'63

Table 4.2
Annual Lobbying by China National Offshore Oil Corporation64
$2.4M
S2.2M-

I2.QM

S1.8M
1* J1.6M=

S1.4M

S1.0M
|

W.8M-I

S0.6M50.2M
•07

An interest group has many names, such as "special interest", "pressure
group", "advocacy group", and "lobby group". However, these are "negatively
charged terms, each implying unsavory tactics or a lack of a concern for a broader

63 Marina Walker Guevara, "China Steps Up Its Lobbying Game", The Center for Public Integrity,
September 13, 2005.
64 "China National Offshore Oil Corporation", Lobbying Database, Center for Responsive Politics, 2014.

144

public interest."65 A neutral term should be interest group. According to
opensecrets.org, there are 12,278 lobbyists in the U.S. by the end of 2013.66 Some of
them are very influential and can affect America’s China policies by lobbying
Congress, such as The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO), International Brotherhood of Teamsters; and the National
Textile Association all of which were against free trade with China and blamed the
Chinese government for violating human rights.
Anti-China interest groups have actively attended congressional committee
hearings. For example, in May 1993, there was a hearing held in the House of
Representatives. The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) expressed their opposition against the extended mostfavored-nation treatment to China. AFL-CIO used the strategy of either-or choice. It
pushed industry and commerce lobbyists to choose “either conscience or profit.”
The AFL-CIO asked, "Aren't democracy, justice and basic human rights more
valuable than those profits gained by exploiting one billion Chinese people?"67
Anti-China interest groups have carried out large-scale lobbying activities of
members of U.S. Congress, especially those conservative congressmen from the
eastern states with textile firms. They collaborated and proposed cancelling mostfavored-nation treatment to China. They put forward separate Sino-US trade bills
and demanded mandatory restrictions on Chinese exports to the United States.
Under the support of anti-China groups, in April 1990, Massachusetts Democratic

65 Ronald J. Hrebenar, Interest Group Politics in America (M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
66 "Number of Lobbyists", Lobbying Database, Center for Responsive Politics, 2014.
67 Yong Wang, "American Interest Group's Impact on U.S. China Policy," American Studies (Chinese), 1998.
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representative Barney Frank proposed a bill that cut half of China's textile and
garment exports to America. In 1991, Congressman Holmes and Gilman
(Republicans from New York) proposed a bill that stipulates: ban on U.S. citizens
investing foreign penal facilities, and American companies and trade union have the
right to sue penal importer and may ask for three times of compensation for loss.68
This bill includes additional terms against Chinese export. Under this bill, American
companies must prove that the products they are imported from China are not made
by Chinese prisoners. The amount of the punishment to offenders is high enough for
all importers.
Anti-china interest groups continuously notified Congressmen and the
Customs Administration of suspicious Chinese products made by prisoners, forcing
the U.S. Customs officers to conduct compulsory examination on some Chinese
products.69 In addition, anti-China interest groups communicated each other in
information, mutually aided each other and coordinated in lobby actions. For
instance, AFL-CIO provided Laogai Research Foundation in California a large
amount of financial aid. Laogai Research Foundation helped AFL-CIO to collect
relevant proof of Chinese exporting products made in forced labor camps. Besides,
AFL-CIO aided some human rights organization to supervise China's human rights
situation. AFL-CIO leaders also held positions in human rights organizations at the
same time, and helped planning activities against most-favored-nation treatment to
China.70

68 Ibid.
69 Shujie Leng, "Made in China - But Was it Made in a Prison?" A/PR, March 29, 2014
70 "International Trade Report", November 2 7 ,1991.
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Based on all, table 4.3 was created to summarize the strategies adopted by
anti-China interest groups. Actually, anti-China sentiment and Anti-Americanism
both exist in the U.S. and China, respectively. Nearly 130 years ago, the U.S.
approved the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which explicitly rejected Chinese
immigrants for six decades because of their race. Until recently U.S. Senate did not
apologize.71 In China, anti-American sentiments emerged in 1999 when the Chinese
Embassy in Yugoslavia was bombed by U.S. Air Force. Thousands of Beijing
residents and college students protested in front of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.
Some of them even threw stones to KFC and McDonald’s.

71 M a tt O'Brien, "U.S. Senate Apologizes for Decades of Anti-Chinese Discrimination", Contra Costa Times,
October 7, 2011.
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Table 4.3

Tactics Used by U.S. Anti-China Interest Groups

Tactics
1. Provide broad media coverage of Tiananmen incident
in 1989. They blame trade interest groups. "Merely
pursue money instead of human rights and conscience."
2. Carry out large-scale lobbying activities and
cooperate with conservative congressmen from Eastern
states harmed by textile imports.

Anti-China
Interest
Groups

3. Pressure US Customs to have mandatory inspection
on certain Chinese products (e.g. made by prisoners).
4. Anti-China interest groups communicate with each
other in the information, mutually support each other in
funding, and coordinate in lobbying actions.
5. Influence public opinion on China, e.g. cyber-security,
oil industry and U.S. national security, Shuanghui’s
purchase of Smithfield Foods and food safety.
6. Protect American labors (against exporting jobs to
China) and win support from the U.S. general public.

Source: author’s data

C. Chinese OH Companies' Own Weaknesses
The causes of Chinese oil companies' failures in the U.S. are complex. We
cannot solely blame U.S. Anti-China interest groups. Chinese oil companies' own
weaknesses should also be examined. There are at least three major weaknesses of
Chinese oil companies. First, Chinese national oil companies do not have mature
business strategies for brand-building. For example, both Chinese auto and oil
companies have tried entering the U.S. market for years. However, they still do not
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have a clear guiding ideology on how to win support from American consumers.
When it comes to foreign brands, average American consumers can easily name
some Japanese or Korean brands, such as Nissan, Toyota, LG, and Samsung. They
never heard of BYD (Build Your Dream], a Chinese auto firm that is attempting to
pursue the American consumers. BYD had planned to sell its E6 electric hatchbacks
in the U.S. by the end of 2010. But, it did not succeed. Stella Li, the senior vicepresident in charge of the company's US business, said: "Back then, we had passion,
but we had no brand, no history, no capital and no competitive advantage."72 Like
BYD, the three major Chinese oil companies currently also lack long-term
development plans in the U.S., and their negative images to the U.S. government and
public will not be improved in a short time.
At the same time, the management of Chinese state-companies' overseas
branches is flawed. Some parent companies did not give overseas branches enough
autonomy in operation, so they missed some good business opportunities. And,
some parent companies just took laissez-faire attitudes toward their overseas
subsidiaries, so the overseas subsidiaries were not well regulated and supervised.
For example, recently, PetroChina’s former Indonesia chief Zhigang Wei was under
investigation.73 He was accused of buying poor-quality oil fields from Indonesia at
unreasonable high prices. Undoubtedly, in the authoritarian regime, corruption is
always a big disadvantage of Chinese national oil companies, which leads to non

72 Bloomberg in Beijing and Shanghai, "BYD Plans to Launch into US M arket Next Year", South China
Morning Post, January 8, 2014.
73 Charlie Zhu and Chen Aizhu, "PetroChina's Former Indonesia Chief under Investigation", Reuters,
October 16, 2013.

149

transparency of decisions and individual leaders' expropriation of the state-owned
assets.
Second, Chinese national oil companies face great pressure from domestic
energy demand and domestic criticism. Due to its huge population and moderate oil
reserves, China's oil consumption per capita is much lower than the world
average.74 With fast economic development, the Chinese are hungry for world oil,
which has imposed great pressure on Chinese national oil companies. Because
Chinese national oil companies are supported by the Chinese government and a
large amount of their capital is from Chinese people's taxes. If they make any
mistake overseas, they might face fierce criticism from both Chinese public and
government.
Third, Chinese national oil companies have an incomplete understanding of
non-Eastern Asian cultures. For example, George Feng and Xianzhong Mu’s article
meticulously exams what cultural challenges are Chinese oil companies facing in
Africa and what strategies should they take. According to the authors, Chinese oil
companies' overseas management was challenged by miscommunication, working
habits, religions, orientation and coexistence.75 While the majority of Chinese
people today are atheists, people in Africa, the Middle East and the U.S. have beliefs
either in Islam, Judaism or Christianity. For example, in the U.S. many stores are
closed and there is less traffic on Sunday, because people go to churches. In China,
Sunday is probably the best day for business. In order to make more money, some
74 "Oil Consumption Per Capita", Index Mundl, January 1, 2012.
75 George Feng and Xianzhong Mu: "Cultural Challenges to Chinese Oil Companies in Africa and Their
Strategies", Energy Policy, vol. 38, issue 11, 2010.

150

Chinese companies even require employees to work on Sunday, which is
unacceptable to some Africans and Americans.

D. The U.S. Urged China to Reform Its State-Owned Enterprises
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Taiwan issue was probably the major
concern between China and the U.S. However, since 2001 economic issues have
topped the Taiwan issue in Sino-U.S. relations. The Obama Administration is
continuously urging China to further reform itself, including the RMB exchange rate
with the dollar, state-owned banks and enterprises, and trade barriers. The U.S.
believes that China's state-owned companies still compete with a range of unfair
advantages in the Chinese and global markets. For example, China's financial system
is still dominated by state-owned banks, who favor lending to large state-owned
companies like PetroChina and Sinopec. In addition, the state-owned companies'
implicit backing by the Chinese government discourages private firms' entry and
expansion. In a meeting at the Commonwealth Club of California, U.S. Treasury
Secretary Timothy F. Geithner argued,
If China's state enterprises want to be treated like commercial enterprises
by the rest of the world, they need to act more like commercial enterprises,
including by paying market-based dividends to their shareholders and
making their corporate governance and finances less opaque.76
Geithner seems to favor China's private companies more than the state-owned
ones. When he visited Beijing in 2012, he said: "China must rely more on innovation
by private companies rather than capacity expansion by state owned enterprise,
with an economy more open to competition from foreign firms, and with a more
76 "Remarks by Secretary Geithner at the Commonwealth Club of California", April 26, 2012.
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modern financial system."77 Indeed, the U.S. is more afraid of China's state-owned
companies which are often related to sensitive sectors like military,
telecommunication, energy and banking.
During Geithner's visit to Beijing in 2012, he also slammed the Chinese
government's subsidies to state-owned companies. To his surprise, the new China
leadership seems to be more cooperative than previous ones. For the first time,
according to senior American officials, Chinese negotiators said they would commit
to removing advantageous financing and regulatory conditions to state-owned
enterprises. The Chinese officials had also agreed to raise foreign firms' stake in join
securities ventures.78 As a return of favor, in 2013 the U.S. and Canadian
government approved the sale of Nexen to CNOOC, which failed in acquiring U.S. oil
firm Unocal in 2005.

£. China's Rising M ilitary Makes I t More Difficult fo r Chinese Companies to Obtain U.S.
Oil Assets
In the spring of 2006, Chinese President Hu visited Washington and
conducted a tough formal talk with his counterpart, George W. Bush. The talk
covered many subjects and urgent issues, such as the rebuilding of Iraq; anti
terrorism; the global financial system; the U.S. debt and China-U.S. trade; human
rights; and definitely the issue of oil. Hu felt uncomfortable with this visit as Chinese
Falun Gong protestor heckled him for several minutes on the White House lawn and

77 "Remarks by Secretary Geithner at the Close of the Fourth Strategic and Economic Dialogue", M ay 4,

2012 .
78 Annie Lowrey, "U.S. Stresses Concessions from China", The New York Times, M ay 3 2012.
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besides a White House announcer mixed up China’s formal sovereign name
(People's Republic of China) with the name preferred by the Nationalist government
on Taiwan (Republic of China). By contrast, Hu immediately left for Saudi Arabia
after his rash farewell to D.C. and had a greatly cozy atmosphere in Riyadh with the
Saudi royal family. Later, it seems that Hu's Arabian sojourn piqued interest in the
United States.79 Americans seem to be unhappy as the Chinese and Saudis signed
new oil contracts. To some extent, the U.S., no matter its politicians or the general
public, is getting more and more cautious of the closer relationship between China
and the Middle East.
The increasing Chinese oil demand makes China much more nervous about
the oil supply security as the U.S. power, particularly the American navy, is globally
present and poses a potential threat to China's maritime oil transportation. Based
on this rationale, the Chinese are speeding up their military strategy transformation
- that is, from the land to the sea. According to Jon Alterman and John Carver, SinoAmerican conflict in the Middle East could cut China off from access to energy, since
the U.S. controls the sea lanes on which oil to China travels.80
Traditionally, China adopts the strategy of "watching the tigers fight", which
comes from an old Chinese saying. This strategy fairly characterizes China's
approach to U.S. policy in the Middle East. Partly this is because the Chinese tend to
believe that the grandiose ambitions of the United States to control the Middle East

79 Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East
(CSIS, 2008).
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and its oil will not succeed in any case.81 In other words, China is not willing to join
the fighting in this region. Instead China prefers to free-ride on the U.S. If America's
efforts to stabilize the Middle East fail, China will probably not step in. Besides, since
Deng Xiaoping, China has always kept in mind that economic development is the top
national priority. The Chinese seems to be good at learning lessons from the ancient
wisdom, such as "Gao Zhu Qiang, Guang Ji Niang, Huan Cheng Wang," which means
"build tall walls, store grains, and claim the throne later." Therefore, the landdefensive strategy has dominated China's military strategy over the past several
decades.
The problem is the conflict between the rising oil demand and unmatched
navy power. How can China solve the problem? The Chinese media, general public
and decision-makers in recent years seem to embrace Mahan's sea power theory
warmly.82 They call for a transformation of China's military strategy, from land to
sea. If we look at several indicators, we will find that China’s increasing oil demand
is unprecedented. First, China is the second in oil-importing nations, probably
become the first in next one or two decades. Oil fuel the rapid economic growth.
Once the engine of Chinese economy started, it is difficult to stop or slow it in recent
years. Second, China's middle class is growing as more Chinese are getting richer.
The young Chinese middle class are well educated and to some extent are also
influenced by Western values and life styles. They are eager to buy nice cars with
larger consumption. This is also rooted in Chinese culture, the culture of face.
81 Jon B. Alterman and John W . Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, The United States, And The Middle East,
(CSIS, 2008).
82 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to M ahan
(Routledge, 2007).
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Owning a new car, particularly an American or German car, make them not lose face.
It is reported that China ranks the top by motor vehicle production in 2010. Third,
China is said to be the second largest manufacturing country in terms of Nominal
GDP and the first in terms of PPP GPD.83 These indicators all suggest that China's
economy is fueled and sustained largely by energy, particularly oil. If there is any
emergency of oil security, China will suffer greatly, let alone face war with other
major powers.
In order to secure China's maritime oil security, in recent years China has
diversified the oil sources. Table 4.4 shows that China has purchased oil assets in
regions beyond the Middle East.

83 Data is based on CIA Fact book and Wikipedia.
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Table 4.4

Large Merger and Acquisition Deals by China's State-owned Oil Firms84
Company

Date

Country

Assets

Price
(US$ millions)

Sinopec

Dec 08

Syria

Tanganyika Oil

2,000

CNPC

Nov 08

Iraq

al-Ahdab field

2,900

Sinopec

Jun 08

Australia

AED Oil

561

Sinopec

Dec 07

Iran

Yadavaran field

2,000

Sinopec

Nov 06

Russia

Udmurtneft

3,500

Sinopec

May 06

Angola

Blocks 17 and 18

2,400

CNOOC

Jan 06

Nigeria

OML130

2,300

CNPC

Oct 05

Kazakhstan

PetroKazakhstan

4,000

Source: Author's database

Also, China speeds up transforming itself from a land power to a sea power.
China's first aircraft carrier was launched in 2012 and it was reported that China is
planning to build four more in coming years.85 China also sent military cruises to
the Indian Ocean and the Eastern African shore to protect its oil tanker ships.
China's strengthening military power is a double-edged sword however. On one
hand, it protects Chinese oil companies' overseas assets. But, on the other hand, it
may foster the ‘China Threat' theory in the U.S. and make it more difficult for
Chinese companies to obtain U.S. oil assets. Below is the logic that explains the

84 Erica S. Downs, "Who's Afraid of China's Oil Companies", in Energy Security edited by Carlos Pascual and
Jonathan Elkind (Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
85 Mike Hoffman, "China Plans to Build 4 Aircraft Carriers", Defense Tech, January 22, 2014.
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connection between China's rising military and the failures of China's oil companies
in the U.S.:

China’s rising market demands;
China started to diversify its oil sources, including buying oil assets from oil-rich
countries
With more overseas oil assets purchased, China started to worry about its oil
security (because the U.S. controls the international maritime transportation line);
In order to protect overseas oil assets and transportation, China started to
strengthen its military power;
However, China’s rising military power makes the U.S. more nervous, which fosters
the "China Threat Theory" in the U.S.
Oppositions to China's purchase of American oil assets by the U.S. public and
Congress. China's state-owned companies are easily subject to the CFIUS

investigation.

Summary

In summary, this chapter covers at least five major sections: 1. an overview
of Chinese state-owned oil companies; 2. a detailed discussion of the big three
Chinese oil companies in the U.S., 3. the barriers to market entry, including CFIUS,
Anti-China interest groups, U.S. Congress and the rule-based society; 4. Chinese oil
companies' own weaknesses; and 5. The impact of China's rising military power on
its companies’ overseas purchases.
In the overview section, I find that China's state-owned oil companies have
grown very fast over the past two decades. Today, they are top ranked in the Global
500. Their fast development is a result of the state-led development. First, compared
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to those private Western oil companies, the Chinese state-owned oil companies are
less worried about their revenues and profits. Their financial condition is relatively
stable because of the capital back-up by the Chinese government and central bank.
For this matter, African politicians and businessmen have confidence in the Chinese
investment, which is one of many reasons that explain China's energy expansion in
Africa. In addition, Chinese state-owned companies are the hotbed for corruption
either in the domestic market or in international markets. PetroChina's bribery in
Africa enabled it to obtain good oil assets. By contrast, in the U.S. PetroChina
received lawsuits against corruption and non-transparent decision.
Second, unlike private Western oil companies, the leaders of Chinese oil
companies are usually appointed, promoted or dismissed by the Chinese
government. Some top government officials were general managers or chairmen of
Chinese oil companies before they were promoted to government positions.
Therefore, there is a great intersection of public and private interest in China. Jiemin
Jiang's downfall showed this.
In the second section, I outlined three major cases of the failures of China's oil
companies in the U.S. PetroChina faced lawsuits. Sinopec’s agreements in Wyoming
were terminated. And, CNOOC failed to purchase Unocal. Following the description
of the process and failures of their attempted purchases, the third and fourth section
answer why they have failed in the U.S. market. To sum up, there are at least three
barriers to entry in the U.S.
The first barrier is CFIUS, as an executive branch committee under the
President rather than a Congressional entity. The study shows that CFIUS has
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shifted its target from Japanese companies to Chinese companies. In recent years,
there are an increasing number of purchases by Chinese investors that have been
blocked by CFIUS, including the cases of CNOOC, Huawei, and Sany Heavy (Huawei
and Sany Heavy will be examined in chapter 5, because they are private Chinese
companies).
The second barrier is the interaction between U.S. Congress and anti-China
interest groups, which makes it more difficult for Chinese companies to trade or
invest in the U.S. The anti-China interest groups often cite China's problems (e.g.
human rights issues, the Tibetan issue, shortage of freedom of speech and more) to
affect Congressional decisions on the China-U.S. trade.
Third, the U.S. is a rule-based society which is starkly different from the
environment where Chinese oil companies grew up. In the U.S., dispute resolution is
heavily based on public regulations and laws, whereas in China many disputes are
settled privately (Called “fA 7 Si Liao" in Chinese). Therefore, when Chinese
companies faced lawsuits in the U.S., they felt unconformable, incompetent and
passive.
In addition to these barriers to entry in the U.S market, Chinese companies have
some weaknesses in common. There is much room for them to improve
management skills as well as understanding of Non-East Asian cultures. For
instance, In China, friends and colleagues compete to pay dinners. In the U.S., most
prefer to “Go Dutch". In China, Sunday is probably the busiest day for department
stores and street vendors. But, in the U.S., many people go to Church and take a rest
on Sunday. Admittedly, understanding foreign cultures is a slow learning process,
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which cannot be done overnight. In the following years, Chinese companies should
"put themselves into Americans' shoes" and gradually change their negative images
in the eyes of many American consumers. The last but not least is China's military
building and its impact on China's purchases of overseas oil assets. China's rising
military may strengthen China’s oil security in the Middle East and Africa. In return,
the U.S. may view it as a growing threat, which makes it more difficult for Chinese
companies (no matter state-owned or private) to obtain American assets. In the next
chapter, I will examine two private Chinese companies (Huawei and Sany Heavy)
which have close ties to the Chinese military and failed in acquiring American assets.
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CHAPTERV

CASE STUDY 4: PRIVATE CHINESE COMPANIES IN THE U.S.

Introduction

In the previous chapter, three Chinese state-owned enterprises are examined.
The empirical studies show that those SOEs investing in strategic resources like oil
will trigger CFIUS reviews. How about private Chinese firms? Will they enjoy more
successes than SOEs in the U.S.? My case studies show that FDI of private investors
in the U.S. has overtaken that of SOEs. This trend gives us at least two signals. First,
ownership matters. Most private Chinese firms are independent from the control of
home government and are not viewed as potential threats by the U.S. government
and public. Second, sector matters. Most private Chinese firms are in sectors of
consumer goods and are also smaller than SOEs in terms of company size. As a part
of American cultures, private entrepreneurship is praised for its innovation.
However, the success of some private Chinese firms in the U.S. does not mean that
all private Chinese firms should be worry-free from a CFIUS review. This chapter
will divide private firms into two kinds. One is those with close ties to home
government. The other is those without. By comparison, my case studies show that
for private Chinese firms, the key to CFIUS approval is to clearly clarify their
purposes of purchases of American assets as well their relationships with home
government.
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Recent Trends of Chinese FDI in the U.S.: Private Firms Have Overtaken the StateOwned

For a long time, China's foreign direct investment (FDI) was dominated by
State-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs are officially described "Guo Jia Jing Ji Ming
Mai" (the economic artery of the country). The status of SOEs in the national
economy was unchallengeable because they control banking, communication,
transportation and energy industries. In recent years, China's private companies
have grown bigger and more sophisticated and are thus getting more comfortable in
considering overseas acquisitions. For example, in 2012, Dalian Wanda Group Co.,
Ltd., a Chinese private conglomerate and China's largest investor in cultural and
entertainment activities, successfully acquired AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., a
leading U.S. film exhibitor. In 2013, Shuanghui, China's largest pork producer
purchased Virginia-based firm Smithfield Foods.1
According to Rhodium Group, a New York-based research firm, 16 out of the
17 deals closed in the first quarter of 2013 by Chinese companies were done by
privately-owned enterprises.2 Figure 5.1 by Rhodium clearly shows that China's
private firms have outperformed China's state-owned firms in the U.S. market since
2012 .

1 Sullivan&Cromwell LLP, "Shuanghui international receives CFIUS clearance for its purchases of Smithfield
Foods", September 10, 2013.
2 William L. Rosoff, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, "Recent Developments in Chinese FDI in the
United States", China Forex, June 15 2013.
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Figure 5.1

Chinese Direct Investment in the U.S. by Ownership, 2000-2013
Annual values. USO million
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The increase of investment by China's private companies is now the new trend
of China's FDI in the U.S. Why did China's FDI trend shift from dominance-by-SOEs
to dominance-by-private firms? Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, a U.S.
lobbying firm for Chinese companies, argues that:
The areas of FDI expansion are broadening from the focus on resources and
high tech to brand building, distribution in industries where private firms
may have a stronger representation. In addition, provincial governments
have been encouraging privately owned firms in their regions to 'go out'.3
Indeed, compared to China’s private firms, SOEs have at least four drawbacks.
First, SOEs are a hotbed of corruption. In previous chapters, I have discussed the
interaction between government officials and SOEs. Some SOEs leaders were

3 William L. Rosoff, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, "Recent Development in Chinese FDI in The
United States", China Forex, June 15, 2013.
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appointed by their government supervisors or later they were promoted to higherlevel government positions. For example, Jiemin Jiang was the general manager of
PetroChina before being appointed the director of the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission in 2013. This movement between
firms and government invites corruption.
Second, compared to most private firms, SOEs are less efficient in economic
activities. In China, SOEs jobs are called "Tie Fan Wan" (literally, iron rice bowl),
which means a permanent job a person would never lose whether he works hard or
not. Although the wages offered by SOEs might be lower than some private
companies, still many Chinese graduates compete for SOEs jobs. In order to get a
stable job in SOEs, a Chinese graduate may use connections and make deals behind
the scenes, which is called "Zou Hou Men" in Chinese (literally, going through the
back door). For this reason, SOEs employees are not necessarily talented or
competent. In addition, they are much less motivated to work hard compared to
private employees because of their permanent positions and fewer incentives. Some
Chinese SOEs have serious debt problems. For instance, in the 1990s, China was
plagued by "triangular debts (when a manufacturer that has not been paid for its
product is unable to pay its suppliers, which in turn struggle to pay their suppliers)."
Later that decade, financial institutions were burdened by bad debts generated by
state-owned enterprises.4
Third, private companies are more creative and can also create more jobs than
SOEs. The number of "Tie Fan Wan" (permanent stable jobs in state-owned

4 Monan Zhang, "China's Hidden Debt Risk", Project-syndicate.org, March 20, 2013.
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companies) is very limited and cannot meet the rising population of college
graduates every year. In 2004, there were 2.8 million Chinese college graduates. In
2013, it rose up to more than 7 million.5 The Chinese government is facing intense
pressure over unemployment because a higher rate of unemployment seems to have
a positive causal relation with social instability, which is not wanted by the Chinese
government. The Chinese government is not willing to see another Tiananmen
protest organized by college students and workers together.
To respond to the rising population of young Chinese graduates and migrant
farm workers, the Chinese government has encouraged private-sector investment
through various policies over the past decade. For example, as a communist regime,
China basically copied the Soviet Union's healthcare model in the 1950s. Hence,
China's healthcare sector had been dominated by public hospitals and was not
opened to private organizations for a long time. In 2014, Chinese authorities
unveiled a package of healthcare measures which allow private sector firms to build
heath institutions.6 Admittedly, China's health care industry is less developed than
the U.S. In the U.S., healthcare is a large mature industry. According to the latest
data by U.S. Census Bureau, there are 784,626 health care companies in the U.S.,
which hire almost 17 million people.7 China has a long way to go in terms of private
healthcare sector. However, there is great potential for China's private companies,
and the government's recent move will create more business opportunities and jobs
for Chinese college students. I expect that in the near future we will see more and

5 "2001-2013 Population of Chinese College Graduates", Career.eol.cn
6 "China moves to encourage development of private healthcare", Xinhua, April 9, 2014.
7 "Health Care Industry Statistics", US Census Bureau, July 2013.
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more Chinese private firms cooperate with U.S. healthcare firms and sell products
together in the Chinese market.
Fourth, China's SOEs are more likely to receive reviews by CFIUS. David Riedel,
president of New York-based Riedel Research Group, said: "External investments by
private companies are less politically sensitive than investments from State-owned
companies, which is critical to investment success in the U.S."8 The success rate of
China's private firms in the U.S. might be higher than that of China's state-owned
firms. However, this does not mean that China's private firms did not receive any
investigations from CFIUS. Actually, CFIUS has also investigated those Chinese
private firms with strong government background. For example, Huawei, a private
Chinese telecommunication company, failed to acquire California-based cloud
computing company 3Leaf in 2010 and 2011. For this reason, in the next section, I
will probe three major regulations relevant to CFIUS.
How does CFIUS work? CFIUS's procedures and legitimacy are based on
three major U.S. regulations relevant to foreign investment. From earliest to
latest, they are The Exon Florio Amendment (1988), The Byrd Amendment
(1993), and Foreign Investment and National Security Act (2007).

8 Yuwei Zhang, "The Changing Face of Chinese ODI in the United States", China Daily, January 9, 2014.
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Major U.S. Regulations Regarding Foreign Investment

A. Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act - The Exon Florio Amendment
(provision)
The Exon Florio Amendment was passed in 1988, as a part of the Omnibus
Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act. This event was triggered by the attempted
acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, an American company, by the
Fujitsu Corporation, a Japanese company.9 Then U.S. President Reagan was
surprised to find out that at that time there were no regulations that he could use to
block the acquisition. So, Senator J. James Exon and Representative James J. Florio
immediately sponsored the amendment, which granted the President the authority
to block proposed or pending foreign "mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers" of
"persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States" that threaten to
impair national security.10 Although Fujitsu Corporation finally withdrew the
acquisition under political pressure, Congress took the opportunity to pass the
legislation that would block similar transactions in the future.11
The Exon Florio Amendment has fundamentally transformed CFIUS, because
President Reagan delegated his authority to administer the Exon Florio provision to
CFIUS, particularly to conduct reviews, to undertake investigations and to make

9 Jonathan C. Stagg, "Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional Involvement Is Too
Much?" Iowa Law Review, November 1, 2007.
10 James K. Jackson, "Congressional Research Service-The The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS)," March 6, 2014. (http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf).
11 Jonathan C. Stagg, "Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional Involvement Is Too
Much?" Iowa Law Review, November 1, 2007.
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recommendations.12 In 1989, when China National Aero-Technology Import and
Export Corporation (CATIC), a state-owned military aircraft producer, attempted to
purchase MAMCO Manufacturing, a U.S. firm machining and fabricating metal parts
for aircraft, President George H.W. Bush ordered CFIUS to conduct the investigation.
CFIUS then started to collect information from various sources to research the
background of CATIC. After several months' investigation, on February 2,1990
President Bush, on the basis of unanimous recommendation from CFIUS, ordered
CATIC to divest all its interest in MAMCO.13 In addition to the power of undertaking
investigations, CFIUS has gained de factor legislative authority to negotiate and
enforce agreements over FDI because of its ability to cause any foreign firm to
divest.14 Thus, after the Exon Florio amendment, CFIUS truly became an empowered
governmental body.

B. National Defense Authorization Act - The Byrd Amendment
The Byrd Amendment is an upgrade of the Exon Florio Amendment. In 1992,
Congress passed it through Section 837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484).15 According to James Jackson, a specialist in
International Trade and Finance, the Byrd Amendment requires CFIUS to investigate
foreign investment in cases where two criteria are met:

12 James K. Jackson, "Congressional Research Service-The The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS)," March 6, 2014. (http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf).
13 Lawrence R. Fullerton, Christopher G. Griner, etc., Review o f Foreign Acquisitions under the Exon-Florio
Provision, American Bar Association Section of Antirust Law, November 2 5 ,1 9 9 2 , p.151.
14 David C. Hoyt, "The Geoeconomic Role of CFIUS in U.S-Sino Relations", CSPC Fellows Review, 2011.
15 James K. Jackson, Congressional Research Service-The The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS), March 6, 2014.
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1. The acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign
government;
2. The acquisition results in control of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the U.S. that could affect the national security of the United
States.16
The mandatory investigation for foreign investments that meet the two
criteria is at least 45 days. Moreover, CFIUS could reopen a review of an acquisition
in question and overturn its approval at any time.17 Under the Amendment, an
acquisition by a foreign government-controlled entity is more likely to be subject to
CFIUS reviews than an acquisition by a foreign non-government entity.18 This may
explain why state-owned firms are more likely than private firms to receive CFIUS
review. In addition, this Amendment also requires CFIUS to file a report to Congress
at the conclusion of any investigation, which "adds to the process an opportunity for
Congress to exert political pressure for more vigorous, stricter enforcement."19 The
Byrd Amendment increases Congress’s involvement in foreign investment, which
can stir up popular opposition and thus makes it more difficult for China's stateowned firms to acquire American assets.

16 James K. Jackson, Congressional Research Service-The The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS), March 6, 2014.
17 David C. Hoyt, "The Geoeconomic Role of CFIUS in U.S-Sino Relations", CSPC Fellows Review, 2011.
18 James F.F. Carroll, "Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act’s
Conception of National Security", Emory International Law Review 23, 167-200, 2009.
19 Ibid.
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C. Foreign Investment and National Security Act
The most recent regulation that strengthens CFlUS’s power is the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) which was passed during the George
W. Bush Administration. First, under FINSA, CFIUS established its membership by
statute. There are nine permanent members.20 Some active members are the
Departments of Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice. The CFIUS
investigation committee is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. Other
government agencies may also serve as lead agency with respect to particular
investigations, depending on the nature of the acquisition.21
Second, FINSA fixes the holes of pre-existing regulations including the Exon
Florio Amendment and Byrd Amendment, because FINSA pays particular attention
to the acquisitions of America's critical infrastructure assets by foreign companies.
FINSA states that "Among the additional factors CFIUS must now consider in its
review are the impact of the transaction on critical infrastructure, broadly defined,
as well as energy assets and critical technologies."22 To some extent, FINSA is
viewed as a response to the controversies surrounding China National Offshore Oil
Corporation's unsolicited bid for Unocal in 2005 and Dubai Ports World's (DPW)
attempt to acquire port facilities in 2006.23
Third, FINSA applies to all foreign investments in U.S. defense and critical
infrastructure businesses regardless of whether they are state-owned companies or

20 Morgan Lewis, "The CFIUS Review Process: Current Issues and Enforcement Trends", April 25, 2013.
21 Jonathan G. Cedarbaum and Stephen W. Preston, "CFIUS and Foreign Investment", in Homeland
Security: Legal and Policy Issues, edited by Joe D. Whitley, Lynne K. Zusman, ABA Publishing, 2009
22 Ibid.
23 Warren Lavey, "US Foreign Investment Act: Impact on Asian Companies", AsiaLaw M ag 66, September
2007.
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private ones.24 For example, in 2007 when Huawei, a private Chinese
telecommunication firm, attempted to buy an American firm, Senator John Kyi,
together with thirteen other Senators, sent a letter to the Treasury Department
urging that the transaction be closely reviewed under FINSA.25 Telecommunication
was treated as a specific form of critical infrastructures. The next section addresses
the Huawei case in more detail.

Huawei

A. Who Is Huawei?26
In 1987, the same year when KFC entered China, Huawei was established by
ex-military officer Zhengfei Ren in Shenzhen of Southern China. Shenzhen is a
fishing town situated just across the border from Hong Kong, so in early years
Huawei was just a small sale agent for a Hong Kong company producing Private
Branch Exchange (PBX) switches, an in-house telephone switching system that
interconnects telephone extensions to each other as well as to the outside telephone
network.27 After three years' learning experience from Hong Kong. In 1990, Huawei
embarked on its own independent research and commercialization of PBX
technologies targeting hotels and small enterprises. In the early 1990s, Huawei
chiefly targeted at the rural Chinese market. For example, in 1992, Huawei

24 Morgan Lewis, "The CFIUS Review Process: Current Issues and Enforcement Trends", April 25, 2013.
25 Karl P. Sauvant, Investing in the United States: Is the U.S. Ready fo r FDI from China? (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2009), p.68.
26 This part draws on Huawei's official website.
27 "Definition of PBX", Encyclopedia, May, 2014.
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developed rural digital switching solution. In 1995, Huawei generated sales of RMB
1.6 billion, mainly derived from rural markets in China.
Huawei shifted its major market from rural China to urban China in the late
1990s. In 1998, Huawei expanded into metropolitan areas of China and launched
wireless GSM-based solutions. GSM is Global System for Mobile Communications, a
standard to describe protocols for cellular networks used by mobile phones.28 In
the 1990s, China started a series of economic reforms including the reform of stateowned enterprise and the housing system by then-Premier Zhu.29 At that time the
government attempted to liberate China’s economy further through labor mobility.
Thus, millions of Chinese farm workers started to migrate from rural China to urban
China. Most farm workers left their parents and children at home in Western China
while they were working in the cities of Eastern China. Due to the far distance and
busy work, many of them could only return home for reunion once a year. This
created demand for inexpensive personal communications. Since then, the demand
for mobile phones has increased every year in China, which spurred Huawei's rapid
growth.
Soon after Huawei’s expansion into urban China, Huawei started to explore
international markets. In 1999, Huawei set up its first overseas R&D center in
Bangalore, India. There are two reasons why Huawei chose to launch its first
overseas R&D center in Bangalore. First, India is geographically close to China and
is also a developing country, so the labor and transportation costs are very low.

28 "Q&A: W hat is GSM?" 4G Americas, April 23, 2014.
29 Zhu Rongji: Zhu Rongji on the Record: The Road to Reform 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 7 (Brookings Institution Press,
2013), p.382.

Second, Bangalore is known as the "Silicon Valley of India" which is the hub of
India's leading IT and telecommunication companies. Thus, Huawei could get
enough technical support from partners in Bangalore. In 2000, Huawei's sales of $
100 million were generated from international markets. Only two years later, the
sales of international markets skyrocketed to $552 million. With China’s "going-out"
policy and admission into the WTO, Huawei speeded up its overseas expansion
during President Hu's administration. So, instead of establishing R&D centers,
Huawei started to build join ventures with foreign companies after 2003. From
2003 to 2007, Huawei had established several joint ventures with Siemens, Global
Marine, Motorola and Symantec.
After twenty years’ rapid development, Huawei has transformed from a small
private company to a giant multinational networking and telecommunications
equipment company. Some praise Huawei because it is an outstanding example of
China's economic reform and success. Others criticize Huawei because it had a
military origin and its success could not be copied by other Chinese private
companies.

B. Huawei's Close Tie to Home Government
Huawei’s military origin is the major source of mistrust for Western
governments including the U.S., Britain and Australia. Many believe the founder of
Huawei, Ren Zhengfei, was a director of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
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Information Engineering Academy.30 Huawei argued that U.S. government
exaggerated Mr. Ren's military background. According to Huawei officials, Mr. Ren
was just a Deputy Regimental Chief without military rank. When he joined PLA in
1974, he was just a soldier tasked to establish the Liao Yang Chemical Fiber
Factory.31 In 1983, Mr. Ren retired from the army and joined Shenzhen South Sea
Oil Corporation (SSSOC), a state-owned company.32 However, he was not satisfied
with the low wage offered by the company, so he decided to found his own business.
In 2010, Huawei's new board of directors and supervisory board were
elected by representatives of Huawei employees. In the same year, Huawei also
revealed board members in its annual report and official website to boost
transparency. It was the first time Huawei exposed its leaders' information to the
public. When Huawei attempted to purchase U.S. firm 3Leaf in 2010 and 2011, the
U.S. government requested more information about Mr. Ren's military background.
However, Huawei refused to answer it.33 On January 19, 2011 an article on Xinjin
Bao asserted that Mr. Ren has not granted any media interviews since becoming the
company's CEO in 1988.34
In addition to Mr. Ren, Yafang Sun, Chairwoman of Huawei, was also believed
to be affiliated with the Chinese government and military. Both Chinese and
30 Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger, "Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed
by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE", U.S. House o f Representatives 112th
Congress, October 8, 2012.
31 Ibid.
32 "Huawei Annual Report Details Directors, Supervisory Board for First Time", Open Source Center,
October 5, 2011.
33 Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger, "Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed
by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE", U.S. House o f Representatives 112th
Congress, October 8, 2012.
34 "Huawei Annual Report Details Directors, Supervisory Board for First Time", Open Source Center,
October 5, 2011.
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Western news media reported that she worked for the Communications Department
of the Ministry of State Security for an unspecified period of time before joining
Huawei. In early years, Sun used her connections at the Ministry of State Security to
help Huawei through financial hardship.35

C. Doomed to Fail in the U.S. Market
Huawei attempted twice to buy American companies. In 2008, Huawei made
efforts to purchase a stake in 3Com, an American maker of Internet router and
networking equipment. Along with Bain Capital, a private equity firm in Boston,
Huawei proposed a $2.2 billion deal, which was very attractive to 3Com. Then,
CFIUS established a committee which consists of representatives of twelve U.S.
government agencies to review the 3Com deal. In the process of review, U.S.
Congress pressed CFIUS and cited a study by the Rand Corporation to support the
argument that Huawei had close ties to the Chinese military.36 In the end, CFIUS
blocked this sale because 3Com makes anti-hacking computer software for the U.S.
military and Huawei's background is suspicious. Eventually, 3Com was acquired by
HP in 2009.
Two years later, in 2010 Huawei attempted again to buy 3Leaf. 3Leaf is a
small little-known American company, but it has some advanced technologies
including cloud computing. Huawei thought the Obama Administration might be
friendlier toward its purchase than the last one in 2008. However, the Obama
35 "Huawei Annual Report Details Directors, Supervisory Board for First Time", Open Source Center,
October 5, 2011.
36 Steven R. Weisman, "Sale of 3Com to Huawei is Derailed by U.S. Security Concerns", The New York
Times, February 21, 2008.
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Administration did not show any favor toward or support for this purchase. Under
pressure from CFIUS, Huawei finally dropped its bid for 3 Leaf. In a brief statement,
Huawei said,
This was a difficult decision; however we have decided to accept the
recommendation of CFIUS to withdraw our application to acquire specific
assets of 3 Leaf.37
Huawei is doomed to fail in the U.S. because in recent years, cybersecurity or
digital warfare has become a hot topic frequently addressed by U.S. news reports,
government official reports and academic papers. The U.S. and China pointed fingers
at each other. The U.S. complained about hacking and cyber-attacks from China's
PLA, Chinese companies and institutes. When Obama met Xi in May 2013, Obama
urged Xi to investigate and curb cyber intrusions from China.38 In the meantime, the
Chinese government also complained about hacking activities from the U.S.
Particularly, after the Edward Snowden incident, Huawei was said to be hacked by
the NSA, because for a long time the NSA had allegedly been looking for
communications between Huawei and the Chinese military.39 In June 2013, China's
news agency China Daily reported: "U.S. should explain its hacking activities on
China.”40
Following Huawei's attempted acquisition, Sany Heavy Industry Co., Ltd,
another Chinese private company, also failed to get four Oregon wind-farm projects
in 2012. However, Huawei and Sany Heavy Industry treated their failures

37 Shayndi Raice and Andrew Dowell, "Huawei Drops U.S. Deal amid Opposition", The W all Street Journal,
February 22, 2011.
38 Geoff Dyer, "Obama to Press China on Cyber Hacking", Financial Times, May 29, 2013
39 Martin Pengelly, "NSA Targeted Chinese Telecoms Giant Huawei-Report", The Guardian, March 22,
2014.
40 "US should explain hacking activity", China Daily, June 2013.
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differently. Huawei dropped its bid for 3Leaft voluntarily amid opposition.
Basically, Huawei settled the case peacefully with the U.S. government. In a
statement, Huawei said: "The significant impact and attention that this transaction
has caused were not what we intended."41 In 2013, several news reports revealed
that Huawei decided to give up on the U.S. market after several failures. The
Financial Times quotes Huawei's executive vice president as saying, "We are not
interested in the U.S. market anymore."42 Unlike Huawei’s attitude of acceptance,
Sany fought back against the U.S. government after its purchased was blocked. As
the next section shows, in 2013 Sany even sued U.S. President Barack Obama.

Sany Heavy

A. Who Is Sany?
Sany is China’s biggest construction equipment manufacturer and the fifthlargest in the world. It was founded by Wengen Liang and three of his partners in
1989 43 Successful Chinese businessmen have some similarities in their early years.
Many were born to poor families. They worked in China's state-owned enterprises,
but later quit. There are many examples (e.g. Huawei, Haier, Lenovo and Sany). Mr.
Liang was born to a poor peasant family in Hunan, central China and also the
hometown of Chairman Mao. In 1983, he joined a state arms plant after his

41 Shayndi Raice and Andrew Dowell, "Huawei Drops U.S. Deal amid Opposition", The W all Street Journal,
February 22, 2011.
42 Shannon Tiezzi, "Huawei Officially Gives Up On The US Market", The Diplomat, December 5, 2013.
43 Staff reporter, "Liang Wengen: Epitome of a Chinese Success Story", WantChinaTimes, November 10,

2012.
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graduation from China Central South University. He worked there for three years
and was also promoted as a top director. In 1986, he quit his job in the state firm
and started to trade ships and make wine but eventually failed.44 In 1989, Mr. Liang
found his right goal - that is, to establish a factory making heavy industry
equipment

B. The Major Impetus fo r Sony's Fast Development in China
In less than two decades, Sany has transformed from a small local firm to a
large multinational company. What factors can explain this success? There are
many, including San/s corporate culture, leaders' Guanxi, adoption of new
technologies, support from the local government and more. I argue the major
impetus or factor for Sany*s success is China’s state support for real estate over the
past decade. Sany is not a house or bridge builder, but it provides equipment for
those builders. It reminds one of a similar case in the U.S. In the Gold Rush, some dig
for gold, and some just sold tools like shovels. Interestingly, shovel sellers finally
became rich while some gold diggers found nothing. Sany, as an equipment maker
for heavy industry and construction, has benefited a lot from China's large
construction projects from the mid-1990s to today. For instance, in 2012, Sany
signed a contract with China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) to
provide a super-high-rise concrete pump for the construction of Guangzhou East
Tower, which will be the highest building in Guangzhou city.45

44 Staff reporter, "Liang Wengen: Epitome of a Chinese success story", WantChinaTimes, November 10,

2012.
45 "SANY Participates in Construction of Guangzhou East Tower", Sany's official website, October 8, 2012
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Sany, as a successful representative of Chinese private firms, has been
welcomed by top Chinese leaders many times. In 2003, Former President Hu
inspected Sany and commented: "You have made splendid achievements in the past.
Hope you unite as one to create a better future!"46 Former Premier Wen visited
Sany in 2005 and 2010, respectively. Premier Wen also witnessed San/s contractsigning ceremony in 2009 when Sany invested EUR 100 million to build a R&D
center and machinery manufacturing base in Bedburg, Germany.47 Other top leaders
who also visited Sany include Jia Qinglin, Political Bureau of CPC and Chairman of
China National Consultation Committee of the CPPCC; Zeng Qinghong, Political
Bureau of CPC and Vice President of the PRC; Huang Ju, Vice Premier and Standing
Committee Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Zhou
Yongkang, Member of Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of CPC Central
Committee, to name a few.48 There are rumors on the Internet that new Chinese
President Xi’s only daughter is dating Sany founder's only son. Due to San/s close
ties to the Chinese government, its attempted investment in Oregon wind farms
drew attention from the U.S. government, which resulted in its failure in 2012.

C. Sany Failed in Oregon Wind Farm Projects and Sued Obama
On February 28,2012, through its affiliated company, Ralls Corp, Sany
purchased wind farm projects in Oregon. Just three months later, the U.S. Navy
contacted Ralls and complained that the wind farms might affect their training

46 "About Sany", Sany's official website.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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because the projects consist of four locations, all of which are near or within
restricted Navy airspace.49 Then, CIFIUS stepped into the investigation. In July, Ralls
received the first interim order from CFIUS demanding a halt to the project on
grounds of national security. In addition, no one is allowed to enter the wind farms
except for authorized American citizens. Sany was shocked. To reduce the loss, Sany
had to transfer the wind farms to American companies because the Chinese were
not allowed to enter the sites. In August, Sany received a second interim order from
CFIUS, which prohibited Sany transferring any projects to American companies.
In the end, Sany had to give up all ongoing wind farm projects in Oregon. Sany
requested for compensation for the loss. CFIUS turned it down saying that "there
was no compensatory mechanism for banned projects."50 The major explanation
that CFIUS gave to Sany was that Sany's wind farm projects were close to U.S.
military facilities. Sany argued that "10 Germany-made Repower wind turbines and
27 Denmark-made Vestas wind turbines were working in the same area."51 Then,
Sany wrote letters to President Obama and Secretary Clinton, but received no
answers. Sany was disappointed and angry. So, Sany decided to accuse Obama of
discriminating against Chinese firms in the U.S.
The Sany case was famous for two reasons. First, it was the first time that a U.S.
President stepped in to block such a foreign business deal since 1990, when
President George H.W. Bush blocked the sale of a manufacturer to a Chinese agency.

49 Sara Forden, "Chinese-Owned Company Sues Obama Over Wind Farm Project", Bloomberg, October 2,

2012 .
so Sany Group,"The Invisible Hand behind the Blocking of Sany's US Wind Farm Investment", Official
website, November 20, 2012.
51 Ibid.
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Second, it is also the first time a Chinese firm used legal means to sue a U.S.
president.52 Sany can file the case at several levels of U.S. courts, though the
likelihood of success is slim. Junpo Hao, an expert in cross-border litigation, said:
"Should the company fail, the losses are minimal, but should the case win, it would
become a milestone."53 Moreover, Sany set an example to other Chinese firms, thus I
expect that in coming years there will be more Chinese firms using legal means to
fight their cases against the U.S. government.

The Shuanghui - Smithfield Acquisition

A. ShuangHui
The Shuanghui - Smithfield Acquisition was the most famous case of China’s
acquisition in the U.S., because the purchase represents the largest purchase of a U.S.
firm by a Chinese company to a date. Shaunghui offered $4.7 billion for Smithfield, a
purchase worth more than $7 billion including Smithfield's debt.54
Probably, most Americans know about Smithfield Foods, the largest pork
producer and processor in the U.S. Smithfield Foods products are sold in major
American grocery stores such as Walmart, Food Lion and Farm Fresh. However,
average Americans are not familiar with Shuanghui, the largest meat producer in
China. Shuanghui’s ham sausage is one of the most famous products throughout
China. It also was my favorite when I was a teenager. Although my mother told me
52 "Sany Accuses Obama of Discriminating Chinese Firms", China.org.cn, October 18, 2012.
53 Staff reporter, "Sany Vows to Keep Obama in the Hot Seat over US Wind Farm Ban", WantChinaTimes,
October 13, 2013.
54 Facsimile and Post, "Shuanghui-Smithfield CFIUS Letter", July 9, 2013.
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that it might have some preservatives, I still could not resist buying packets of
Shuanghui ham sausages. They were cheap and ready-to-eat. At the very beginning,
Shuanghui sold only pork sausages. Later, Shuanghui diversified its products by
making chicken, beef and fish sausages with various flavors. There are some Muslim
groups in Northwestern China, so Shuanghui's chicken sausages are labeled as "Qing
Zhen Shi Wu" (Islamic food).
Shuanghui was founded in 1958 by the local Luohe city government and was
not a private company at the beginning. In 1984, Wang Long, known as "China's
butcher-in-chief, was appointed head of Shuanghui.55 Since then, Shuanghui has
gradually transformed itself into a private firm. During the 1970s and 1980s,
China’s domestic consumption was weak. China was even an oil and meat exporter.
The Soviet Union was Shuanghui’s largest foreign market. When the Soviet Union
collapsed, Shuanghui's managers were very upset as Shuanghui lost its major
oversea market. But a train trip by Wang Long changed Shuanghui’s fate. Ready-toeat ham sausage originated from Japan and the U.S. In the early 1990s, ready-to-eat
ham sausage was a new thing to the majority of Chinese people. Once on a train,
Wang Long saw a passenger next to him eat ham sausage.56 An idea came into his
mind that Shuanghui should produce ready-to-eat ham sausages instead of selling
raw meats. So, Wang Long immediately returned to his factory and drafted a plan
including buying ham sausage making machines from Japan.57

55 Clifford Coonan, "Shuanghui International buys world's biggest pork producer". The Irish Times, June 4,
2013.
56 Wan Long, Baidu, 2014.
57 Baike, Baidu.
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In 1992, Shuanghui produced its first branded sausage.58 After two decades'
growth, Shuanghui has already become a meat importer instead of meat exporter.
Today, Shuanghui buys tons of raw meats overseas and then processes them in
world factories, and finally sells them to the growing number of Chinese consumers.
According to Chairman Wan Long, “Chinese traditionally like to eat pork, and China
doesn't have the resources to raise cattle on a large scale. If there isn't a lot of beef,
you'll have to eat pork if you like to eat meat." It is reported that in 2012 China
imported more than 1.3 million tons of pork and its byproducts, including more
than 500,000 tons from the U.S.59

B. Smithfield Foods
Smithfield Foods is a Virginia-based pork producer, headquartered in Smithfield,
Virginia. The company was founded in 1936 by Joseph Luter. Its prime time was in
the 1980s when it purchased Eckrich, Farmland Foods of Kansas, Gwaltney of
Smithfield, John Morrell, and Premium Standard Farms.60 However, since the 1990s
Smithfield Foods has continuously received criticism for environmental, animal
rights and labor violations. In 1997, the company was fined $12.6 million by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for violations of the Clean Water Act. It was
then the largest Clean Water Act Fine ever.61 In 2005, Human Rights Watch (HRW)
issued a report criticizing Smithfield Foods for unsafe work conditions. In 2010, the
58 William Bi, Helen Yuan: "Changing China Food Safety Key to Shuanghui on Smithfield", Bloomberg
News, Jun 3, 2013.
59 Ibid.
60 Ralph Deptolla, "Smithfield's Journey to Sustainability: A Work in Progress", Global Business and
Organizational Excellence, Volume 30, issue6, August 5, 2011.
61 "Smithfield Foods Fine $12.6 Million, Largest Clean W ater Act Fine ever", Environmental Protection
Agency, August 8 ,1 9 9 7 .
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Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) released an undercover video which
showed that Smithfield Foods tortured animals.62 At the time when Shuanghui
attempted to buy it, Smithfield Foods has a debt outstanding of $3 billion. By
contrast, China's enforcement of regulations regarding environment and labor
rights was not strict. In 2011, there was an article on the Internet, documenting that
Shuanghui had polluted a local river.63 However, so far Shuanghui has not been
warned or punished by local government.

C. Why Was Shuanghui Interested in Purchasing Smithfield Foods?
Today, farming lands and water resources are very precious in China because
they are decreasing in recent years with China's fast urbanization and
industrialization. In order to meet the huge domestic demand, Chinese companies
are actively seeking lands, resources, forests and energy around the globe. "The U.S.
has sufficient farming land and water resources. Buying Smithfield is to secure the
supply of feed and water to pigs for Shuanghui", said by James Feng, general
manager of Soozhu.com, China's biggest independent hog researcher.64 Indeed,
when I took a train crossing the U.S. from the East Coast to the West, I was so
amazed by the diversity and richness of natural resources in the U.S. In Chinese, the
world "America" means "beautiful country." As a new country, not many big wars or
devastating destruction happened in U.S. territory. Overall, lands, water resources
and forests are well protected in the U.S. By contrast, in its long history, China
62 Stephanie Storm, "McDonald's Set to Phase out Suppliers' Use of Sow Crates", The N ew York Times,
February 13, 2012.
63 http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_5566622_l.htm l
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experienced many devastating wars and peasant revolutions, particularly, Mao's
Great Leap Forward Movement, which caused damage to China's natural resources.
Today, it is rare that one can see old trees in China.
In addition to rich farming lands and water resources, better technologies are
another factor that motivated Shuanghui to purchase Smithfield. For a long time
China’s farming has been heavily dependent on labor, whereas American farming
utilized tools, equipment and new technologies. Through many TV programs or
movies, the Chinese people have developed stereotypes toward American
agriculture industry - that is, they generally think that an American farm is so large,
on which American farmers fly airplanes and drive big tractors. By contrast, China's
agriculture is far behind. The Chinese peasants work very hard in the fields using
simple tools. To feed China's huge population, Chinese agriculture agencies are
sending agriculture technicians to Europe and the U.S. every year. Li Qiang,
chairman of Shanghai JC Intelligence Co., an agricultural research company, said:
"China spends tens of millions of dollars every year importing U.S. piglets or
breeding swines because the U.S. has much better technology in that field."65

D. Food Safety Concerns
When Shuanghui attempted to buy Smithfield Foods, Shuanghui was accused
of using chicken in ham to save cost,66 because chicken meat was cheaper than
pork. Average Chinese consumers nowadays are very concerned about meat quality.

65 William Bi, Helen Yuan: "Changing China Food Safety Key to Shuanghui on Smithfield", Bloomberg
News, June 3 ,2 0 1 3 .
66 "Shuanghui Accused of Using Chicken in Ham to Save Cost: Paper", Caijing, October 12, 2013.
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In recent years, both Chinese and Western media exposed several scandals
regarding China's food safety, including fake milk powder, bad fried chicken and
illicit cooking oil recycled from gutters. The Chinese generally think that food
imported from Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. is much safer and
cleaner. However, some Chinese consumers could not travel to the U.S. or Europe
frequently due to the far distance and visa restrictions. Therefore, Hong Kong
becomes their top destination to buy baby milk powder. Since 2008, a huge
population of Chinese have flooded to Hong Kong and caused shortage of milk
powder in Hong Kong. So, in 2013 the Hong Kong government lifted restrictions on
buying milk powder - that is, no more than 1.8 kilos of milk powder could be taken
out of Hong Kong per person per trip.67
With the purchase of Smithfield Foods, Shuanghui was eager to tell the
Chinese public that Shuanghui products are safe because they import better and
safer meat directly from the U.S. Wan Long, head of Shuanghui, said: "Europe and
America have excellent skills and equipment. If we go and purchase businesses from
America and Europe, develop China's meat industry, we will raise the level and
standard of our food safety."68

67 Yali Cheng, "HK Limits Milk Powder Purchases", Shangbao, Aril 19, 2013.
68 William Bi, Helen Yuan: "Changing China Food Safety Key to Shuanghui on Smithfield", Bloomberg
News, June 3, 2013.
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E. Keys to CFIUS Approval69
According to Alston & Bird LLP, the largest law firm in Atlanta, Shuanghui
and Smithfield managed the political and regulatory process surrounding the
proposed acquisition exceptionally well. First, Shuanghui and Smithfield submitted
documents to CFIUS voluntarily even before CFIUS started the investigation. By
doing so, Shuanghui provided a high degree of transparency and confidence to U.S.
government agencies and political leaders. Second, Shuanghui made a definitive
commitment to maintain Smithfield’s structure, independence and headquarters in
the U.S. Shuanghui also guaranteed that there will be no closures at Smithfield's
existing facilities and locations, and that Smithfield's existing management team will
remain in place. Third, Shuanghui also pledged to maintain Smithfield Foods's
headquarter in Smithfield, Virginia, and to continue Smithfield's philanthropic
support of community initiatives and investments in sustainability. In the past
several years, Smithfield Foods has donated a large amount of money to University
of Virginia, Virginia Tech and some programs in Richmond. I believe with
Shuanghui's backup, Smithfield will continue or even expand its philanthropic work
in the future. In a word, Shuanghui respected Smithfield’s corporate culture and
heritage, and the role Smithfield plays in its home communities.

69 This section heavily draws on Anthony Balloon, Thomas Crocker and Eric Shrimp: "Shuanghui Wins
CFIUS Approval of Smithfield Acquisition: Company's Careful Approach to U.S. Government Validated."
Alston & Bird LLP, September 2013.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Summary of Major Findings

This dissertation respects the importance of cultural factors in determining an
MNC’s success. However, the most original parts of the dissertation are the statist
intervention and market entry. For instance, in the statist section, I have examined
some U.S. regulations on foreign investments (e.g. The Exon Florio Amendment, The
Byrd Amendment, and FINSA) which are helpful for those Chinese MNCs as new
comers to the U.S. market.
Second, this dissertation acknowledges the interaction between market factors
and statist factors. Given that cultural dissimilarities between China and the U.S. are
constant and controlled, the degree of importance of statist and market factors may
vary by different conditions. For example, for Chinese state-owned enterprises
which had invested in the U.S., statist interventions were probably the most
important determinants for their successes or failures. In contrast, market factors
served as the most influential factors in the case of American consumer producers
investing in China.
Third, empirical studies show that my two statist hypotheses are more valid and
persuasive (l.MNCs with close ties to their home government, and 2.MNCs investing
in sensitive sectors) than the cultural hypothesis. The cases of Google, Huawei,
CNOOC, PetroChina and Sinopec all support the fundamental argument that state-
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supported MNCs investing in sensitive sectors are more likely to receive political
resistance from the host country, which cause them to fail. In addition, the cases of
KFC, McDonald's, General Motors and Ford in China show that market factors and
statist factors sometimes are overlapped with each other.
Fourth, one of the difficulties I encountered in writing this dissertation is finding
some government reports and data. Neither CFIUS reports nor Chinese reports by
the Ministry of Commerce of China have been fully disclosed to the general public.
However, I have obtained enough relevant information and evidence from various
sources to support my cases. These sources are U.S. Chamber of Commerce, KPMG,
Rhodium Group, mainstream American and Chinese news reports, and academic
journal databases. Below is a summary of the key findings:

A. With Distrustful Bilateral Relationships and Cultural Dissimilarities, Domestic
Firms with Statist Support Will Erect Obstacles fo r Foreign MNCs to Succeed.
American media often attribute the failures of American internet companies
in China to China's strict censorship and government intervention. Likewise,
Chinese media often blame the U.S. government for treating Chinese companies
unfairly and setting up barriers to their market entry. Both the Chinese public and
American public often point fingers at each other and think that the failures of their
companies in the counterpart's market is largely due to distrustful Sino-U.S.
relations.
Sino-U.S. relations are like a pendulum, swinging back and forth. In Mao's
China, Sino-U.S. relations were at the lowest point. When Deng came into power
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after Mao’s death, Sino-U.S. relations started to improve quickly. China and the U.S.
even experienced a short honeymoon period in the 1980s. Then, the bilateral
relations started to fall after a series of incidents in the 1990s including the Taiwan
Strait Missile Crisis and U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. After
2002, the bilateral relationship improved again because the U.S. needed to
cooperate with China on terrorism, and in the meantime China's new President Hu
had a mild-mannered character. Admittedly, bilateral relationships or governmental
intervention can explain international business or trade in some ways. For instance,
when China and the U.S. were on their honeymoon from the early 1980s to the mid1980s, the U.S. even exported weapons and high technologies to China, which is
unlikely today.
However, in the field of international studies we cannot merely use bilateral
relationships to explain everything. Likewise, we cannot use only culture to explain
everything in humanity studies or in social science. Through my case studies, I find
that the failures of Chinese MNCs and American MNCs in each other's markets are
caused by a combination of cultural, statist and market factors. For instance, while
Google insisted that its failure in China was largely due to statist intervention and
hacking activities, the results of my studies find that market competition also
matters. Many Chinese internet users agreed on the fact that Baidu was doing better
than Google in terms of search relevancy in Chinese words. Baidu had occupied the
largest market share even before Google entered China. In addition, Baidu's fast
development benefited from China's loose enforcement of intellectual property laws
through the 1990s to the mid-2000s. During that period, Baidu was able to provide
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free online music and videos without risk of punishment. By contrast, Google was
not able to do the same because it is an American company and might easily be sued
by other American companies. Therefore, in its early years of development, Baidu
was more attractive to Chinese internet users than Google was.
Similarly, eBay also faced a strong Chinese rival in China: Taobao. Yun Ma,
founder of Taobao, travelled to America and later introduced the e-commercial
platform to China. Both Taobao and Baidu did not simply copy their American
counterparts. Instead, they made many changes and improvements in
advertisement, website layouts, online tools and services. In addition, Taobao and
Baidu, as local Chinese firms, know the psychology and demand of Chinese
consumers better than eBay and Google, respectively. The study clearly shows that
with a distrustful bilateral relationship, domestic Chinese firms with statist support
(e.g. Baidu, Taobao) can erect great obstacles to their foreign counterparts (e.g.
Google, eBay).
Likewise, we cannot simply attribute the failures of Chinese state-owned
enterprises in America to the discrimination and unfairness of the U.S. government.
Cultural dissimilarities and market competition matter. When Chinese companies’
purchases were blocked by CFIUS, the Chinese media criticized the U.S. government
for trade protectionism and discrimination. Actually, there are both cultural and
market factors that resulted in failures of Chinese companies in the U.S. For
instance, Chinese state-owned oil companies grew in a relation-based culture,
where disputes are usually resolved out of the court and thus they seldom face
lawsuits from private companies or individuals. In general, Chinese public and
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private firms are more submissive to the state authorities than their American
counterparts. And, they are less likely to sue state-owned enterprise or government
agencies if their interest were damaged. Therefore, Chinese state-owned enterprises
have a sense of superiority over Chinese private firms.
However, when they enter the U.S. market, a rule-based society, Chinese stateowned enterprises lose the sense of superiority and lack incompetence in dealing
with various issues they never encounter in China, such as interest group politics,
strict environmental inspection and large penalties, lawsuits from American
investors, and complicated regulations regarding foreign investment and hiring
employees in the U.S. Indeed, with distrustful bilateral relationships and cultural
dissimilarities, both American MNCs and Chinese MNCs have experienced certain
barriers to enter and penetrate each other's market.

B. Sectors Really Matter.
Admittedly, type of sector is an important factor that affects foreign MNCs'
successes or failures in host countries. In general, those American companies
making consumer goods and having transparent relations with its home
government are more likely to succeed in China, so do Chinese firms in the U.S.1 For
instance, American fast food (e.g. KFC, Hooters, Subway, and Pizza Hut), auto (e.g.
General Motors and Ford) and clothing firms (e.g. Calvin Klein, GAP, and Ralph
Lauren) have gained popularity and successes in the Chinese market. In previous
chapters, I have explained why these American companies are more welcomed by

1 There are four basic needs in China: Yi, Shi, Zhu, and Xing (Clothing, Food, Housing and Transportation).
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the Chinese people. To sum up, there are at least three reasons. First, they provided
more jobs, built large plants and opened physical chain stores, whereas most
internet and media companies did not. So, the local Chinese officials and business
leaders prefer job-creating American firms. Second, they set up businesses in China
much earlier than American internet and media companies (e.g. KFC entered China
in the 1980s, almost twenty years earlier than eBay and Google). For this reason,
they are more experienced in localizing their products than internet companies.
Third, as they are not investing in sensitive sectors or buying strategic resources,
they are encouraged by local Chinese officials and are also allowed to build
partnerships with local Chinese firms.
Within the same sector, some American companies are more successful than
others in China. My empirical studies show that KFC is doing better than McDonald's
in China. General Motors is doing better than Ford. Calvin Klein is more popular
than Ralph Lauren. Indeed, there are other explanatory factors beyond the type of
industry. For instance, market entry and choice of location matter. KFC entered
China earlier than McDonald's. KFC established its first China restaurant near
Tiananmen Square, which is more influential and attractive than McDonald's first
one in Shenzhen city. General Motors also entered China much earlier than Ford.
General Motors chose to build a joint venture with a strong Chinese automaker in
Shanghai, which is more successful than Ford's joint venture in Chongqing.
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C. Statist Interventions and Changing Perceptions o f Foreign MNCs from the Host
Country
In the 19th century, Lord Palmerston said: "Britain has no permanent friends,
nor permanent enemies. She has only permanent interests.”2 According to
constructivism of IR, state's behaviors are often dependent on their perceptions of
each other. Arguably, their perceptions of others do not always stay constant. The
establishment of CFIUS was a statist response to Japanese companies in the 1970s.
During that time, the U.S. viewed Japan as an economic competitor. Today, the U.S.
widely views China as a competitor to the U.S. In recent years, the U.S. government
became more cautious on mergers and acquisitions by Chinese state-owned firms or
Chinese state-supported firms, including the cases of CNOOC, Huawei, and Sany
Heavy.
In the 1960s, American children were told not to waste food at school because
Chinese children were starving. With the success of China's economic reform, some
of those poor Chinese children are now extremely rich. Their bold overseas
investment and luxurious lives may change Americans' perception of Chinese
investors. Currently, the American media still embraces the notion that Chinese
money directed at the U.S. is harmful. However, some scholars argued that it might
be just as false as it was in the 1980s when Japanese firms were said to flood the US
market with money.3

2 David Brown, Palmerston and the Politics o f Foreign Policy, 1846-1855 ^Manchester University Press,
2002), p. 82.
3 Alex Coblin, "Public vs. Private: How China Prefers to Invest in the U.S.", CHINA-US FOCUS, February 6,
2014.

Statist intervention can affect public attitudes toward foreign MNCs (e.g.
Chinese nationalism), which may hurt or help foreign MNCs. For instance, in the
1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, Chinese college students embraced America's
democracy and praised KFC's Beijing restaurant as a gathering place. In contrast,
during the 1999 Anti-American Movement, angry Chinese college students
protested against the U.S. government and damaged KFC restaurants in several
Chinese cities. Another example is Chinese people's hatred toward Japan stirred up
by statist intervention. Previous studies showed that under tense diplomatic
relations, China’s state media and newspapers repeatedly lashed Japan for its
invasion, which helped foment radical nationalism in China. During a series of antiJapanese protests in 2012 and 2013, some Chinese consumers were so worried
about buying Japanese cars, because a number of Japanese cars were damaged and
the owners were beat severely by Chinese radicals. Also, on China's most popular
social network website, Weibo, there are numerous messages claiming that
boycotting Japanese products is a patriotic deed. Finally, it turned out that China's
popular hatred toward Japan had, to some extent, benefited some American
companies, particularly, American automakers.
Chinese people's perception of the basic necessities of daily life is evolving.
Bikes were once a basic necessity in China. Due to the mobilization of labor,
urbanization and rapid economic development, cars are nowadays widely viewed as
a necessity by average Chinese people. Unlike the U.S., the auto industry is a
relatively new industry in China and the market potential is great Today, there are
more Buicks being sold in China every year than in the U.S. With the decline of
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Detroit, some American automakers have changed their perception of the world's
car capital in recent years. Admittedly, cultural dissimilarity is a great challenge for
American automakers. However, it did not stop American automakers move their
research centers to China. Today, global automakers race to Shanghai and they
believe that China is fast becoming the car capital.4 There are great market
demands for new cars and internet services in China. Nevertheless, foreign auto
makers and internet companies have two different fates in China. One of the major
reasons is statist intervention. In an authoritarian regime, social stability is a great
concern for the ruling class. However, social stability is heavily dependent on
economic development. One the one hand, China’s state authorities continue to
attract foreign investments which are impetus for fast economic development. On
the other hand, they filter out those foreign investments which might cause social
instability.

D. Ownership: China's FDl Trend in the U.S.: Private Firms Overtook the State-owned
For a long time, China's FDI was dominated by state-owned enterprises.
China's private firms were weak and lacked enough capital or government support
to invest overseas. But, the trend has gradually shifted in recent years. In 2013,
China's investment in the U.S. doubled and the majority was contributed by private
Chinese investors. Chinese private firms are actively involved in a wave of overseas
mergers and acquisitions. Some examples are Fosun International's buyout of One

4 Robyn Meredith, "From China, the World's New Car Capital", Forbes, April 22, 2009.
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Chase Manhattan Plaza, Shuanghui's acquisition of Smithfield Foods, and Yashili's
dairy investment in New Zealand.5
The rapid growth of investments from China's private firms is due to several
reasons. First, the U.S., as a rule-base society, has strong legal protections that foster
innovation while China lacks market incentives and mature regulations. Second,
many private Chinese firms are pushed out of the market by large, heavily
subsidized state-owned enterprises in China.6 However, in the U.S. the Chinese
state-owned firms do not have a sense of superiority over Chinese private firms.
Third, the appreciation of RMB since 2005 has further encouraged Chinese private
firms to invest in the U.S. Fourth, many private Chinese investors can get green
cards through investing at least half a million dollars in the U.S. Canada also has
similar immigration policies. In recent years, there have been an increasing number
of rich Chinese businessmen and government officials fleeing to North America. In
2013, about 80 percent of the recipients of the U.S. investment green cards were
from China.7
Food and real estate are the two major sectors that interest Chinese private
investors. These two sectors are relatively less related to national security and the
success rate of purchases is high. For example, Shuanghui successfully purchased
Smithfield Foods in 2013. China Vanke, China's largest residential real estate
developer, broke ground on a 61-story residential skyscraper in Manhattan earlier

5 "China's foreign trade boosts overseas investment", Xinhua, January, 2014.
6 Alex Coblin, "Public vs. Private: How China Prefers to Invest in the U.S.", ChinaUSFOCUS, February 6,
2014.
7 "Surge in Visas Issued to Chinese Lures Developers to NYC", The Real Deal-New York Real Estate News,
May 13, 2014.

197

this year.8 These successful cases do not imply that all Chinese private firms had a
pleasant experience in the U.S. market. Like China did to American companies, the
U.S. does not fully open its telecommunication market to private Chinese companies
including Huawei and ZTE. While Huawei have succeeded in many other countries,
it lags much behind Samsung and Apple and still seeks a foothold in the U.S. market.
In 2010, Huawei and ZTE both failed to win a Sprint contract due to strong
opposition from the U.S. authorities. Instead, Samsung got the offer. Today, Huawei
still lacks a deal with a major U.S. carrier (e.g. T-Mobile, Sprint, AT&T and Verizon)
to sell its high-end models.

E. Barriers to Market Entry - "U.S. and China, Which Is Harder to Enter?"
China is the largest developing country while the U.S. is the largest developed
country in terms of GDP and population. A survey of 1,004 global business leaders
conducted by law firm Allen & Overy in 2011 showed that China and the U.S. are
ranked first and second among nine major countries in terms of "hardest markets to
enter."9 For Chinese companies, the strict regulatory environment in the U.S. is
probably the main deterrent to entry. According to the survey, 38% of Chinese
business leaders chose the U.S. as the hardest to enter. A series of U.S. regulations
regarding taxes, intellectual property rights, environment protection, labor rights
and safety are strange and new to Chinese investors who grew up in a relationbased society. By contrast, only 4% of German business leaders and 2% of Canadian
ones think the U.S. market is the hardest to enter.
8 ibid.
9 Allen & Overy: Opportunities and Challenges, 2011.

For American companies, building Guanxi with the state government and local
governments and thus reducing statist interventions is probably the main barrier to
entry. My studies show that some American firms have overcome this barrier. To
win state support from the host country, leaders of General Motors personally
caught every opportunity to meet with Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and expressed
their willingness to cooperate with the Chinese government and respect China's
political regime. Today, General Motors is one of the largest foreign automakers in
China by sales. GM's success in China is inseparable to its Guanxi with China's state
government and the Shanghai city government. However, building Guanxi in China
is not easy for most other American companies. They need to search right persons
or local Chinese companies that can connect them efficiently with the state
government or local governments. In order to do so, some American companies
have risked bribing the Chinese intermediaries and thus violating U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. For example, in order to access lucrative business in China,
some American companies had to hire children of senior Chinese leaders. Morgan
Stanley and Citigroup are recently exposed by the U.S. media and are being
investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice. Based on these findings, the next
section will discuss implications for both Chinese MNCs and American MNCs.
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Implications for American MNCs in China

A. Localization
The localization strategy does not only include localizing products, but also
includes localizing top managers. According to Judge and Li, when foreign
subsidiaries operate in relation-based environments, managing directors who are
parent-country nationals with host country origins will generally be most effective,
all else being equal.10
In fact, some American companies are good at localizing their managers in the
Chinese market while others are not. General Motors set up a good example for
other American companies in terms of selecting local managers. Early this year,
General Motors announced that Chongwei Xie, a native Chinese, will be in charge of
GM’s public policy and Government Relations in China-related affairs.11 GM's official
website says that Mr. Xie leads an experienced team that is building and maintaining
a strong relationship with key government agencies and interpreting China's
political environment to support management decisions.12 Mr. Xie, with degrees
from both Chinese and American universities, can serve as a good bridge between
GM and the Chinese market. Also, KFC did a good job in localizing mangers in China.
Lucy Wu, deputy head of the Chinese China Store and Franchise Association, said:
"Yum [parent company of KFC] has the right boss in China. Su is Chinese and knows
10 William Q. Judge and Shaomin Li, "Organization Design for Foreign Subsidiaries of Multinational
Enterprises: A Contingency Perspective," International Journal o f Business and Managem ent, Vol.7, No. 3,
February 2012.
11 "Albert Xie served as vice president of GM China Public Policy and Government Relations", Wantinews,
Feb 10, 2014.
12 GM official website, Media, February 10, 2014.
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the Chinese market much better than foreigners. His localization strategy is the
secret of success."13
In contrast, eBay was doing a poor job in localizing top managers in China. In
2004, eBay just entered China with ambitions to conquer the Chinese market within
three months. EBay was then too optimistic because it was one of the world’s most
well-known E-commerce firms compared to its Chinese competitor. EBay had
succeeded in many other places of the world before it entered China. However, after
three years, eBay was pushed out of China by Taobao, a local Chinese company
which was little known to most Westerners. In Helen H. Wang's recent book, The
Chinese Dream, she pointed out that eBay committed several mistakes. The biggest
mistake is that eBay sent a German manager to lead the China operation and
brought in a chief technology officer from the U.S. Neither one spoke Chinese or
understood the local market. EBay basically replicated its global platform to China
and advertised on the internet in a country where small businesses did not use the
internet much.14
Similar to eBay, other American internet companies like Google, Amazon, and
Yahoo all failed in China. Shaun Rein, founder and managing director of the China
Market Research Group, said: "the reality is that many American companies will end
up failing there, or missing expectations, because they do not localize their business
models and management teams enough to compete with fast emerging domestic
players."15

13 Samuel Shen, "Kentucky Fried Chicken banks on China", The New York Times, May 5, 2008.
14 Helen H. Wang, "How eBay Failed in China", Forbes, September 12, 2012.
15 Shaun Rein, "Why Global Brands Fail in China", CNBC, November 14, 2012.
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B. Reducing Corporate Hierarchy between U.S. Headquarters and Chinese Subsidiaries
Beyond localizing top managers, reducing the corporate hierarchy is another
important implication for American companies in China. Judge and Li proposed that
when foreign subsidiaries operate in relation-based governance environments,
organizational structures that imitate successful local competitors will generally be
most effective, all else being equal.16 Today, MNCs are becoming bigger and look
like a kingdom in terms of organizational structure. The term "hierarchy" is often
used in either a social system (e.g. caste in India) or a political system (e.g. dynasty
and feudalism in China). Investopedia defines corporate hierarchy as:
Corporate hierarchy is the arrangement of individuals within a corporation
according to power, status and job function. In a public company, usually
the board of directors will be at the top, followed by the CEO, who may also
be the chairman of the board of directors as well as the president. Below the
CEO will be other C-level executives, such as the CFO, CIO and COO, followed
by upper management (vice-presidents/managers/directors), then the
employees in each department who are further broken down into levels of
experience and authority.
Each company's hierarchy will vary from this general structure. Corporate
hierarchy affects the employees' ability to advance within the company and
also impacts corporate culture. Corporations can have hierarchies that are
considered more vertical, where the power comes from the top down, or a
more horizontal hierarchy, where power and responsibility are more
evenly spread across the firm.17
While eBay and Google's Chinese mangers had less decision-making power,
James McGregor, author of One Billion Customers, said: "Yum [parent company of
KFC] has become the most successful foreign company in China

They got in

early, they adapted the product, they expanded aggressively and they gave their
16 William Q. Judge and Shaomin Li, "Organization Design for Foreign Subsidiaries o f Multinational
Enterprises: A Contingency Perspective," International Journal o f Business and Managem ent, Vol.7, No. 3,
February 2012.
17 Investopedia, Dictionary "Corporate Hierarchy", 2014.
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Chinese managers real decision-making power.”18 So, one suggestion for American
companies is that they cannot simply apply its global standardization strategy to
China, a relation-based society. Instead, they should customize a new organizational
structure that can decentralize decision-making and reduce corporate power
hierarchies.

C. Partnering with Local Firms and Listen to Their Opinions
Local cultures cannot be purchased or transplanted. Therefore, the most
important investment for a foreign subsidiary entering a relation-based country is
to cultivate close relationship with powerful locals.19 For example, Groupon had a
strong Chinese local partner, Tencent. Tencent QQ is the most popular social
network software in China. However, even with Tencent as a partner, Groupon still
ignored suggestions from Tencent and relied on hiring foreigners to lead its
business. Duncan Clark, chairman of Beijing-based technology consultancy BDA,
said: "Why the heck didn't Tencent do more?" he said. "The whole structure was
quite bizarre."20 Groupon was even lambasted by a Baidu executive at the Global
Mobile Internet Conference for bringing in a gaggle of foreign directors who do not
even speak good Chinese.21 Groupon committed the same mistake that eBay did
before. Their failures sent a warning to other American companies that partnering

18 William Mellor: "McDonald's No Match for KFC in China as Colonel Rules Fast Food", Bloomberg,
January 26,2011.
19 William Q. Judge and Shaomin Li, "Organization Design for Foreign Subsidiaries of Multinational
Enterprises: A Contingency Perspective," International Journal o f Business and M anagem ent, Vol.7, No. 3,
February 2012.
20 Michale Kan, "Groupon's Struggle in China No Surprise, Say Analysts", PCWORLD, August 25, 2011
21 i u i j
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with local firms is not enough, American companies should also listen to their local
partners and respect their decisions.
Partnering with a local Chinese firm can help American companies understand
business culture and reduce risks. However, in the meantime the Chinese partner
company might easily take American companies' intellectual property or learn
advanced technology. This is a double-edged sword. When GM and Ford entered
China, they knew this dilemma. But, they were ready to share some technologies
with their Chinese partners while they were continuing developing new
technologies in the U.S. To enter the Chinese market, sometimes American
companies have to make some sacrifices.

D. Depoliticizing Your Products and Services
Why is talking Chinese politics a bad idea for American companies in China?
The Chinese government is very concerned about its legitimacy (the popular
acceptance of an authority) and social stability. The ruling class might see some new
ideas and thoughts brought by American companies as threats. For example, some
recent online Chinese news reported that a professor of Peking University replied to
Chinese President Xi, saying that "If Peking University becomes a second Harvard
University; it will be very dangerous to China." Indeed, many Chinese leaders stress
the point that China should keep its own political system (socialism with Chinese
characteristics led by the Communist party) rather than the democracy model
represented by the U.S. The Chinese government encourages Chinese companies to
learn technologies and management skills from American companies, but does not
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encourage them to go deep into the discussion of politics. Therefore, in order to
build good company-government relations and company-company relations
(American companies with China's state-owned enterprise), American companies
should be cautious of exporting American democracy to China. Google's and
Facebook's failures in China show that the depoliticization of your products and
services is a precondition for success in China.

Implications for Chinese MNCs in America

A. Adapting to the Rule-Based Society
Some Chinese internet users criticize corrupted Chinese officials sarcastically,
saying that "Even our village chief is more powerful than U.S. President Barack
Obama." Power is like a lion while regulations are like a cage. The U.S. is a rulebased society, where power is within the cage of regulations. Obama's power and
decisions are balanced by Congress and other entities like the U.S. media and public.
By contrast, in China where hidden personal connections are more important than
regulations, state-owned Chinese enterprises intersect considerably with
government officials' personal interests. Chinese companies grew up in a relationbased society. Therefore, adapting to a rule-base society is a great challenge for
them. Currently, many Chinese companies are willing to invest in the U.S. market,
but they are not familiar with U.S. investment laws. Gary Locke said: "the United
States is a mature, stable economy with a commitment to the rule of
law

Whenever I talk to Chinese companies about opportunities in the U.S., 1
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always advise them to engage American lawyers, accountants and public relations
professionals."22

B. Understanding the US. Market
Chinese companies need to improve their management skills and
understanding of the U.S. market. To understand the U.S. market, Chinese
companies first need to cope with obstacles. In short, the barriers to market entry
can be divided into three categories: political, social and environmental. The
political barriers include distrustful bilateral relationships, anti-China interest
groups, and U.S. government agencies like CFIUS. The social barriers include
American public's negative attitudes toward China and the difference between rulebase society and relation-based society. The environmental barriers are not limited
to the strict environment laws and high standard of environment protection in the
U.S. In the broader sense, it may also include the set of structural factors that
influence all business, such as the pending mid-term election (which may stoke
nationalist sentiments and xenophobia; the American business environment and the
state of the economy (unemployment, inflation, and insufficient demand).23
In previous chapters, I suggest that American internet companies should
invest in China through partnering with Hong Kong or Taiwanese companies and
thus reduce risks. Likewise, Chinese state-owned enterprises may also invest in the
U.S. through Hong Kong companies. First, compared to Chinese companies, Hong
22 Bill Black, "A Conversation with Former U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke", Fleishmanhillard, March 10,
2014.
23 M y understanding of environmental barriers is improved by Dr. Earnest (Shift from merely
environmental regulations to a set of structural factors that influence all businesses).
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Kong companies are better at understanding the Western markets and cultures.
Second, Europe and the U.S. generally trust companies from Hong Kong more than
Chinese companies. For instance, in 2010, China National Gold Group Corporation, a
centrally state-owned Chinese gold producer, purchased three mining assets in
Southern California through Hong Kong-listed Jackin International Holdings
Limited. "It is very difficult for Chinese state-owned enterprises to buy US mines this may be due to political reasons - so we decided to go through a Hong Konglisted company," said Yusheng Zhou, who was then-executive director of Jackin.24

C. Improving Images through Investing in US. Social Media
Several surveys showed that the U.S. public still holds a negative view of China.
Gary Locke, former U.S. ambassador to China, said: "Many Americans don’t
understand China. And they sometimes don't distinguish between the Chinese
government and individual Chinese companies. For that reason, occasional friction
between the U.S. and Chinese governments may cause people to think more
negatively about Chinese companies whose only goal is to succeed commercially."25
Indeed, building a positive image is very essential for Chinese companies entering
the U.S. market. As the Chinese people are getting rich, adverting in U.S. major media
agencies is no longer a dream. In recent years, the Chinese government and Chinese
firms are making efforts to burnish the country's image through advisements in U.S.
social media. For example, Xinhua, China's state-run news agency, leases a "60-foot
24 Toh Han Shih, "State gold miner enters US arena via HK backdoor", South China Morning Post, February

11, 2010.
25 Bill Black, "A Conversation with Former U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke", Fleishmanhillard, March 10,
2014.
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high (18-meter) by 40-foot (12-meter) wide sign on the north end of Times Square,
hoping to reach the estimated half a million people that pass through the area every
day."26
Chen Guangbiao, a Chinese entrepreneur and CEO of Jiangsu Huangpu
Renewable Resources Recycling Company, did a survey of over a thousand ordinary
Americans in cities like New York, Boston, and San Francisco and found out that
only 20 some of them know about the Diaoyu Islands ( a series of disputed Islands
called "Senkaku Islands" by the Japanese). Later, he decided to publish a half-page
advertisement in The New York Times, "solemnly declares to the U.S. Government
and the American people", that the Diaoyu Islands have been the territory of China
since antiquity.27 Earlier this year, Mr. Chen even attempted to acquire The New
York Times. His mission in buying the paper was "presenting an authentic China"
and "promising better China coverage" to the outside world. It was reported that Mr.
Chen flew to New York City and had dinner with a middle-level leader from The New
York Times. However, the Times denied that the newspaper was up for sale.28

D. No Fears fo r CFIUS: Do Your Lessons
Chinese companies should do the lessons before purchases. First, select areas
for investment carefully — Chinese companies should avoid sensitive areas
including telecommunication, energy, aerospace, and information security.

26 Kristina Cooke, "China News Agency Leases Times Square ad Space", Reuters, July 26, 2011.
27 Peter Barefoot, "Diaoyu Islands Belong to China Ad in NY Times, Chinese Reactions", China Smack,
September 6, 2012.
28 Benjamin Carlson, "This eccentric Chinese tycoon is trying to buy The New York Times," Raw Story,
January 3, 2014, accessed on August 28, 2014, http://w w w .raw story.com /rs/2014/01/04/this-eccentricchinese-tycoon-is-trying-to-buy-the-new-york-times/
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Second, Chinese investments may attract additional scrutiny. However,
Chinese investors should be more self-confident and straightforward when dealing
with CFIUS. Chinese companies should not attempt to circumvent CFIUS review at
the beginning, because CFIUS is increasingly initiating post-closing reviews and has
the power to force the investor to divest assets.29 Instead, Chinese firms should
voluntarily submit their information to CFIUS before the closing of deals. For
example, the parties in the Smithfield deal may have learned their lesson from
previous experiences as the parties filed a voluntary notice with CFIUS prior to
closing the transaction.30 Indeed, the more you fear, the more likely you are to fail.
Third, Chinese companies are in the learning process of hiring U.S.
professionals to aid its purchase. In 2005, China's Lenovo, the world's largest
personal-computer producer, successfully acquired IBM's PC-making business arm
with help from Jeffrey Carlisle, then-chief of Lenovo's government relations. Today,
Lenovo is attempting to buy Google-owned Motorola Mobility. Early this year,
Lenovo chose to hire attorneys at Steptoe & Johnson LLP who held positions at the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Homeland Security Department to guide its
Motorola review through CFIUS.31 Lenovo set good examples for other Chinese
companies. I expect that in the future more and more Chinese MNCs will research
U.S. regulations regarding foreign investments and hire American interest groups,
trade experts and attorneys to assist their purchases.

29 Louise Gong and Amanda Forsythe, "CFIUS and Chinese Investments: Lessons from the Smithfield Deal",
Corporate Practice Newswire, November, 2013.
30 Ibid.
31 David McLaughlin, "Lenovo Said to Turn to U.S. Security Experts to Aid Deals", Bloomberg, February 3,
2014.
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Finally, for Chinese companies doing business in the U.S., they look forward to
seeing improved public images of China as well as a more transparent CFIUS review
process. For American companies in China, they look forward to seeing accelerated
investment liberalization and improved Guanxi with the Chinese government. With
these changes, Chinese MNCs and American MNCs are expected to enjoy more
successes in each other's markets, and in return their successes will reduce friction
in the bilateral relationships.

Future Studies

The study suggests that it is very important for private Chinese firms to
voluntarily clarify the purposes of purchases and their relationships with the home
government. Although some Chinese companies like Huawei did so, they still failed
to shrug off suspicions.
Future studies are needed in order to answer this question: how to make
Chinese MNCs' words credible when it comes to CFIUS reviews? Future scholars of
Chinese and American MNCs studies might look at several possible solutions:
1. Increasing mutual trust between China and the U.S. and reducing their
geopolitical rivalries through strengthening bilateral relationships,
2. Improving corporate images through investing in American social media and
mainstream news media,
3. Engaging American lawyers and getting more familiar with CFIUS regulations,
4. Building joint ventures with U.S. firms instead of acquiring U.S. firms wholly.

Second, numerous cases in this study show that statist and market factors
sometimes interact with each other in confounding ways. To take this step further,
future researchers can think over the quantification of statist and market factors.
Third, Chinese MNCs are relatively new to the U.S. market. They are eager to
learn about the CFIUS review process. In the meantime, American MNCs in China are
hoping that the Chinese government could further open more sectors for foreign
investments. Therefore, future studies can be devoted to transparent CFIUS review
process in the U.S. and investment liberalization in China.
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